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Federal land subsidies to railroad corporations comprised an important part of
the federal government’s policies towards its western land domain in the middle decades
of the nineteenth century. In all, Congress granted over a hundred million acres to
railroad corporations to subsidize construction of a transcontinental railway network.
Long after the last such grant in 1871, these land grants continued to incite political
contests in Congress and state legislatures and legal disputes in communities across the
West. By the end of the century, railroad corporations had become manifestations not
just of the threatening growth of corporate power in the United States, but also of the
official governmental approach to public lands, the failed and corrupt implementation
of that approach, and the apparent threat of resource depletion that resulted. Through its
examination of the Northern Pacific’s land records, administrative and judicial opinions
relating to public lands, and the transcripts of key cases involving land grants, this
dissertation makes significant contributions to the historiographies of railroads, of
federal land policies, and of the Progressive conservation movement. It treats the

relationship between the government and railroad corporations not as one between
regulator and regulated, but rather as one between co-managers of the nation’s resources
and economy, and as one in which the legal boundaries of authority were uncertain.
Most importantly, though, this dissertation provides insights into the failures of
lawmakers and policymakers to standardize and categorize the social and physical
worlds they governed. Legal conflicts, including those involving railroad corporations,
ultimately exposed contradictions at the heart of the American legal order. These
included contradictions between the promotion of individualism and the protection of
community order; between notions that land should be owned by as many people as
possible for the sake of building a virtuous, fair society and a belief that land should be
commodified and exploited for sake of economic growth; and between characterizations
of property as bastions of protection from the State and the use of property as a tool of
the State in acquiring and maintaining power. Each of these contradictions can be
negotiated but never resolved.
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Ask the man who wonders that there are so many laws, to go with you to
the neighboring prairie, and, standing in the door of the farmhouse, with
corn-fields and pastures before you, explain to him the title by which the
owner holds the land, how far his use is absolute, and how qualified by
the rights of his neighbors, or the paramount rights of the State, the
relative rights of the wife and husband, the persons who shall succeed
when the owner dies, the rights of the adjoining proprietors in the stream
which runs through the pasture, the rights of the tenant who tills the
meadow, what right the owner has in the shore of the lake, how far he
may build into it and on what conditions, the relative rights of himself
and the public in the highway before his house, the right which he has to
the pew in the church, whose spire shines through the trees, and in the
family vault where he expects in due time to be borne.
--David Dudley Field, Chicago, IL, 1859.

INTRODUCTION

In 1888, English scholar James Bryce criticized western railroad land grants as
“often improvident” and as giving “rise to endless lobbying and intrigue, first to secure
them, then to keep them from being declared forfeited in respect of some breach of the
conditions imposed by Congress on the company.”1 Bryce also observed the extent to
which the grants of land to the railroads allowed the beneficiary companies to exercise
great power not only through their role as carriers of people and commerce, but also
through their role as large landowners, a role which brought them “yet another source
of wealth and power” and which “brought them into intimate and often perilously
delicate relations with leading politicians.”2 Indeed, from the perspective of the socalled “railroad tycoons” and their financial backers, the land grants became sources of
wealth and power independent of and sometimes contrary to the interests of the railroad
corporations themselves as carriers.3 While Congress intended the railroad land grants
to serve as a means to the end of railroad construction and the settlement of the federal
government’s expansive public domain, the railroads came to see them as an end in
themselves—as independent sources of wealth and power.

1

James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 1st Ed., Vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan
and Co., 1888), 507.
2

3

Bryce, American Commonwealth, 507.

See Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern
America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011).
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Bryce wrote at a time when railroad companies, and the subsidies they had
received, had become unpopular. Over the previous decades, however, federal land
grants to railroads had been a critical component of the government’s effort to settle its
newly expanded public domain—an endeavor which Euro-Americans largely
celebrated. Stephen Douglas orchestrated the first such grant to the Illinois Central in
1850, made possible by his compromise to grant lands in a checkerboard pattern as a
way to pay for the subsidy. The granting of public lands to railroads accelerated during
the Civil War with Congress’ passage of the Pacific Railway Act of 1862, which
chartered the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific and subsidized their construction of
a railway from Nebraska to San Francisco, California through the granting of land.4 This
policy continued in subsequent years with similar grants on both sides of the Union
Pacific-Central Pacific line. In all, agents of the federal government granted roughly
130 million acres to railroads from 1850 to 1871.5
In the middle of the century, railroads represented American modernity. As
technological marvels, they symbolized the ability of American society to control and
harness nature to better American life, while their carrying of passengers and products
represented the freeing of humans from the tyranny of distance and time.6 By the end of
the nineteenth century, though, they had come to represent something much more

4

Pacific Railway Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 489.

5

Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future of
the West (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1992), 18, 122; Paul W. Gates, “The Railroad LandGrant Legend,” Journal of Economic History 14 (Spring 1954): 143-46; Samuel T. Dana, Forest
and Range Policy: Its Development in the United States (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956), 37-38.
6

See, for example, William G. Thomas III, The Iron Way: Railroads, the Civil War,
and the Making of Modern America (Yale University Press, 2011).
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negative. They had become manifestations not just of the threatening growth of
corporate power in the United States, but also of the official governmental approach to
public lands, the failed and corrupt implementation of that approach, and the apparent
threat of resource depletion that resulted.7 Many saw the railroads as the primary
beneficiaries of the predominant public lands policy of converting the public domain
into privately held property as rapidly and cheaply as feasible in order to stimulate
economic development.8 The massive giveaway of land to corporations from 1850 to
the end of the century was part of the reason that American historian Vernon L.
Parrington famously described the era as “the Great Barbecue.”9 Railroad officials and
other plutocrats got fat, it seemed, while farmers and laborers went hungry.
These land grants led not only to “endless lobbying” in Congress to secure them
and to keep them from being forfeited, as Bryce noted, but also to endless disputes in
towns and rural areas across the West. The railroads’ ownership (or claimed ownership)
of so much land contributed mightily to their fall in public imagination from that of
promoter to that of parasite, and from that of savior to that of scapegoat. 10 At the same
time, some policymakers and forestry experts began advocating for a new governmental

7

See Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian.

Wilkinson characterized the “main thrust” of such policies as being the desire “to
transfer public resources into private hands on a wholesale basis in order to conquer nature.”
Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian, 18.
8

9

Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, vol. 3 (Harcourt,
Brace, 1954), 23.
Paul Wallace Gates once argued that the railroads’ administration of land grants had
more to do with producing the settler-railroad conflicts of the late nineteenth century than the
railroad’s shady financial dealings, alleged rate-fixing, or accumulation of political power did.
See Paul Wallace Gates, Fifty Million Acres: Conflicts Over Kansas Land Policy, 1854-1890
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997).
10

4
approach to forest resources and, to some degree, to land management more generally.
In short, they sought for the federal government to retain land rather than to dispose of
it, and to manage forests for sustainable use rather than to encourage their destruction.
This dissertation is a case study meant to answer a deceptively simple question.
In a period of shifting attitudes towards timber resources beginning in the last decades
of the nineteenth century, how did the land use approaches and legal strategies of the
land grant railroads, themselves perhaps constrained by the legal environments they
encountered, shape the development of natural resources and land law and the
development and implementation of federal land-use policies? In answering that
question, the scope of this study is limited to the Pacific Northwest, including lands now
comprising the states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, and the western part of
Montana. This is because that region was a central focus of both timber companies and
conservationists, and because it was a region in which substantial grant lands and public
lands remained during the time in which federal public land policy shifted from land
alienation to land retention and management.11
The first two chapters cover the railroad companies’ acquisition of lands and
their efforts to secure them from depredations. Chapter 1 examines the process by which
railroad companies actually acquired their extensive land grants. Over several decades,
legal disputes between railroads and settlers, miners, speculators, politicians, and

11

Federal railroad land grants in the Pacific Northwest consisted of two large land
grants, one the western portion of a grant to the Northern Pacific for a railway from Lake
Superior to the Puget Sound and the other for a railway from Portland to the California-Oregon
border. Under these grants (as amended through subsequent legislative acts) the Northern
Pacific received almost forty-million acres stretching from Wisconsin to Washington, and the
Oregon & California received over three-million acres in Oregon along the Willamette Valley.
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government officials tested a nascent bureaucracy and an over-burdened judiciary. The
laws governing such disputes remained unpredictable, despite the efforts of lawmakers
to endow American law with stability and certainty. Chapter 2 explores the customs of
free land, free minerals, and free timber that pervaded Euro-American communities
across the West over the nineteenth century. Railroad officials benefitted from these
perspectives, and their companies initially accelerated the rate of resource exploitation
that such perspectives promoted. However, railroad land grant recipients, particularly
in the Pacific Northwest, also played an important role in confronting such customs,
ultimately paving the way for a paradigm shift in federal public lands policy.
Chapter 3 examines the practices and customs of the lawyers representing
railroads and some against whom they litigated. While many developments in the legal
profession in the Pacific Northwest mirrored those occurring in the East, the scale and
speed of developments differed. Lawyers in this region were intimately aware with the
physicality of law itself—that it existed as it was written and distributed—and in the
limitedness of humanity’s conquest of space and time. This contributed to broader
changes in legal literature and in the federal judiciary.
Chapters 4 and 5 explore railroad policies towards land and its resources and the
extent to which legal considerations either undermined or supported those approaches.
Chapter 4 begins by exploring the efforts of the Northern Pacific and Oregon &
California railroad companies to dispose of their lands, especially their agricultural
lands (and those they could sell as “agricultural” to those who had never been to the
region). It then shows how railroad officials began to recognize, around the turn of the
century, the value of their companies’ land holdings not just for securing debt or raising
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revenues through sales and ultimately through the production of goods to be transported,
but also for sustaining the railroad empires themselves. Railways required a lot of
physical material, including timber, and the companies’ holdings in the Pacific
Northwest were rich in such materials. The political and legal consequences of the
Oregon & California’s apparent decision to retain its timberland holdings in Oregon is
the subject of Chapter 5. After almost a decade of political wrangling and litigation,
during which the legal status of over two million acres of prime timberland remained in
limbo, the federal government took back the lands. It did so in a way that largely
repeated the improvidence of the land grants in the first place.
This dissertation is many things. On one level, this dissertation is about
relationships between railroad officials and government officials, representatives, and
bureaucrats. Traditional historical accounts of these relationships have largely focused
on the government’s regulatory efforts in the areas of commerce, political influence,
and consumer and labor protections. John F. Stover’s studies of railroads during the
Progressive era, for instance, include discussions of the government’s regulatory
attempts to address problems relating to monopoly and corporate organization, political
corruption, passenger safety, and labor condition, but they lack any discussion of the
influence of railroads on the management of land and natural resources. 12 Similarly,
Maury Klein, writing in 1994, examined what he called the “second pioneering era of
American railroads” from the Civil War to the first decades of the twentieth century,
during which time railroads, according to Klein, helped bring about federal regulation

12

See John F. Stover, The Life and Decline of the American Railroad (Oxford
University Press, 1970); John F. Stover, American Railroads, 2nd ed. (University Of Chicago
Press, 1997).
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of big business in the areas of capital mobilization, corporate organization, accounting,
and labor relations by demonstrating the failures of self-rule through a purported
“community of interests.”13 Despite Klein’s assessment of Edward H. Harriman (who
headed the Union Pacific, Southern Pacific, and other major railroads around the turn
of the century) as “the Moses who dragged the rail industry into the modern era,” and
despite Harriman’s and other railroads’ extensive holdings of land and natural resources
at that time, Klein neglected the railroads’ role in bringing about “modern” approaches
to land and natural resources.14
The recent trend in railroad historiography has favored exploring the
multifaceted impacts of railroads on broader social, cultural, economic, political, and
legal processes. Three legal histories from the last decade demonstrate this trend. First,
in his account of southern railroad lawyers during the late nineteenth century, for
instance, William G. Thomas III linked the choices these lawyers made not only to the
development of increasingly complex corporate forms and mechanisms, but also to the

13

Maury Klein, Unfinished Business: The Railroad in American Life (Hanover, NH:
University Press of New England, 1994), 141. For specific works on the Union Pacific, see
Klein, Union Pacific: The Birth of a Railroad, 1862-1893 (New York: Doubleday, 1987); Union
Pacific: The Rebirth 1894-1969 (New York: Doubleday, 1989). These works are primarily
corporate, administrative, and economic histories with an emphasis on key figures including
Edward H. Harriman, whose leadership of the Southern Pacific from 1901 until his death in
1909 is relevant to my study). Klein has also published a biography of Harriman, The Life and
Legend of E. H. Harriman (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), using some
private manuscript sources made available for the first time to Klein.
14

Klein, Unfinished Business, 112. For a work emphasizing the collaborative aspects
of the relationship between the state and the railroads, see Robert Angevine, The Railroad and
the State: War, Politics, and Technology in Nineteenth-Century America (Palo Alto, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2004) (arguing that in the decades following the Civil War, military
leaders, understanding the important role railroads could play in conquering and settling the
West, allied with the railroads and formed a mutually-beneficial relationship whereby the
“government provided the land, the army provided the protection, and private businesses built
and operated the railroads”), quote at 226.
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integration of the South into the national economy; to the usurpation of the planter class
as the dominant power brokers and the development of a local political economy unique
to that region; to the bifurcation and increased professionalization of the legal
profession; to the weakening of common law defenses such as fellow-servant,
contributory negligence, and assumption of risk; and to the shift in regulatory power
from states to the federal government.15 Second, Barbara Welke, in Recasting American
Liberty: Gender, Race, Law, and the Railroad Revolution, 1865-1920, analyzed how
people’s daily experiences with the railroad impacted their conceptions of liberty and,
ultimately, shifted the balance in American society and law between individual
freedoms and corporate or state power. In so doing, she linked the development of
railroads and public streetcars to the formulation of new legal causes of action to redress
mental or emotional harms, to the institution of formal racial segregation, and to the
general acceptance of the proposition that liberty in such a modern world required state
protection (all of which she claimed were also rooted in gendered assumptions).16
Finally, James W. Ely, in Railroads and American Law, showed how railroads affected
“the evolution of American law” more generally, including their impact on the role of
government as both sovereign and contractor, on issues of corporate liability for
personal injury, on law’s mediation of broader social conflict, on the separation of

15

See generally William G. Thomas III, Lawyering for the Railroad: Business, Law,
and Power in the New South (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1999).
16

See generally Barbara Young Welke, Recasting American Liberty: Gender, Race,
Law, and the Railroad Revolution, 1865-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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powers (both among the branches of government and within the federalist structure),
and on bankruptcy law.17
Though not strictly legal histories, two recent works on railroads during the
middle to late nineteenth century have greatly influenced this project. One is Richard
White’s Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America,
published in 2011. In that work, as immense in its depth of research as in its size, White
agreed with traditional economic history orthodoxy that railroad entrepreneurs served
an important role in “making … modern America,” as his title suggests, but the
“contributions” in his account are nothing to be celebrated. Railroad entrepreneurs
played their part not through innovating technologies and systems intended to improve
society, but rather through developing financial mechanisms to enrich only themselves
while bankrupting the corporations whose interests they purportedly represented, as
well as undermining the social policies that motivated the federal government’s
subsidies to them.18 The other is Thomas’ The Iron Way: Railroads, the Civil War, and
the Making of Modern America, also published in 2011. In this work, Thomas explored

17

See generally James W. Ely, Railroads and American Law (University Press of
Kansas, 2001), quotation at vii. Other recent works exploring railroads’ impact on broader
society include William Deverell’s Railroad Crossing: Californians and the Railroad, 18501910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994) (a cultural and political history which
explored why and how various socio-economic groups in California opposed the Southern
Pacific and the impact of their opposition efforts on California politics); and Steven W.
Usselman’s Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology, and Politics in America,
1840-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) (arguing that in the period from
1876 to 1904, the railroad experience of embracing those technical innovations consistent with
an efficient and orderly railroad operation while rejecting those which threatened to disrupt
those rules inspired the Progressive image of an efficient, well-run society attainable through
rational and scientific management and provided a model for bureaucracies necessary to
implement that vision on a grand scale).
18

See generally White, Railroaded.

10
the role of railroads in the Civil War, particularly in supporting two different “modern”
worlds, one in the North, the other in the South.19 Whereas the “modern America” in
White’s account was one of greed, corruption, and ineptitude, the modernity of Thomas’
America is plural, malleable, and amoral. Railroads “made” something, to be sure, but
what that thing was, and the meanings attached to it, depended on a host of other factors
beyond the control of railroads.
On another level, this dissertation is about the relationships between railroads
and the physical environment. Regarding the role of railroads as suppliers of natural
resources through their management or disposal of their extensive land grants,
traditional railroad histories have tended to focus on the wisdom of congressional
policies, the railroads’ subversions of those policies, and the social and political
ramifications of the land grant policy. For instance, in a 1946 article, David Maldwyn
Ellis examined the political movement for the forfeiture of railroad land grants during
the late nineteenth century, a movement that he argued arose from the rising fears of
land monopolies combined with a distrust of railroads and their practices. Ellis did not
blame the railroads, however. Rather, he considered the railroads to have been rational
economic actors and the railroads’ subversions of federal policy and the forfeiture
movement that followed to have been the “inevitable outcome of our lavish and poorlyadministered land grant policy.”20 More recently, Lloyd Mercer’s Railroads and Land
Grant Policies examined the “economic rationality” of land grants to seven

19

See generally Thomas, Iron Way.

David Maldwyn Ellis, “The Forfeiture of Railroad Land Grants, 1867-1894,”
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 33, no. 1 (June 1946): 60.
20
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transcontinental railroad systems (including the Canadian government’s grant to the
Canadian Pacific along with six grants in the United States). Based on the social rates
of return, Mercer argued that government subsidies to railroads were economically
rational in all but one case (the grant to the Texas Pacific & Santa Fe), but he added the
important caveat that while economically rational at the time, the land grants can be
deemed after the fact to have been unnecessary in the cases of the Union Pacific, the
Central Pacific, and the Great Northern. Still, he ultimately concluded, in contrast to
Ellis’ assessment, that “[o]n balance, the land grant policy was good for society,” at
least “in terms of economic efficiency.”21
Until very recently, scholars have largely neglected the impacts of railroads on
natural resources law or policy. A notable exception is Sherry H. Olson’s The Depletion
Myth: A History of Railroad Use of Timber, published in 1971. Her central argument in
that work was that the most important responses to the threat of depletions were made
by the “major industrial consumers of wood, not by forest owners, managers or lumber
producers” in the form of “investments in research … in the use of wood and its
substitutes.”22 Accordingly, her work focused on the railroads as consumers of timber
products rather than as suppliers, producers, or managers of natural resources, and she

21

Lloyd J. Mercer, Railroads and Land Grant Policy: Study in Government Intervention
(Academic Press, 1982), 149.
22

Sherry H. Olson, The Depletion Myth: A History of Railroad Use of Timber
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 3. See also, Frederick J. Yonce, “Lumbering
and the Public Timberlands in Washington: The Era of Disposal,” Journal of Forest History 22,
no. 1 (1978): 4-17 (contending that the NP land grant “had a major impact on timber protection,
land availability, and concentration that is seldom recognized,” and that “the picture that
emerges in Washington is much more complex and much less ethically clear-cut than that of
wholesale theft, fraud, and monopoly”), quotation at 5-6.
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grounded her analysis in the economic realities of supply and demand. More recently,
Alfred Runte published a cultural and environmental history that examined the profound
role of the railroads in creating and maintaining national parks throughout the West.23
Runte argued that railroads, by providing the American public access to “nature” and
by making it a shared experience, not only fostered the public’s growing appreciation
for nature but also strengthened the bonds of fraternity and nationalism. Richard Orsi’s
Sunset Pacific is the most extensive treatment of a western railroad’s practices towards
land and natural resources. His central argument was that the Southern Pacific, because
it saw its corporate interests as consistent with the public welfare, “promoted more
organized, efficient settlement, economic development, and more enlightened resource
policies in its service area.” In so doing, that railroad, according to Orsi, “took a major
role in the emergence of modern management of water, wilderness parks, forests, and
rangelands.”24
On yet another level, this dissertation is about the origins of federal forest
management—one part of the wider Progressive-era conservation movement. In recent
decades, historians have thoroughly reassessed the Progressive conservation movement,
including its central premises, and have undermined the traditional narrative (based on
the statements of Progressives themselves) of that movement as one rooted in an
altruistic and open-minded concern for nature. This revisionist trend began with Samuel
P. Hays’ 1960 work, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, in which he argued that

23

Alfred Runte, Allies of the Earth: Railroads And the Soul of Preservation (Truman
State University Press, 2006).
24

Richard J. Orsi, Sunset Limited: The Southern Pacific Railroad and the Development
of the American West, 1850-1930 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), xiv-xv.
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the Progressive conservation movement was not in fact a crusade of the people against
the trusts or “interests” as many Progressives had insisted, but was primarily a scientific
movement whose central tenet was that scientists and technicians—not politicians—
should dictate the course of resource development.25 Environmental historians have
built upon Hays’ work, as well as developments in ecology, to historicize the science of
conservation and to reject the view of culture and environment as separate entities.
Rather, the trend has been towards viewing culture and environment as interconnected
components of an ecological system that is far more chaotic, unstable, and random than
previously thought.26

25

Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive
Conservation Movement, 1890-1920, paperback ed. (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999)
(originally published in 1960).
26

For an accessible summation of transformations within the field of ecology and their
impacts on environmental history, see Donald Worster, “The Ecology of Order and Chaos,” in
The Wealth of Nature: Environmental History and the Ecological Imagination (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993): 156-70. Representative of this trend in histories of conservation
are Arthur F. McEvoy’s The Fisherman's Problem: Ecology and Law in the California
Fisheries, 1850-1980 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) (arguing that
conservation and effective management by a unified directing power can solve the “fisherman’s
problem,” essentially the tragedy of the commons applied to fisheries, only if and to the extent
that decision-makers understand the interconnectedness of human interactions and the
ecological landscape, and that the “fisherman’s problem” has persisted as long as it has because
policy-makers, including Progressive conservationists, failed to grasp that truth); Joseph E.
Taylor III’s Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the Northwest Fisheries Crisis
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999) (arguing that conservationist attempts to
prevent a salmon crisis between the 1880s and 1920s damaged fisheries as much as overfishing
or habitat destruction, based in large part on the fact that fisheries biologists acted upon faulty
logic and failed to heed the extent of genetic differentiation among salmon and the role of
climate in influencing and de-stabilizing salmon runs); and Karl Jacoby’s Crimes Against
Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American Conservation
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) (arguing that Progressive conservation’s core
values were to standardize resource-use and to enforce those standards on previously
autonomous local communities, and that it, thus, constituted an exercise of social authority by
conservationists and the State over local communities which had enjoyed and depended upon
certain customary, pseudo-legal privileges over the land which conservationists deemed
“illegal”).
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This dissertation makes significant contributions to the historiographies of
railroads, of federal land policies, and of the Progressive conservation movement. It
offers a new perspective to the narrative regarding the relationship between railroads
and the government, one that has tended to focus on their relationship as one between a
sovereign regulator (the government) and a regulated subject, alternatively emphasizing
either the government’s effectiveness in constraining the railroads or the railroads’
successes in exerting political influence to use the government (and the law) as an
instrument for its economic gains. This dissertation, in contrast, explores their
relationship as one between co-managers of the nation’s land and natural resources and
economy, and one in which the legal boundaries of authority were uncertain. It follows
in the line of other works that have emphasized the impact of railroads on aspects of the
American experience not normally associated with railroads—in this case, natural
resources law and policy. It will also add to the insights of Orsi’s work regarding that
subject by adding a legal component. With regard to the field of conservation history,
this dissertation focuses on the conservation movement as one challenging established
legal paradigms, thus serving as an apt illustration of not only Hays’ influential thesis,
but also the extent to which conservation was contested terrain throughout the entire
Progressive era and the extent to which its “successes” depended on the legal wrangling
of “interests” long thought to have opposed it.
This dissertation, though, is predominantly a legal history. Its core questions
relate to those historical phenomena categorized as “legal” by those who encountered
or related to them. As such, legal historians have primarily shaped the theoretical
perspective of this dissertation. Forty years ago, this endeavor would have been
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unsatisfying, as American legal historians into the 1970s, for the most part, remained
blissfully ignorant of social and political theories, or at least they did not see their
relevance to the study of law’s development. Christopher Tomlins, one historian who
has contributed to transforming the field, recently wrote of U.S. legal history as being
“one of the most obdurately atheoretical of intellectual practices.”27 Tomlins’
observation echoes similar critiques from years earlier. For instance, Morton Horwitz,
in 1973, complained of the “celebratory or self-congratulatory” tone of legal
historiography, one Horwitz linked to the fact that legal histories were, at that time,
almost exclusively the province of lawyers, not professional historians. Horwitz
especially lamented their tendency to emphasize “lawyer-like concerns” while
“ignoring the relationship between what lawyers do and their political function.”28
In recent decades, however, American legal history has matured as a field.
Rather than envisioning law as a rational discourse that changes according to
lawmakers’ reasoned interpretations of precedent, the dominant trend in the legalhistorical scholarship has been to emphasize law’s interdependent relationship with the
social, political, and cultural environment in which it is produced and maintained. To
some degree, all legal historians of the last half-century owe an intellectual debt to
James Willard Hurst. Through his works, Hurst introduced legal historians to a
sociological approach to law, one that focuses on law as a social institution rather than
as a body of intellectual doctrines. Such an approach required exploring not just

Christopher Tomlins, “What is Left of the Law and Society Paradigm after Critique?
Revisiting Gordon’s ‘Critical Legal Histories,’” Law & Social Inquiry 37 (2012): 155.
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Morton J Horwitz, “The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal
History,” American Journal of Legal History 17 (1973): 275.
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decisions of the Supreme Court and other high appellate tribunals, but also the decisions
(or even deliberations) of state and county courts, the records of executive agencies, and
correspondences of law offices. Although legal historians have moved away from
Hurst’s historical model of law’s relationship with its environment, Hurst provided
historians with the intellectual space to do so. Hurst was an “instrumentalist” in that his
chief concern was not the logic (or illogic) of legal doctrines but rather how well they
served—or functioned—as an instrument for certain social aims. Moreover, in Hurst’s
accounts, legal change occurred not due to judicial clarifications of past precedent based
on reason and logic, but rather due to changing demands of society upon legal
institutions.29
One can trace the roots of Hurst’s account to the jurisprudential theory of “legal
realism” developed much earlier in the twentieth century. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr., who served on the America’s highest court from 1902 to 1932, was a
pioneering advocate of this legal theory. In elucidating the central theme for one of his
finest works, Hurst made explicit his intellectual debt to Holmes and the legal realists
who followed when he quoted the Holmes’ succinct summation of legal realism: “the
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”30 Holmes’ writings, including
his judicial opinions, undermined the conception of law as deriving from natural law as
realized through an unending process of reasoning, and he believed laws should be
judged scientifically according to how well they satisfy “accurately measured social

In this way, Hurst’s work (and that of most functionalist legal historians of the last
half century) can also be described as Realist in the tradition of Oliver Wendell Holmes.
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Hurst, Law and Economic Growth, 608, quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Common Law (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Co., 1909), I.
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desires”—or how well law serves its various “functions”—rather than according to their
consistency, or lack thereof, with notions of morality or natural law. 31 His externalist
approach to interpreting legal precedents paved the way for all externalist interpretations
of law’s role in history.32
Hurst’s model has also come to represent the “consensus model” of legal history.
In Hurst’s writings, the “lawmakers” were elites, but the demands they made of law
represented the shared desires and morals of the community at large. Specifically,
nineteenth century legal developments reflected the American consensus that law
should “protect and promote the release of individual creative energy to the greatest
extent compatible with the broad sharing of opportunity for such expression.”33 In the

Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Law in Science and Science in Law,” Harvard Law Review
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inconsistent with formal legal concepts. However, whereas legal functionalists replaced logic
with experience and pragmatic, object-oriented reasoning, CLS scholars replaced it with
subjectivity and cultural hegemony.
33

Hurst, Law and Conditions of Freedom, 6. Hurst failed to recognize the extent to
which his “consensus” excluded some peoples from the project of economic development or the
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released. For a largely instrumentalist account of how the law was used to serve the needs of
the Anglo-Americans at the expense of Native Americans by divesting them of lands and rights,
see Vanessa Ann Gunther, Ambiguous Justice: Native Americans And the Law in Southern
California, 1848-1890 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2006). That Native
Americans were excluded from the American project of economic independence was
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century. Although he recognized them as “a significant step in increasing the self-determining
role of the wife in the household and outside,” at another point he characterized these laws as a
“diversion” from economic matters which lawmakers turned to only “grudgingly.” Hurst, Law
and Conditions of Freedom, 24, 29. It appears that it was Hurst who was reluctant to diverge
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1970s, scholars began to question Hurst’s “consensus model” by arguing either that law
represented a balancing of a diversity of social interests, or that elites, far from
representing a community consensus, in fact manipulated law to serve their own
interests and to bolster their positions within society. Most notably, Morton J. Horwitz
argued, in 1977’s The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, that nineteenth
century law primarily served the powerful by enabling “emergent entrepreneurial and
commercial groups to win a disproportionate share of wealth and power” and then to
retain that power once gained.34 What Hurst saw as law’s “release of energies,” Horwitz
saw as law’s protection of propertied interests and its promotion of technological and
territorial expansion, goals whose social costs fell disproportionately on the unpropertied classes, including minorities and the white working class. To Horwitz (or at
least this early version of Horwitz), then, law functions no differently than politics; it is
a source of power that designates winners and losers. 35 Although Horwitz’s approach

from discussing economic matters that contravened his consensus model. He seemingly only
“grudgingly” included women in his narrative.
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Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), xvi. See also William Edward Nelson, Americanization
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differed from Hurst’s, their philosophies shared one core principle: the notion that law
is an instrument of society and is socially—if not economically—determined. In this
way, Horwitz became Karl Marx to Hurst’s Adam Smith.
Regardless of its connections to past scholarship, Horwitz’s Transformation of
American Law came at a transitional point in legal historiography, and it proved
important.36 Its influence was primarily in its critical stance towards American law’s
development. Whereas Hurst had criticized, at times, law’s inflexibility in responding
to changed social circumstances, Horwitz criticized not just law’s failures in serving
certain objectives, but also the objectives themselves. Others followed suit. The same
year of Transformation’s publication, 1977, a group of legal scholars established the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies (CLS) to examine—and to attack—the structures
of law that allowed it to protect, if not produce, unjust social hierarchies. Rather than
envisioning law as a product of social experiences, CLS scholars treated law as
ideology. In a most succinct and straightforward description of CLS, Allan C.

legal history through the filing of lawsuits or the pressuring of legislators. According to this
view, law is often seen as reflecting the competition among various economic and social groups
in society as a whole. See Kermit Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989).for a general text that incorporates this view.
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Hutchinson observed—at the apex of the CLS movement in 1989—that what united
CLS scholars was a belief that “the Rule of Law is a mask that lends to existing social
structures the appearance of legitimacy and inevitability; it transforms the contingency
of social history into a fixed set of structural arrangements and ideological
commitments.”37 Law’s power, then, is not simply dependent upon the social power of
those groups who wield it, but rather in the capacity of legal reasoning, as a discourse,
to obscure the political decisions that “lawmakers” have made. In that way, as James
Boyle summarized, “the language of legal reasoning and legal rights comes to be seen
as a description of the way things are”—and must be!—“rather than a moral and
political choice.”38 The main goals of the CLS movement were thus to undermine the
key source of law’s legitimacy, namely the objective impartiality of legal reasoning (in
purported contrast with political decision-making), and to proffer alternatives to the
“Rule of Law” as it has been constituted.
Over the next generation, the legal history branch of the CLS project—Critical
Legal History (CLH)—came to replace instrumental or functional realism as the
dominant paradigm in legal history. Rather than seeing law as either a product of or
response to a single social context, CLH scholars emphasized the embeddedness of law
in a multitude of social contexts.”39 Whereas Realists replaced legal positivism with
social determinism, CLH scholars replaced determinism with contingency.
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Writing in 1984, Robert W. Gordon also provided a useful overview of the CLH
movement up to that time. Although CLH approaches were never unified except in their
critiques of legal positivism and in their rejection of legal realism as an alternative, generally,
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In addition to legal-historical scholarship, two works of scholars outside the
legal and history academies also profoundly influenced this dissertation. The first is
James C. Scott’s Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed. While Scott’s focus was on explaining the failures of utopian,
high-modernist social revolutions, his approach provides a model for studying the
interactions between all States and the social and physical phenomena upon which they
rely. In short, States exert control by making their subjects and landscapes “legible”
using processes of standardization and abstraction. Ultimately, however, the complex
networks of social and physical processes defy such simplifications and their continued
existence leads to unintended—and unforeseen—consequences. It also seems from
Scott’s case studies that the more grandiose a State’s goals, the more disastrous the
results.40
The other is Bruno Latour’s The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil
d’Etat, in which Latour recounts his extensive observations of the innermost workings
of France’s central administrative law tribunal. Following the CLS rejection of wholly
externalist models for explaining law’s developments, Latour conceived of law as

CLH scholars, according to Gordon, accepted most, if not all, of the following propositions (1)
that social experiences and historical developments are undetermined; (2) that the causal links
between social conditions and legal concepts or forms are also undetermined; (3) that law is
produced through political struggle; (4) that law is a “relatively autonomous” structure that
“transcend[s] and, to some extent, help[s] to shape the content” of social interests; (5) that law
is best understood as a set of “ideologies and rituals” that guides and constrains people’s
understandings of social experiences; (6) that our thinking about law and history is as contingent
and historically produced as the subjects we study; and (7) that an awareness and appreciation
of the meta-narratives deeply embedded in our own minds is necessary to understand the
ideological underpinnings of such narratives. Robert W. Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories,”
Stanford Law Review 36, no. 1 (1984): 100-02.
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“indeed autonomous compared to the social” and as “one of the means for producing
the social defined as association, for arranging and contextualizing it.”41 Latour rejected
not only the causal power of society, but of the a priori existence of society altogether,
as he had in his earlier works on the scientific community. This is where his work is
most relevant to this dissertation. Rather than taking society as a given and as something
that can be used to explain certain phenomena (including legal developments), Latour’s
focus is on the constituent parts (the “actors”) and on how they construct the connections
that ultimately constitute “society.” Law is but one of these threads that links actors or,
in Latour’s words, “weaves the social.”42
Latour also attempted to answer the question of how law “weaves the social.”
This is where his scholarship connects with Scott’s to suggest a promising model for
studying legal history. Latour’s model posits that law is not only embedded within the
social, as CLH scholars typically recognize, but “already of the social, of association.”43
Accordingly, one cannot even separate—even fuzzily—the legal from the social (as well
as from the political, scientific, or cultural). They are all of the social, each lacking its
own sphere of influence. In defining what makes the legal aspects of social connections
peculiar from the other forms of association, Latour’s conception of law mirrors Scott’s
view of the State in emphasizing law’s lightness, its abstractness, its superficiality.
Latour’s work thus connects with Scott’s to suggest a strong correlation between
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legalistic associations and the modern State. States are built upon abstract, superficial
renderings of the domain precisely because they are products of associations of which
legalistic reasoning—itself necessarily abstract and superficial—is a fundamental part.
This, it seems, is a key contributor to the indeterminacy of law. Legal reasoning is
abstract, and it is produced in two dimensions, namely in printed text on paper. But it is
made—and continually remade—by actors in particular contexts whose contours must
remain obscured.
As this dissertation shows, the federal government established over the last half
of the nineteenth century a multitude of processes for Euro-Americans to exploit and
acquire protected rights in the government’s massive land estate. Policymakers and
lawmakers alike attempted to make the social and the physical legible through systems
of standardization and categorization that belied the complexities and contradictions
inherent to the social and physical orders they encountered. They also failed to account
for a less formal body of law that had taken root in western communities, namely a
tradition of free land and free resources. As conflict exposed contradiction, the legal
profession proved incapable of shoring up these flawed policies, in part due to its own
superficialities and internal contradictions: between the promotion of individualism and
the protection of community order; between notions that land should be owned by as
many people as possible for the sake of building a virtuous, fair society and a belief that
land should be commodified and exploited for sake of economic growth; and between
characterizations of property as bastions of protection from the State and the use of
property as a tool of the State in acquiring and maintaining power. Each of these
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contradictions can be negotiated but never resolved. Therein lies the heart of
contingency. Its legacy is written on the landscape.
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CHAPTER 1 – RAILROAD LAND GRANTS IN AN INCONGRUOUS LAND
SYSTEM
THE RISE OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND THE LIFE
AND DEATH OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1850-1903

Beginning in 1850, federal land grants to railroads became a critical component
of the government’s effort to settle its newly expanded public domain.1 They seemingly
represented what James Willard Hurst once famously wrote was the central driving
force of American law for much of the nineteenth century, the principle that government
should promote the “release of creative human energy” by providing humans the
greatest extent of freedom as is possible.2 Indeed, this principle permeated all federal
public lands policy and law—not just railroad land grants—through its preference for
granting to individuals and companies the liberty, means, and incentive to secure and
develop natural resources and to bring the products of those resources to market.
Because railroads received so much land, and because their construction of
railways made surrounding lands more valuable, the “creative energies” of these
corporations often conflicted with those of settlers, miners, land speculators, politicians,
and officials within the federal government. Conflicts over the acquisition of public
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lands were nothing new. However, the involvement of large railroad corporations, with
extensive legal staffs behind them, as parties to the disputes ensured that a great
proportion of them would be resolved not through the extra-legal violence and
intimidation of local vigilante groups that had become a predominant feature of the
“frontier” experience,3 but rather through the federal legislative, administrative, and
judicial systems.
Congress itself did not grant any land but rather merely provided the legal
mechanisms by which railroads could obtain the land. Railroads acquired and secured
lands only after the completion of several steps, often occurring decades apart, each of
which raised complex legal questions that tested both traditional legal doctrines and the
capacity of institutions charged with implementing them. Land grants composed part of
what public land historian Paul Wallace Gates termed “an incongruous land system”
that also included homesteading, preempting, land auctioning, and mineral locating.4
Each process of acquiring legal rights to public lands required the administration by
government officials, particularly within the General Land Office (GLO) and the
Department of the Interior. In this way, public land laws were part of a much broader
delegation of governmental authority from an elected legislative branch to an unelected,
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professional bureaucracy. Since each of the hundreds of land laws contained
ambiguities and inconsistencies, the GLO’s duties included acting as a quasi-judiciary
by filling any gaps in legislation and resolving any inconsistencies through its
adjudication of disputes. Considering the number of complex and novel issues that
confronted the GLO, this was a difficult job. The GLO was not up to the task.
Over the last decades of the nineteenth century, the judicial branch also played
an increasingly important role in interpreting railroad land grants and in establishing
legal precedents in the adjudication of land disputes.5 During this era, most judges and
other members of the legal profession viewed lawmaking in scientific terms; they
believed that the logical processes of induction and deduction—free from political
choice—could dictate legal decisions. This perspective, now known largely as either
“legal formalism” or “classical legal thought,” was an effort not just to depoliticize
lawmaking, but also to make the law itself more stable and predictable. In this, the legal
profession failed. A review of decisions of the GLO and federal courts shows that the
law of railroad land grants developed slowly and inconsistently—with abrupt and
unpredictable shifts—through extensive litigation occurring over several decades.
I.

Public Land Law Development: Firing up “the Great Barbecue.”

Grants of land to railroad corporations continued and expanded Congress’ prior
policy of granting lands to states for the construction of wagon roads and canals, and of
granting rights of way (but not additional grants of land) for the construction of railways.
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Even more than that, they indeed embodied the government’s approach to public lands
dating back to 1785.6 In short, it favored disposing of them, whether through public
auction, through preemption or homestead, or by granting them to entities that had made
(or had agreed to make) improvements in the form of canals or railroads.
The Land Ordinance of 1785 established the general system by which the
government would legally and politically divide, identify, and convey its public
domain.7 Given the amount of land the federal government claimed (even before the
Louisiana Purchase, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and “Seward’s Folly”), the
system needed to allow for the quick, efficient, and orderly sale of land. The ordinance
largely succeeded in creating such a system. It rendered lands legible though its use of
the rectangular (cadastral) survey system that the United States would later extend to
virtually all of the land it later acquired. Specifically, the law directed that land be
divided into 36-square mile townships, with each township being further divided into
numbered “sections” of 640 acres (one square mile) each. 8 Thus, virtually any tract of
land within the grid could be described through a uniform, objective, and unchanging

6

Federal public lands arguably date to December of 1783, when Virginia ceded its
claims in the north and west of the Ohio River. I use the term “arguably” because much if not
all of Virginia’s claims were also claimed by one or more other states, including Connecticut,
Massachusetts, or New York. Two years later, in 1875, Congress passed a law that would
influence and constrain natural resource management to today. Credited largely to Thomas
Jefferson, this law, the Land Ordinance of 1785, established the rectangular survey system that
would later be extended to virtually all of the land the United States later acquired. Land was to
be divided into 36-square mile townships, with each township being further divided into
numbered “sections” of 640 acres (one square mile) each. Land Ordinance of 1785, Journal of
the Continental Congress 28 (May 20, 1785), 375.
Land historian Vernon Carstensen identified the 1785 ordinance as being “of primary
importance in the history of the public domain.” Carstensen, introduction to The Public Lands,
ed. Vernon Carstensen (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), xv.
7

8

Journal of the Continental Congress, Vol. 28, May 20, 1785, 375.

29
notation of its size, shape, and location. This stood in stark contrast to the traditional
metes-and-bounds system, by which objects such as trees, rocks, fences, or roads (any
one of which can be confused for another or even moved or eliminated in time) defined
a property’s boundaries.
The cadastral survey certainly had important advantages over the metes-andbounds system. Public lands historian Vernon Carstensen was right when he observed
that “had a system of describing land by metes and bounds been employed” after 1850,
when land settlement “reached vast proportions,” then “lawsuits and neighborhood
feuds would have been one certain harvest of this vast movement of land-seekers on to
new land.”9 However, the ease of transfer and security of title came at a cost, one
unforeseen at the time. As political scientist James C. Scott reasoned in Seeing Like a
State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, the value
of the cadastral system lay “in its abstraction and universality.”10 While these features
allowed for land to be transferred to and from outsiders (people who perhaps had never
even seen the land) and for ownership to be clearly delineated, the irony is that the
completeness and unambiguousness of the cadastral map depended upon its “abstract
sketchiness, its lack of detail—its thinness.”11 Accordingly, while the federal
government found an ideal way to “see” its land for the purposes of disposing of it, such
a system allowed for the perpetuation of its blindness to the land’s actual, physical
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character.12 Such myopia would allow Congress to continue a public-lands policy illsuited to conditions in much of the West long after the need for serious reassessment
should have become clear.
For several decades, the federal government used the cadastral survey to sell
lands by auction with specified minimum prices. Policymakers believed that the public
domain was one of the government’s most valuable assets and that it should use it for
raising revenues while also allowing for the orderly expansion of the body politic.13
Euro-Americans did not always wait for lands to be surveyed, for the opening of land
offices, or for the eventual public auction before settling on federal lands, however. In
1841, Congress legitimated the claims of such settlers—called “squatters”—with its
passage of the Preemption Act of 1841.14 This legislation allowed heads of families,
widows, or single men to secure legal title to up to 160 acres of surveyed public lands,
provided they followed the prescribed steps. After inhabiting and improving their land,
qualified settlers had thirty days to file a declaration of intent to preempt, and they had
a year to prove up the settlement and improvement, to submit an affidavit testifying that
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they met all of the requirements of the act, and to pay $1.25 per acre.15 The law also
applied retroactively to persons and families meeting the above requirements, so long
as they paid the required $1.25 to the land office. This was just one of many times in
the nineteenth century when Congress validated illegal entries.16
During the Civil War, Congress expanded its program for subsidizing western
settlement with three monumental laws—the Homestead Act, the Morrill Act, and the
Pacific Railway Act—each passed within months of one another in 1862. Under the
Homestead Act, heads of households of at least twenty-one years of age could acquire
title to up to 160 acres for free, so long as they resided on the land for five years and
improved it for agricultural purposes.17 The Morrill Act granted land to individual states
for the establishment of colleges “where the leading object shall be [the teaching of]
agriculture and the mechanical arts.”18 The Pacific Railway Act chartered and granted
lands to the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific to aid in the construction of a railway
from a point on the Missouri River in Nebraska to a point on the Pacific Ocean at or
near San Francisco, and granted land to other corporations for the construction of five
eastern branches.19 The Homestead Act provided free land, the Morrill Act provided the
means to learn how to farm it, and the Pacific Railway Act provided for the necessary
transportation.
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While each land grant was to some degree unique, the Pacific Railway Act
shared several features with most other land grants from the era, all borrowed from the
first federal railroad land grant for the construction of the Illinois Central in 1850.20 All
of them included “rights of way” across public lands for the construction of the railroads
themselves. These “rights of way,” normally one-hundred feet wide, were mere
usufructuary rights (rights to use the land owned by another) rather than full property
rights, and the law treated them separately from the grants of land. The railroad
companies generally received their land grants defined according to a certain number of
square-mile sections of land within a prescribed distance—the “place limits”—from the
railway. They normally granted only alternate sections of land, thereby creating a
“checkerboard” pattern of land ownership, the rationale being that the government
would sell the alternate sections it retained for no less than double the typical minimum
price of $1.25 per acre given their proximity to the railway, effectively paying for the
subsidy. The “checkerboard” provision dated to the Illinois Central grant and was a key
reason why Stephen Douglas was able to get the Illinois Central legislation through
Congress.21 Additionally, railroad land grants normally excluded lands containing
minerals other than coal and iron and lands already settled, claimed, or reserved
pursuant to federal laws, they provided for “in-lieu lands” (also frequently called
“indemnity strips”) outside of the place limits within which the railroads could select
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lands in lieu of excluded place lands, and they required completion of the roads by a
certain date, usually within ten years of the granting legislation.22
Under the Pacific Railway Act of 1862, the recipient corporations initially
received the odd sections of land within ten miles of the railway with an indemnity strip
of five miles beyond that.23 This amounted to a grant of 6400 acres per mile of
constructed railway. Even with that amount of land, both the Union Pacific and the
Central Pacific still proved unable to find the requisite capital for the massive
construction project Congress had envisioned. Two years later, Congress responded by
passing new legislation allowing for both corporations to mortgage lands and doubling
the size of the land subsidy.24
On the same day that Congress increased the land subsidies to the Union Pacific
and Central Pacific, it also passed the largest land subsidy of all. Specifically, it
chartered the Northern Pacific and provided it with a land grant estimated to include as
much as fifty million acres to subsidize the construction of a railway from Lake Superior
to the Puget Sound, with a branch line along the Columbia River to Portland, Oregon,
then that region’s largest commercial center.25 The immense size of the land grant was
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During the following seven years, Congress granted land for the construction of two additional
“transcontinentals,” both to the south of the Union Pacific – Central Pacific line. I put this term
in quotation marks because it’s a bit of a misnomer, in that the railroads themselves did not
cross the entire continent but rather merely connected to a railway system that did. They thus
comprised parts, albeit substantial parts, of transcontinental routes but were not themselves
transcontinental. That the railroad promoters desired Portland as a terminus of a branch line was
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due not only to the length of the route, but also because the average subsidy per mile
constructed exceeded that of any other road. For the portion of the route passing through
territories—covering all but that portion through Minnesota, the only state along the
route at the time—the subsidy was double even the twenty sections per mile given to
the Union Pacific and Central Pacific.26 Northern Pacific promoters justified its larger
size by citing the enormity of the task of constructing a railway through such a
seemingly desolate region, and by pointing out that Congress had decided not to provide
additional subsidies in the form of government bonds or in allowing the Northern Pacific
to mortgage lands.
Of course, political influence and the financial self-interests of members of
Congress, some of whom served on the Board of Directors of the Northern Pacific,
played a role as well, just as it did with other subsidies.27 Members of Congress and
their influential “friends” engaged in self-dealing at every step, from the Pacific
Railroad Survey of the 1850s, to the passage of land grant legislation, to the selection
of termini and routes, to the construction of the railway itself, and to the ultimate
disposal of land. Gates reported in his federally commissioned History of Public Land
Law Development that the Pacific Railroad Survey “enabled influential people to have

likely due to the growth of Portland in the decade prior to 1864, during which it had grown from
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26

27

At the time, the only state along the designated route was Minnesota.

See Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern
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surveys made that favored their political and sectional interests and, indeed in a number
of instances, their own land investments.”28 After railroads received their subsidies, the
self-dealing of railroad entrepreneurs, as Richard White recently detailed, contributed
mightily to the many failures of the railroad corporations, as well as the more general
financial panics and economic recessions they precipitated.29 Railroad officials
routinely awarded construction contracts and sold land to companies with which they
were also associated, at a loss to the railroad but at a gain to themselves. White, in
Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America, even went so
far as to argue that the railroad companies ought to be regarded “not as new businesses
devoted to the efficient sale of transportation but rather as corporate containers for
financial manipulation and political networking.”30
Even as the Northern Pacific’s grant shared features with each of the others, it
is worth describing some of its more significant provisions. Section One created the
corporation, gave it the powers to construct a railroad line within proscribed parameters,
and defined the corporate structure.31 Section Two granted the corporation a “right of
way” with a width of four-hundred feet through the public lands, as well as the right to
use materials—including “earth, stone, timber, and so forth”—from the public lands for
the construction of the road. Further, because the vast majority of the land granted was
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already owned by Indians, that section called for the United States to “extinguish, as
rapidly as may be consistent with public policy and the welfare of said Indians, the
Indian titles to all lands falling under the operation of this act, and acquired in the
donation to the [road] named in this bill.”32 Section Three defined the grant of land
beyond the right of way. It provided “that there be, and hereby is granted … every
alternate section of public land, not mineral, designated by odd numbers, to the amount
of twenty alternate sections per mile, on each side of said railroad line, as said company
may adopt, through the territories of the United States, and ten alternate sections of land
per mile on each side of said railroad whenever it passes through any state.”33 That
section also provided for an indemnity strip of ten miles beyond the place limits.34
Section Four contained the actual conveyance. It provided that upon the construction of
each twenty-five mile portion of the line, and upon the examination and certification
that such the railroad had completed the section in a “good, substantial, and
workmanlike manner,” patents were to be issued to the company for the granted lands
coterminous with the constructed segment.35 Section Six provided protection for the
company prior to patent. Upon the Department of the Interior’s receipt of the Northern
Pacific’s map of its proposed general route, it excluded from sale, entry, or preemption
all lands within the limits of the grant, as indicated by the map.36
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The rationale for Section Six, variations of which were included in other land
grants, was apparently to prevent speculators, who would have sought to benefit from
the rise in land values that would attend the railway construction, from taking up the
lands once the railroad had identified the general route. Such speculation would not only
forestall actual settlement of the country, but would also deprive the railroad company—
and perhaps more importantly, its potential lenders—security that it would receive
anywhere near the full amount of lands the government promised it, thereby
contravening the statute’s purpose of using the lands to facilitate the railway
construction in the first place. Because the land grant also contained time limits on
completing the respective railways, many likely mistakenly assumed that the land would
be closed for no more than ten years, after which the lands would either have been
patented to the railroad or restored to the public domain.
The Northern Pacific grant was the first of three applying to lands in the Pacific
Northwest. Two years later, in July of 1866, Congress subsidized the construction of a
road connecting Portland, Oregon to the Central Pacific at Sacramento in the much more
heavily developed central valley of California.37 Unlike the Pacific Railway acts,
however, Congress did not charter a company to receive the Oregon portion of the
subsidy—twenty square miles of land per mile of railroad—but rather directed the
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legislature of Oregon to choose the company to construct the roughly 326 mile-long
portion from Portland to the Oregon-California border near Ashland, Oregon.38
Otherwise, the provisions mirrored those in the Northern Pacific land grant, albeit with
a smaller land subsidy. In all, the company chosen to receive the Oregon grant
potentially could have received over four million acres, much of it in the fertile
Willamette valley and all of it covering the most valuable and most inhabitable area of
Oregon. Although this amount paled in comparison to the Northern Pacific subsidy, it
still exceeded the amount Congress donated to Oregon’s citizens upon the state’s
admittance to the Union.39
The Oregon land grant contained a deadline of one year for the Oregon
legislature to designate a company and for that company to file its “assent” with the
secretary of interior; otherwise the legislation would be “null and void.”40 Likely
unbeknownst to members of Congress at the time, this provision would lead to the first
notable legal and political controversy involving that grant. In late September of 1866,
two months after the act’s passage, a group of prominent Portlanders prepared articles
of incorporation to form “The Oregon Central Railroad Company.” They gave the
articles to Joseph Gaston, the road’s chief promoter, to file them with the secretary of
state (of Oregon) as required to form a corporation. It appears that Gaston, however, on
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October 6, brought the articles to the secretary, but he also asked that they be filed only
“in pencil,” since the incorporators had not yet fully organized the company. 41 On
October 10, the Oregon legislature passed a joint resolution naming “The Oregon C. R.
R.” as the company to take the grant on the assumption that the incorporation of the
Portland-based company had been completed.42 The following month, before the
legislature adjourned for a nearly two-year-long recess, Gaston added his name and
those of the other Portlanders to the articles before finally attaching his certificate and
seal and filing them with the secretary on November 21, 1866.43
It appears that Gaston’s company had not completed its incorporation by issuing
stock subscriptions and electing directors prior to April 22, 1867,44 when another group
consisting primarily of Sacramento capitalists formed yet another “Oregon Central”
railroad corporation in Salem to compete with Gaston’s for the grant.45 Because
Gaston’s company planned to construct the railway on the west bank of the Willamette
Ganoe, “History of O&C,” 251. In 1903, Secretary of State F. I. Dunbar wrote that
no company had been formed under the name “Oregon Central” in October of 1866. F.I. Dunbar
to Samuel A. Clarke, September 2, 1903, Southern Pacific Collection, MSS 1113, Box 3, Folder
7, Oregon Historical Society Research Library, Portland, OR.
41
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River, his company became known as the “West Side Company.” The other company
planned to build along the east bank and thus became known as the “East Side
Company.” The East Side Company immediately challenged the validity of the Oregon
legislature’s designation of the “Oregon Central” as recipient of the grant, given that no
company of that name formally existed at the time. Over the next few years, the two
companies “fought each other bitterly,” as one prominent public land historian
summarized their contest for the grant.46 Both companies began construction in May of
1868 as part of their efforts to win over the people along their respective routes and,
perhaps more importantly, their legislators. Gaston later admitted to trying to block the
East Side’s construction by inciting opposition along the proposed route so as to get the
landowners either to refuse to grant the requisite right of way or to do so but at exorbitant
prices, by blocking the company from securing labor, by trying to break down its credit,
and by stirring up lawsuits against the company.47 Ben Holladay, an entrepreneur from
California who effectively gained control of the East Side Company in the summer of
1868, engaged in similar tactics on the other side.48 Holladay ultimately proved
victorious when the Oregon legislature, in October of 1868, reversed its designation of
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the West Side Company in favor of Holladay’s, with the vote dividing along county
rather than party lines.49
Some raised the legal question, however, as to whether the East Side Company
could accept the grant, given that Congress’ one-year deadline to accept its terms and
conditions had already passed, with the West Side Company being the only company to
file its assent in the Department of the Interior within the one-year time period. The East
Side Company, it appeared, needed new legislation renewing the grant and extending
the time for acceptance and the construction of the first twenty miles. Unfortunately for
Holladay and his backers, a substantial faction in Congress had turned against the
railroad land grant policy.50 According to one knowledgeable observer, Republicans and
Democrats alike had soured on railroad land grants to such a degree that Republicans
would only vote for them if they contained protections for settlers and against railroad
speculation, while Democrats opposed them altogether.51 Although Holladay succeeded
in getting the legislation, opponents of railroad land grants, most notably George W.
Julian and William S. Holman, both from Indiana, succeeded in inserting a provision
requiring the railroad to dispose of the land only to “bona fide settlers,” in parcels no
larger than 160 acres, and for no more than $2.50 per acre.52 Together, these conditions
came to be referred to as the “homestead clause.” Decades later, one railroad official
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described the homestead clause as the “little accident of a few lines that old George W.
Julian slipped over on Congress.”53 In March of 1870, because a court had previously
held the West Side Company to have exclusive rights to the “Oregon Central” name,
Holladay formed a new company, the Oregon & California, to receive the grant.54
After the West Side Company abandoned its claim to the Portland-to-Ashland
line in early 1870, it secured another grant from Congress for the construction of a
railway from Portland to Astoria, on the coast, with a branch line from Forest Grove to
McMinnville.55 This grant also contained an identical “homestead clause.”56 Two
months later, Holladay acquired control of the West Side Company, and the two
companies were thereafter operated more or less as a single enterprise.57
Even with the political environment shifting against land grants, the Northern
Pacific was able to feed on the trough a few more times in 1869 and 1870. At the behest
of that company, Congress passed legislation in 1869 allowing the company to issue
bonds on its grant lands, despite the fact that the lack of such authority was a substantial
part of the justification for the unprecedented land subsidy. 58 That same year, it also
authorized the company to extend its branch line from Portland to Puget Sound, while
also providing that there would be no additional financial or land subsidy (aside from a
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right-of-way) for the extension.59 The practical effect of this legislation was to allow the
Northern Pacific to carry an even greater percentage of the trade from the “Inland
Empire” to its port on Puget Sound, thereby rendering Portland, a competitor for
regional supremacy, just another stop along the line. A year later, Congress authorized
the Northern Pacific to locate and to construct its main line to Puget Sound “via the
Columbia River,” and to locate and construct a branch line across the Cascades, each
“with the privileges, grants, and duties provided for in [the company’s] act of
incorporation” in 1864.60 Though some in Congress may not have realized it, the
practical effect of this legislation was to give the Northern Pacific an additional land
grant for its railway between Portland and Tacoma.
In 1870, the House signaled the end of the land grant era when it passed a
resolution stating that “the policy of granting subsidies in public lands to railroads and
other corporations ought to be discontinued.”61 The last grant, to the Texas Pacific for
the southernmost transcontinental route, was passed a year later.62 Gates attributed the
shift against railroad subsidies to Westerners having realized “that railroads were not
prompt in bringing their lands on the market and putting them into the hands of farm
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makers,” a realization that caused “the West [to turn] from warm friendship to outright
hostility to railroads.”63 Henry George encapsulated such hostility in the following rant,
from 1871, against the Pacific railroad land grants:
Since the day when Esau sold his birthright for a mess of pottage we may
search in vain for any parallel to such concessions. Munificence, we call
it! Why, our common use of words leave no term in the English tongue
strong enough to express such reckless prodigality. Just think of it!
25,600 acres of land for the building of one mile of railroad--land enough
to make 256 good sized American farms; land enough to make 4,400
such farms as in Belgium support a family each in independence and
comfort. And this given to a corporation, not for building a railroad for
the Government or for the people, but for building a railroad for
themselves; a railroad which they will own as absolutely as they will own
the land--a railroad for the use of which both Government and people
must pay as much as though they had given nothing for its construction.64
However, inasmuch as railroad land grants were proven imprudent, the damage
was already done. In all, the federal government granted roughly 130 million acres to
railroads from 1850 to 1871.65 While almost a third of this was granted to one railroad,
the Northern Pacific, over seventy railroads in all received some grant of federal public
land.66 The federal government ultimately patented 38 million acres to the Northern
Pacific, over 12 million to the Atlantic & Pacific, over 11 million to the Union Pacific,
roughly 8 million to the Central Pacific, and roughly 7 million each to the Kansas Pacific
and Southern Pacific.
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Several factors contributed to the federal government’s subsidization of Western
settlement and resource exploitation. In his monumental work on the legal history of the
lumber industry in Wisconsin, Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the
Lumber Industry in Wisconsin, 1836-1915, James Willard Hurst emphasized the role of
capital scarcity combined with land abundance. In short, because land (and its resources)
seemed unlimited but the capital to develop it remained in short supply, the proper role
for government was to stimulate development in any way it could including, if
necessary, giving away the nation’s economic base.67 In the case of railroads, this capital
would come from overseas, including the financial centers of London and Berlin.
If that seems shortsighted, it is because it was. With land seemingly unlimited,
most policymakers saw any concern for conserving resources for future use as
misplaced. The best way to increase development in the short-term, policymakers
thought, was to delegate the State’s power over public lands to private parties. 68 This
preference can be seen in other areas of law, including certain legislative changes to the
common law of contract at the state level that were designed to allow citizens to make
maximum use of limited capital, and the lack of regulations governing the timber
industry. It was not just the government that was shortsighted. For their part, private
landowners were also typically incapable, if not unwilling, to consider the costs of
current practices on the future productivity of their lands. Perhaps the most notorious
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example of this was the depletion of forests in the upper Midwest over the latter half of
the nineteenth century.69
Contemporaneous accounts support Hurst’s thesis. The central argument of
proponents of railroad land grants, for example, was that they were necessary to attract
the necessary capital. They reasoned that capitalists would not invest in railroad
construction ahead of settlement (and, hence, traffic), but they would invest if the
railroad corporations held rights to substantial land as an additional asset. Other
arguments centered on the potential for economic growth, the spread of “civilization,”
national security concerns, and, in the case of the transcontinentals, the potential linking
with Chinese markets.70
While the “land grant era” ended in 1871, at that time, most of the land “granted”
had not in fact been conveyed to the respective recipient railroad companies. Each grant
required administering, and that was an overwhelmingly difficult task, one made more
difficult by the shifting politics against railroads and their apparent monopolization of
western land and resources.
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II.

Administering Railroad Land Grants

The Northern Pacific, the Oregon & California, and the Oregon Central land
grants were just a few of the thousands of legislative acts Congress passed over the
nineteenth century regarding the federal government’s massive estate. Between 1785
and 1880, Congress passed approximately thirty-five hundred such laws, with 241 of
those occurring between March of 1869 and March of 1875 alone.71 Each required
governmental administration, and the GLO was the agency charged with fulfilling most
of the government’s obligations. Formed in 1812 and housed in the Department of the
Interior since 1849, the GLO had many duties: it was responsible for surveying the
public lands and dividing them into legal divisions and subdivisions, for protecting the
public domain from timber depredations and from illegal or fraudulent entries or
appropriations, for classifying lands according to their natural resources and to their
most valuable uses, for furnishing patent records, and for adjudicating disputes related
to the public domain.72
The scope and nature of the GLO’s responsibilities made it very important. As
legal historian William Nelson characterized the office, it was “as politically significant
in the newly emerging states of the West as the customs service was in the port cities of
the East.”73 In 1840, a Senate committee reported that "few places … afford[ed] such
ready and certain means ... of extending favors and accommodation to a large and
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influential portion of the community, as those attached to the land system." 74 The land
office was so influential primarily because of the money it spent and the favors it could
do for local citizens, for example by contracting work out to survey teams at inflated
prices or by holding public auctions with terms favoring one group or another.
The local register and receiver posts were very valuable assets within the
political spoils system of the day, especially considering that receivers were entitled to
keep the fees (in addition to any bribes) they collected. In one instance, after Montana
elected Wilbur F. Sanders to the U.S. Senate from Montana in 1890, a person by the
name of J. D. Jenks wrote Sanders seeking his endorsement of Jenks’ application to
become receiver for the land office at Helena. In support of his appointment, Jenks, a
fellow Republican, cited his military record, his loyalty to the party (“I vote as I
fought”), and the “remarkable” manner in which he had gathered signatures, specifically
that he did not just “go into a saloon or gambling house” to round up signatures.75 After
Jenks was passed over for the post, he wrote Sanders to complain. He thought the person
Sanders had chosen instead to be unqualified due to his young age, his lack of military
experience, and his early withdrawal from Sanders’ senatorial campaign.76 Jenks simply
could not believe that Sanders had given such an unqualified person “the best position
in the State.”77 Given that the bulk of the salaries of GLO receivers consisted of the fees

74

Nelson, Roots of American Bureaucracy, 27.

75

J.D. Jenks to Hon. W.F. Sanders, Senator, Montana, Butte City, MT, March 13, 1890,
Wilbur Fisk Sanders Papers, Box 2, Montana State Historical Society.
76

Jenks to Sanders, April 25, 1890.

77

Jenks to Sanders, May 3, 1890.

49
paid for their services, not all posts were equal. Thus, although Jenks was “humiliated”
by being passed over in favor of someone so unqualified, he implored Sanders not to
insult him “by offering [him] a little one horse office that would starve any man to
death”; he rather “prefer[red] suffering in silence.”78
With the expansion of the federal public domain and in the number of laws
governing it through the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the GLO’s already
vast powers and responsibilities increased dramatically. This was indicative of a much
broader delegation of governmental decision-making from the legislative branch to an
unelected bureaucracy.79 Scholars have debated what contributed to this shift, but one
likely factor was simply that the increasing complexity of American social and
economic relations required a higher level—in both quantity and quality—of
governmental administration. Writing in the 1920s, Max Weber cited to precisely that
to explain similar transformations across Europe.80 One other factor according to Weber
was the leveling of economic and social hierarchies.81 Democratic theory mandated the
law treat all citizens as “formally equal,” and this in turn required the elimination of
legal privilege and the enactment of legal guarantees against governmental arbitrariness,
both of which a government of personally detached and objective experts could best
achieve.82

78

Jenks to Sanders, May 3, 1890.

79

See generally Nelson, Roots of American Bureaucracy, 5.

80

See Nelson, Roots of American Bureaucracy, 4.

81

Nelson, Roots of American Bureaucracy, 4.

82

Nelson, Roots of American Bureaucracy, 4. Writing decades after Weber, Nelson
found Weber’s factors to be “necessary but not sufficient conditions” to explain the shift, at
least in the United States, particularly since there had been “widespread, powerfully voiced

50
Even with its increased responsibilities through the middle decades of the
nineteenth century, the GLO, at the time of the Northern Pacific and other western
railroad land grants, retained the same basic size and structure that it had since the
1830s, despite its increased workload. Heading the GLO was the commissioner of
public lands, who one historian noted had “greater duties … than one man could
properly discharge.”83 On paper, the secretary of interior oversaw the commissioner and
the GLO, but with the secretary having so many other bureaus and offices to supervise,
the commissioner assumed much of the supervision of GLO in practice. (The GLO, the
secretary of interior, and the secretary’s legal advisors, when acting in regards to public
lands, are hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Land Department.”) Three principal
clerks (one of the public lands, one of private land claims, and another of surveys), a
recorder, and a solicitor served directly under the commissioner in the central office in
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Washington, D.C.84 The clerks of public lands and of private land claims were
responsible for whatever work the commissioner needed done within their respective
areas, the clerk of surveys directed and oversaw the making of surveys (which another
agency conducted), the recorder certified, transmitted, and recorded all patents the GLO
issued, and the solicitor served as a legal advisor to the commissioner regarding all
disputes and controversies involving the public lands and private land claims.85 In
addition, the GLO opened offices at the local level as the government opened lands to
entry and purchase under the myriad of public land laws. Throughout the GLO’s history,
over 380 offices were established to dispose of the public domain.86
The Land Department had several duties as to railroad land grants as their
recipients went through the several prescribed steps in availing themselves of their
respective subsidies. The first step for the recipients of most grants, including the three
in the Pacific Northwest, was filing maps of the projected general routes of their roads
with the Land Department, after which the president was directed to have the lands
along such routes surveyed.87 The Northern Pacific grant also contained a provision
specifying that upon general location, all lands subject to railroad location were
thereafter closed to sale, entry, or preemption before or after survey, while the two
Oregon grants directed the administration to withdraw granted lands from disposal
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under the public land laws.88 Railroad companies typically filed their maps of general
location in multiple sections. The Northern Pacific, for instance, filed its map of
“general location” in three separate filings. The secretary of interior accepted its map
covering Minnesota and a portion of Washington Territory on August 13, 1870, its map
covering the Dakota, Montana, Idaho, and the remainder of Washington territories on
February 21, 1872, and its map of the branch line over the Cascades in Washington on
August 15, 1873. For their parts, the Oregon & California filed four maps from February
of 1870 to April of 1871, and the (“West Side”) Oregon Central two maps, one in May
of 1871 and the other in January of 1872.89
Because it was impossible to ascertain which sections were subject to future
railroad location—i.e., which were odd sections, non-mineral, etc.—prior to survey, the
Land Department from the start withdrew all place lands on all three of the grants from
sale, entry, or preemption. Once surveyed, the even sections would be re-opened and
subject to disposal under the public land laws, with the caveat that the minimum price
be doubled from $1.25 to $2.50 per acre. The Northern Pacific grant did not direct the
administration to withdraw lands but rather excluded the lands by law even without land
office action. Still, the agency withdrew Northern Pacific lands as a way of “giving
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notice of the limits of the grant” and to “avoid confusion and to protect both settlers and
the company.”90 The judiciary—including the Supreme Court—repeatedly upheld the
validity and wisdom of this practice.91
It became imperative that the Land Department ascertain which preemptions or
entries preceded a railroad’s “general location” and withdrawal, both for determining
the superiority of rights as between railroads and claimants and for determining the price
to be paid upon proving up claims.92 This was not always an easy matter. On February
10, 1870, Commissioner Joseph S. Wilson issued a circular with instructions for
handling preemption claims on lands within the withdrawn limits of a railroad grant. It
required persons who had settled on unsurveyed lands within the lateral limits of
railroad withdrawals prior to the withdrawal to file their declaratory statements within
six months after the land being surveyed, and to make proof and payment within twelve
months thereafter. Regarding settlements on surveyed lands, the circular required the
settler to file his declaratory statement, “giving therein the date of settlement, within
three months from the date of publication [t]hereof by the register and receiver, and
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thereafter make proof and payment as provided by law.” Any failure to comply with
these requirements, Wilson stated, should result in the forfeiture of the claim.93
For many years, the GLO withdrew lands not only within the place limits of
grants, but also within any indemnity strips, even though there was no explicit statutory
directive to do so.94 The reason seemed to be that the Land Department interpreted the
land grants as promising to convey not just particular parcels of land—the specific
amount of which might vary depending upon the character of the land and how much
had been claimed prior to the railroads’ rights attaching—but rather particular quantities
of land. Accordingly, it saw the withdrawing of indemnity lands as necessary in
ensuring that the government met its legal obligation to cover any losses within the place
limits with sufficient quantities of lands in the indemnity strips. This policy changed
under Commissioner William A. J. Sparks in the late 1880s. First, Sparks declared that
past withdrawals of indemnity lands did not actually exclude settlers from preempting
such lands but rather merely served as information for defining the limits for when
railroads made their indemnity selections at a later date.95 On this point, Secretary
Lucious Q. C. Lamar overruled Sparks, but in 1886 Lamar went a step further and began
actually restoring withdrawn indemnity lands to the public domain.96 By the following
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year, with the backing of President Grover Cleveland, Lamar had revoked the
withdrawals of almost twenty-five million acres of indemnity lands.97
The aggressive stance of Sparks and Lamar toward railroads and their withdrawn
lands should not have been surprising, given a growing populist resentment towards
railroads and the GLO’s apparent approach to them. This angst had indeed been a
contributing factor to Cleveland winning the presidency in the first place. 98 During the
campaign, Cleveland had specifically advocated reforming the land office in order to
deal with the rampant fraud and speculation resulting from the railroad land grants and
other land laws.99 His position garnered some support in Republican circles while
alienating other expansionist Democrats. Secretary of Interior Carl Schurz, for instance,
led a group of “mugwump” Republicans, dissatisfied with the party’s support of big
business and its nomination of Jay Gould’s “friend” James Blaine, to defect from the
party in support of Cleveland.100 Schurz, a land reformer, supported Cleveland for the
presidency because he viewed him as a man of “incorruptible integrity” who possessed
“a high sense of official honor” and “a keen instinct of justice.”101 On the other side,
Andrew B. Hammond, one of the preeminent lumbermen in western Montana and a
Democrat, soon broke from supporting President Cleveland based on his aggressive
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public land policies, including most notably Cleveland’s threats to retain forests in
federal ownership in perpetuity.102 Upon winning election, Cleveland appointed Lamar
and Sparks because of their reputations as land reformers. In his first report to Congress,
Sparks signaled that he intended to change things in the GLO with his condemnation of
the state of affairs: “I found that the magnificent estate of the nation in its public lands
have been to a wide extent wasted under defective and improvident laws and through a
laxity of public administration astonishing in a business sense if not culpable in
recklessness of official responsibility …”103
A key source of the resentment towards the government’s railroad policies was
the failure of many land grant recipients to construct their railways within the statutory
timeframe. The original deadline for completion of the Northern Pacific line, for
example, was July 4, 1876, but the road was far from completed by that date.104 The
Northern Pacific secured multiple extensions from Congress, ultimately moving the
deadline to 1879, but even that was not enough time. The company finally celebrated
the railway’s completion in the fall of 1883, but even then, the line was only “complete”
because the Northern Pacific had leased another company’s 214-mile road from
Wallula, WA to Portland, OR—one built without a land-grant subsidy.105
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The Oregon companies seemingly got off to a faster start. From 1870 to 1872,
the newly-formed Oregon & California Railroad completed over half of its East Side
line (from Portland to a point near Roseburg), while the “West Side” Oregon Central
completed construction of railroad from Portland to McMinnville by way of Forest
Grove, a distance of 47 miles. In January 1873, however, the Oregon & California's
funds became exhausted and the railroad suspended construction for several years.106
After a change in ownership and with the support from newly-issued mortgage bonds,
construction resumed in the summer of 1881. Construction continued uninterrupted
until the beginning of 1884, when funds were again exhausted but by which time the
company had extended the main line some 145 miles from Roseburg, Oregon to a point
just over a mile south of Ashland, the southern-most terminus in Oregon. The final
portion of the road from Ashland to the nearby Oregon-California border would not be
completed until 1887, after the Oregon & California had again gone into receivership
and come under the control of the Southern Pacific.107
Financial failures, which railroad officials largely brought on their companies
through their own malfeasance, were largely to blame for the delays. As was the case
with the Union Pacific and the infamous Credit Mobilier scandal, many Northern Pacific
officials also had financial stakes in various construction and land companies, such that
the Northern Pacific routinely awarded contracts and sold land at terms unfavorable to
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the railroad company but quite profitable to the railroad’s officials.108 They did not let
their company’s charter stand in the way. They got around charter’s prohibition on
building branch lines, for instance, by financially backing local entrepreneurs (including
lumber baron Hammond in western Montana) to build the lines and then purchasing
them on behalf of the Northern Pacific for much more than the cost of construction.109
In one case, Missoula entrepreneurs Hammond, Bonner, Hauser, and Marcus Daly
joined with Northern Pacific officials Villard and Thomas Oakes to form the Rocky
Fork Railway and Coal Trust to construct a branch line to Red Lodge, Montana, which
the Trust also founded, to supply the Northern Pacific with coal. Once built, the Trust
sold the branch road to the Northern Pacific in 1891 for $1.4 million, almost twice what
it had cost to construct. The Northern Pacific went into receivership—for the second
time—two years later.110
Delays in construction hindered economic development not only by denying
communities a transportation infrastructure, but also by withholding lands within the
limits of their grants from market (with other lands being available at only double the
price) for many more years than Congress originally anticipated. Since the principal
purpose of the grants was to stimulate railway development ahead of settlement, many
felt that railroad officials and their capitalist backers received the benefit of the subsidies
while intentionally denying the public their part of the bargain. Ultimately, resentment
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towards the railroads led to, in historian David Maldwyn Ellis’ words, a “ground swell
of public opinion which through the 1880`s demanded the recovery of grants to
companies failing to observe the requirements of the law,” in most cases the deadline
for completing the railroad.111 Ellis even characterized the forfeiture movement, despite
it never being a “major political issue in the country at large,” as being still “an integral
part of the agrarian and industrial unrest which characterized the decades following the
Civil War.”112
The forfeiture movement was not just a populist one of “the people vs. the
railroads,” however. For example, when the Northern Pacific selected Tacoma as its
western terminal, it was prominent Seattle businessmen who led the charge to forfeit
that railroad’s land grant for its branch line from Wallula to Tacoma. They sought to
transfer the grant to another company that planned to construct its line across the
Cascades to Seattle rather than Tacoma.113 Likewise, prominent Portlanders for some
time sought the forfeiture of the Northern Pacific’s grant between Wallula and Portland
so that Congress could transfer it to another company promising to construct a line from
Portland to Salt Lake City, thereby making Portland a terminus of a transcontinental
rather than just a pass-through city.114
The forfeiture issue raised a legal question as to whether land grants were
forfeited automatically by operation of law and, if not, who in the government had the
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power to declare them forfeited. In 1874, the Supreme Court answered both questions.
It held that forfeiture of land grants was not automatic but rather required some
governmental action, and that this was a matter for Congress, not the Land Department
or the courts.115 By the early 1880s, a substantial contingent in Congress had come to
favor forfeiture, and in 1884, the House passed, by a vote of 251 to 17, a resolution
calling for the forfeiture of all unearned grants. Over the succeeding few years, Congress
passed laws forfeiting over twenty-eight million acres, including nearly a million acres
of the Oregon & California’s “West Side” land grant from Portland to Astoria.116 There
might have been much more if not for a disagreement among those supporting forfeiture
as to the extent of lands that should be restored to public entry. One group favored the
forfeiture of only those lands remaining unearned, another favored the forfeiture of
those lands unearned as of the statutory deadline, even if they had been earned
subsequently, while still a third pushed for the forfeiture of all unearned and earned
lands whenever the statutory deadline had been violated.117 Often, the conflict among
these groups led to delay and, in some cases, to no forfeiture bill being passed at all.
One prominent federal judge in Portland, Oregon, in 1887, observed that the Northern
Pacific’s land grant between Wallula and Portland would have already been restored to
the public domain “but for the irrational conduct of certain persons in Congress, who
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stubbornly insist that no part of the grant west of the Missouri river shall be forfeited,
unless the bill includes the earned as well as the unearned lands.”118
The Northern Pacific came out of the forfeiture era for the most part unscathed.
The fight over the forfeiture of portions of its massive grant came to a head in 1886.
Congress took up potential forfeiture legislation in May and June of that year, at which
time two portions of the Northern Pacific’s road remained uncompleted: the portion of
its main line from Wallula to Portland and a seventy-five mile segment of the Cascade
branch. In the Senate, Joseph N. Dolph, an attorney from Portland who had previously
represented the Northern Pacific, argued against forfeiting the unearned portion of the
Cascade branch. He appealed to nationalistic pride by citing to Great Britain’s
subsidization of the Canadian Pacific as evidence that it was “attempting to seize and
take out of our grasp the commerce of the old East,” such that it was hardly the time for
the United States to impede construction of the Northern Pacific’s line by revoking part
of its subsidy. He also contended that there were no agricultural lands of any value to
settlers within the unearned portion of the Cascade branch.119
Dolph’s insistence that the unearned lands along the Cascade branch were
worthless prompted Senator Van Wyck of Nebraska—a chief proponent of their
forfeiture—to ask what harm there would be in them being forfeited.120 Dolph explained
that the unearned lands, though not valuable for settlement, were valuable to the railroad

118

United States v. Ordway, 30 F. 30, 35 (D. Or. 1887).

119

Northern Pacific Forfeiture, Remarks of Hon. J. N. Dolph, of Oregon, in the Senate
of the United States, May 27, 28 and June 1 and 14, 1886 (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1886), 5.
120

Northern Pacific Forfeiture, Remarks of Hon. J. N. Dolph, 11-12.

62
for securing bonds, such that, if they were forfeited, funding would dry up and
construction would cease. That would be to nobody’s benefit. Van Wyck and others
accused Dolph of still acting on behalf of the Northern Pacific. Dolph responded by
insisting that his support for the forfeiture of approximately three million acres adjoining
the un-built Wallula-to-Portland section ought to have demonstrated his legislative
independence from his old client.121 However, it seems that the Northern Pacific was
eager to have that portion forfeited if it meant subduing the political agitation for more
drastic measures against the company, such as those Van Wyck proposed and against
which Dolph was fighting.122 In any event, Congress failed to act in 1886. When the
Northern Pacific completed the Cascade branch the following year, the fight over the
forfeiture of unearned lands along that section became moot. In 1890, Congress finally
passed a General Forfeiture Act, which included the forfeiture of all land adjoining the
Wallula-to-Portland section of road. Populists and land reformers, far from celebrating,
however, instead alleged that the bill was a “Northern Pacific bill” designed to prevent
anything more drastic.123
The last step in administering railroad land grants was for lands to be patented.
Upon completing each 25-mile section of railway, railroad companies filed selection
lists of lands for which they sought patents. Once the federal government received a
selection list from a railroad, the list took a circuitous route through the government
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bureaucracy.124 After landing in the local land office, the list was sent to the GLO, where
the list was first directed to the Railroad Division so it could determine whether the
lands were of the character prescribed in the grant and hence subject to patent by the
company. That division’s examination consisted of three steps: (1) determining whether
the lands were within the limits of the grant, (2) digging through tract-books and the
plats and field notes to determine whether there were any conflicting claims, and (3)
consulting with witnesses to ascertain whether the railroad had in fact been constructed
opposite the lands claimed.125 Though there was no official designation of which clerks
would handle which selection lists, it was customary for each clerk to have charge of a
specific state, so that clerks with more intimate knowledge of the lands in question could
review each selection list (normally two assigned to each list). If the listed lands were
found to be within the prescribed grant and no conflicts were found, the Railroad
Division clerks certified the list and forwarded it to the division’s chief for approval.
Once the division’s work was completed, it sent the list first to the Mineral Division to
determine whether the list contained any mineral lands, and then to the Swamp Division
to ascertain whether the list contained any swamp lands.126 If these divisions certified
that the list was free of such lands, the list was sent to the commissioner of the GLO to
sign off on it, at which time it went to the secretary of interior for approval, then to the
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Recording Division to be copied and filed, and then back to the Railroad Division to
draw up and issue the land patents.127
The operations of the GLO were sometimes disorganized. As one Interior
Department employee, Frank Griffith, later recounted, letters from the various
companies to the commissioner of the GLO or the secretary were “pretty well scattered
around.”128 The system of filing was to sort by year, with everything relating to a
company for a particular year going into a file wrapped with a band. If that band became
loose, the papers could become detached and mixed with other files.129 The Railroad
Division, in recommending a list or selection for patent, did not consider whether any
of the conditions subsequent had been violated.
Sometimes years, or even decades, separated railway construction and the
issuing of patents to the adjoining land grant. As of 1887, when the Northern Pacific
completed its Cascade branch and the Oregon & California completed its line, only a
small percentage of either railroad’s land grant had been patented. The Northern Pacific
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had only patented less than a million acres of its estimated forty-seven million acre
grant, the Oregon & California only 323,000 acres of its three million acres.130
The delays in patenting fomented the already potent popular anger directed
towards the railroads and the government’s land grant policy. Many contemporaries
blamed the railroads entirely for the delays, pointing to their self-interest in delaying
patents as a way to avoid paying property taxes. 131 Despite the appealing logic of such
arguments, little evidence existed at the time of railroads intentionally delaying patents
to avoid taxes. Decades later, however, a long-time Oregon & California employee who
was in charge of that company’s land taxes during the 1880s, reportedly admitted to a
government prosecutor that “it was the policy of the Company to avoid selecting as long
as possible in order to keep them off the tax rolls.”132
The goal of the railroad companies was ostensibly to have the land pass
effectively straight from the government to purchasers, with the railroads “owning” the
land for just enough time to pass the titles along. Doing so required they market lands
that the railroads did not yet own and to have a purchaser lined up prior to patenting,
but that made some prospective buyers uneasy. Northern Pacific Vice President George
Stark, in 1878, wrote to a representative of potential purchasers in Toronto, Canada to
alleviate his clients’ concerns regarding the security of the titles they would be
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contracting to purchase from the Northern Pacific. Stark indicated that it was standard
practice for purchasers of unpatented grant lands to pay the GLO the filing and survey
fees on behalf of the Northern Pacific. The company would then file a selection list
covering all lands “sold” through such a manner, receive the patents, reimburse the
purchasers for their payment to the GLO, and convey the patents pursuant to the
contractual terms.133
However, while the railroads played a role in the delays in railroad patenting, so
too did the Land Department. For one, the department often intentionally delayed the
patenting process. Indeed, the primary reason the Northern Pacific had patented so few
acres by 1887 was that the department, in 1874, had suspended the issuance of patents
to that company. Four years earlier, Congress included a provision in an appropriation
bill requiring the Northern Pacific to pay the costs of surveys before receiving patents
to land. For the following four years, the GLO overlooked the provision and issued
patents without the Northern Pacific paying for the surveys. When the GLO discovered
its error, it demanded back payments and suspended further patents until such payment
was made.134 The Northern Pacific refused, its officials believing the requirement to be
in violation of its charter and not wanting to acquiesce to a precedent that its charter
could be amended at the will of Congress.135 The suspension continued until 1882, when
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the Northern Pacific finally agreed to pay the costs of surveying. However, by that time,
the forfeiture movement had taken hold, and the GLO had begun to suspend the issuance
of railroad patents in anticipation of forfeiture legislation. The GLO thus issued another
order suspending the issuance of patents to the Northern Pacific, one that would remain
in effect until 1890, when Congress finally passed a forfeiture bill affecting the Northern
Pacific.136
The GLO not only suspended the issuance of patents specifically to railroads,
but it also suspended all patents in particular areas—sometimes encompassing entire
states—where land officials knew fraud to be pervasive. For the most part, however, the
GLO was ineffective in reducing, much less preventing, the commission of frauds
regarding the public domain. The pervasiveness of such frauds—often at the behest of
railroad, lumber, or mining interests and allowing for their monopolization of
resources—further fueled popular suspicions of both corporations and the GLO. Judge
David Davis represented such views when he blamed the stealing of millions of acres
of the public domain by corporations and other monopolies on the “collusion and
cooperation of agents employed to protect the interests of the people.”137
Several factors explain the GLO’s seemingly lax administration of land laws
including railroad land grants. For one, the land office was simply under-manned,
under-funded, and under-equipped to handle the work. While the land office’s duties
and responsibilities greatly expanded after 1862, both due to the amount of new laws
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passed but also because of the expansion of the public domain to be administered,
Congress consistently failed, throughout the remainder of the century, to provide it the
necessary resources to meet the new demands placed upon it. As historian Harold H.
Dunham summarized the problem, its “machinery for handling [its tasks] remained
inefficient, antiquated, and inadequate.”138 Similarly, Gates concluded that the bulk of
the blame for the “less favorable features” of public lands policy during the latter half
of the nineteenth century should be placed on Congress for “refus[ing] to give the Land
Office sufficient staff and appropriations with which to press forward its surveys,
scrutinize selections carefully, bring its records up to date, and require the railroads to
take title and have their lands made taxable.”139
One of the GLO commissioner’s obligations was to make annual reports to
Congress, and for most years during the 1870s and 1880s, these reports included
requests for more staff, better pay, and more office space. In 1877, for example,
Commissioner James A. Williamson reminded Congress that “[y]ear after year [his]
predecessors in this office [had] urged upon Congress the necessities of the public
service in this regard,” and that he continued working toward “the same end.”140 As he
described Congress’ inaction and its consequences, “it does not appear to have reached
the judgment of Congress that a paramount need of the country is daily sacrificed upon
the altar of a false economy, and the most sacred interest of the hardy pioneers of
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civilization, that of speedy acquisition and security of their homes and hearthstones, is
continually ignored and disregarded.”141 The lack of a proper workforce, Williamson
argued, contributed to a backlog in the work of the public lands division, such that
people writing to the office had to wait several months for a reply. Apparently, little
changed in the succeeding six years, as Commissioner Noah C. McFarland complained
in 1883 that the “increase in working force and appropriations has been doled out in
pittances.”142 The problem was still far from resolved five years later, when the secretary
of interior implored Congress to increase the office’s staff and resources, even arguing
that it was more deserving of “intelligent, thorough and effective Congressional action
for its relief” than any other agency in the government.143
As for the pay of GLO employees, a Senate committee acknowledged in 1881
that GLO clerks exhibited more ability than their salaries—which the report
characterized as just enough to allow them to “eke out a bare subsistence”—indicated.144
The low pay arguably made GLO employees more susceptible to bribery and, at the
very least, contributed to a high turnover within the GLO, with many of the best legally
trained employees resigning to enter into private practice representing land and railroad
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corporations before the GLO.145 For example, two employees of the GLO, Britton and
Gray, moved on to become the Northern Pacific’s legal counsel in Washington, D.C.146
Even as small as the GLO staff was, its working spaces were still too small to
accommodate even the small number there were. In 1880, the Public Lands Commission
wryly noted that the “room allotted to the General Land Office is not quite the worst
that it could be, nor is it wholly inadequate, but it approximates both.”147
Congress was blameworthy not just for its failure to provide the GLO with the
necessary means to administer the public domain, but also for the actual substance of
the laws it did succeed in passing. The laws regarding the nation’s vast land estate
unfortunately formed an “incongruous land system”—one which would have made it
difficult for even a perfect agency to administer.148 Many have seen the Homestead Act
as ushering in a new era—the “Homestead Era”—of federal land policies, one focused
on giving free land to industrious settlers rather than on raising revenue. Gates showed,
however, that the Homestead Law “did not completely change our land system, that its
adoption merely superimposed upon the old land system a principle out of harmony
with it, and that until 1890 the old and the new constantly clashed.”149
Specifically, as Gates described the GLO’s predicament, “[c]arelessly drafted
measures led to uncertainty about routes, about the rights of railroads nearing or crossing
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each other, about the inclusion of swamp or what the states tried to call swampland in
grants, about the penalty of forfeiture for failure to build the lines or to build on time,
and about restrictions affecting the right to select indemnity lands.”150 In 1887, Secretary
Lamar complained of the confusion that resulted from the magnitude of different laws.
“The public land States and Territories,” he argued, “were gridironed over with railroad
granted and indemnity limits,” with “the limits of one road [in many instances]
overlapping and conflicting with other roads in the most bewildering manner, so that
the settler seeking a home could scarcely find a desirable location that was not claimed
by some one, or perhaps two or three, of the many roads to which grants of land had
been made by Congress.”151 Decades later, in 1905, one report concluded that “the land
laws, court decisions, and departmental practices had become so complicated that the
settler was at a marked disadvantage in trying to get his share of the public lands when
pitted against the wealth and superior legal services of corporations.” 152 It was not
simply the number of laws, but also their imprecision as to the respective rights and
duties of grantees and claimants and the times at which they attached, that led to legal
complexities and, ultimately, confusion. The complex nature of the land laws would
have made the administering of the land laws, even by a land office composed of the
most honest and energetic of land officials, difficult.
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III.

The Administrative Adjudication of Land Contests

With so many different laws providing for the government’s disposal of land, it
became difficult for settlers and railroad agents alike to determine whether land was
public, whether it had been entered under any number of land laws, or whether it was
contained in one or more land grants. Such confusion led to conflicting claims and
ultimately to disputes. In addition to all of its executive duties, the Land Department
also adjudicated such disputes. In this sense, the Land Department, like other executive
agencies, served a judicial function in addition to its executive and, arguably, legislative
ones. Its adjudication of such contests, including those involving railroad land grants,
in fact became one of its most time-extensive obligations throughout the late nineteenth
century and a source of even greater power for the office.153
As with its other duties, however, the Land Department (and particularly the
GLO), for the most part, did not possess the necessary means to adjudicate claims in a
timely manner, such that land titles often remained clouded for several years. It was not
just the number of people working in the Land Department, but also their lack of
expertise, that was a problem. In 1877, Commissioner Williamson reported that, as to
the resolution of land disputes, the office was “still further in arrears,” due to the
inability of officials or clerks lacking legal training—or as he called them, “mere
novices in official life”—to handle the work. The examination and resolution of
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conflicting claims required legal training and “the acquisition of those habits of care,
research, and judicial observation which enter into the judgments of courts.”154
The disputes took many forms. There were disputes between rival claimants for
the same tract of land, between claimants and others seeking cancellation of the entries
or claims and a preference right to enter the lands, and between the federal government
itself and claimants upon allegations of illegality in the entries or claims. The railroads
became embroiled in litigation over the nature and extent of their rights to particular
tracts of land as against the rights of preemptors, homesteaders, mining claimants,
Indians, federal and state governments, and other railroads. Indeed, no public lands
legislation produced more litigation than the railroad land grants. The Northern Pacific,
on its own, was a party to over three-thousand formal legal disputes involving its land
grant.155
A recognized procedure existed for resolving such disputes, whether they arose
from an application or from a land contest. Typically, the local register and receiver
took the first action. The judicial discretion of these officers was quite limited, in that
all decisions were subject to review by the commissioner of the GLO whether appealed
or not.156 The commissioner’s role in the process was expansive; at the same time, he
served as prosecutor, judge, and jury. He prepared the charge and collected and
presented the evidence, decided questions of law and declared legal rules, and made
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findings of fact.157 In the great majority of cases, the commissioner’s decision was final
and conclusive, though parties could appeal to the secretary of interior and ultimately to
the United States Supreme Court, whose scope of review was limited to the secretary’s
interpretations of law. Given the finality of the great majority of the commissioner’s
decisions, and given the amount of money involved in such decisions, one member of
Congress called the commissioner “the most important law officer of the
Government.”158
The problem land officials faced was that they initially had little guidance in
navigating a rather tricky legal terrain. The railroad land grants themselves contained
little guidance for administering the grants, particularly as the rights arguably created
therein conflicted with rights under the many other public land laws. Rather than leave
such decisions to individual registers and receivers and clerks in local land offices,
executive officials higher up in the administration took the lead in interpreting railroad
land grants and in providing directives to the district land offices.159
The commissioner, the secretary, or the attorney general often established
precedent later followed not just by lower officials in the Land Department, but also by
courts including even the Supreme Court. For example, the Supreme Court’s holding
regarding the nature of a railroad land grant in its 1874 opinion in the case of
157

Dunham, “Some Crucial Years,”117-141.

Dunham, “Some Crucial Years,” 117-141. See also Nelson, Roots of American
Bureaucracy, 28 (arguing that the GLO “gained added importance because they gave rise to
disputes requiring administrative and sometimes congressional adjudication”).
158

159

Commissioners of the General Land Office and secretaries of the Interior
Department occasionally sought the advice of the Attorney General’s office in issuing both legal
opinions in resolving particular cases and circulars to the land office for administering the land
grants in light of such opinions.

75
Schulenberg v. Harriman has often been cited as establishing two principles: that
railroad land grants were grants in praesenti, and that, prior to the road being located,
they were considered to “float” until the route was located, at which time title related
back to the date of the act.160 This is why public lands historian David Maldwyn Ellis
labeled Schulenberg “the most important case dealing with land grants.”161 This
interpretation, however, dated back at least to 1856, when Attorney General Caleb
Cushing advised the Land Department that “[a railroad land grant] by its text makes a
conditional grant in praesenti in the nature of a float, and which does not attach to any
particular parcel of the public lands until the necessary determinative lines shall have
been fixed on the face of the earth.”162 That principle was cited in two more
administrative land decisions prior to the Supreme Court’s supposedly precedentestablishing opinion.163
The Land Department also developed precedent regarding the meaning of
Section Six of the Northern Pacific’s land grant—a source of much settler resentment
and legal confusion—before receiving meaningful guidance from the judiciary. Because
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so much time usually elapsed, along most of the route, between the Northern Pacific’s
general locations and the ultimate construction of the road, there was much opportunity
for settlers, ranchers, miners, timbermen, speculators, or even other railroads to attempt
to claim lands within the place limits of the Northern Pacific’s grant for themselves. The
prospects of railroad construction enticed settlement along the proposed route, with
some entering lands prior to the secretary’s orders of withdrawal even reaching the local
registers and receivers, who had the principal duty in enforcing such withdrawal. In such
cases, the practice of registers and receivers was initially to accept such entries at least
until such time as they received the withdrawal orders. The Northern Pacific contested
that practice, however, and filed with the GLO an application to cancel entries made on
odd sections within granted limits after its map of general road had been filed and
accepted but before the order of withdrawal had reached the local land offices.164 The
company’s lawyers argued that Section Six operated “to reserve from disposition under
the general laws of the United States all odd numbered sections within the limits of their
grants along the general route, as shown by a map of the same, filed by the company
and accepted by the secretary of the Interior, August 13th, 1870, and that all entries or
locations made of lands within these limits subsequent to the filing and acceptance of
such map should be cancelled, and the lands held to satisfy the grant to the company
made by the third section of the act.”165
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Despite the GLO’s reputation—one that has persisted—for favoring the
railroads as against settlers, Commissioner Willis Drummond, formerly a practicing
attorney, seemingly went out of his way to decide against the Northern Pacific. The
commissioner provided two distinct rationales for his decision, one explicitly policybased and the other purportedly based on legal precedent. He first argued that “bona
fide settlers who had continued to improve their claims on the faith of the government
withdrawal would be prejudiced” by cancelling their entries as the railroad requested
and that such a result should thus be avoided. He then offered a legal interpretation of
Section Six—one that would apply just as much to entries even after a land office
received an order of withdrawal, and right up to the time of definite location, as to those
involved in this dispute. Taking a strikingly narrow view of Section Six’s protections,
he argued that the section applied only to those lands found, as of the date of definite
location, to belong to the company and that it “did not operate as a withdrawal of lands
from market” prior to definite location.166 The commissioner reasoned that the words
“hereby granted” in Section Six referred to those granted in Section Three, which were
those odd sections, within the place limits, free from preemption, homestead, or other
legal claims as of definite location. While this interpretation made some sense in
isolation, it essentially made Section Six meaningless, since courts and the
administration had consistently held, since the attorney general’s opinion in 1856, that
the company’s rights under in praesenti grants, such as the Northern Pacific’s, attached
to such specific parcels as of definite location even without Section Six.
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Not surprisingly, the Northern Pacific appealed the commissioner’s decision to
the secretary, who sought the advice of the attorney general despite being a respected
attorney himself. The Assistant Attorney General, W. H. Smith, gave his advice and
recommendation on March 15, 1873.167 Smith first cited to the rule that all words in a
statute are presumed to have meaning, i.e. that no word—much less a whole sentence
or paragraph—should be rendered superfluous.168 Specifically, any construction of
Section Six which would render it “a mere repetition of the third [section] must be
rejected if any other reasonable construction can be found consistent with the objects of
the act and the intention of Congress.”169
He considered the commissioner’s opinion to represent just such a
construction.170 Therefore, “if any force or effect whatever is to be given to the clause
in question …, it must be held to extend protection to the odd sections prior to definite
location.”171 Smith found the Northern Pacific’s proffered interpretation the only one to
be “reasonable,” consistent with “the usual and accepted meaning of the words,”
consistent “with every other portion of the act and with the whole act,” and “justified
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by the objects contemplated by Congress in making the grant.”172 The clear purpose of
Section Six, Smith wrote, was to withdraw odd sections within the limits of the grant
from the date of the approval of the map of the general route.173
As to when the withdrawal took effect—whether it was when the secretary
signed the order of withdrawal or when the register and receiver received it—Smith
chose a third option. According to his reading of the statute, Section Six’s withdrawal
provision took effect as of the date of definite location, and an executive withdrawal
order was not necessary for it to occur. The Northern Pacific grant did not speak of
“withdrawal” as most other grants did, but rather of lands simply not being liable to
sale, entry, or preemption. This was evidence, Smith argued, that Congress intended to
offer the Northern Pacific additional protection, based both on an acknowledgement “of
the difficulties that would inevitably be experienced in the construction of the road
through a wild, uninhabited, and for the most part unsurveyed tract of country,” and on
the lack of pecuniary aid in government bonds. He thus recommended to the secretary
that the secretary reverse the commissioner’s decision. Secretary Columbus Delano
concurred and reversed the commissioner’s decision on March 22, 1873.174
One basic problem with the grants was that the lands the federal government
granted to railroad companies, as well as the lands through which the railways were to
be built, were already claimed and held under various levels of legal (as well as physical)
security. They were already privately held, not by Euro-Americans, but by indigenous
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peoples. That fact begged the question as to the relationship between railroad land grants
and so-called “Indian country” or “Indian lands.” Justice John Marshall initially defined
the nature of Indians’ property rights, for the purposes of American law, in his 1823
opinion in the case of Johnson v. M’Intosh.175 He held that Indians possessed a “right
of occupancy” to their lands, one that could only be sold to the United States as
sovereign successor to the European “discoverers” of the North American continent.
It is doubtful whether members of Congress thought much about the inherent
conflict between the stated objectives of its Indian policy, namely ensuring the welfare
of indigenous peoples, and the very purpose of the railroad land grants, namely the
colonization and settlement of the West. However, at least one secretary of interior did
recognize it, though he had no trouble deciding how the conflict should be resolved. In
1878, Secretary Schurz noted that, while the government was bound to protect the
Indian right of occupancy, there was also “a work of national importance … to be
undertaken” with support from the government, namely opening the country up to
“settlement and civilized habitation.” This policy, according to Schurz, trumped the
duty to protect Indian land, a fact that he found Congress to have apparently recognized
in its provisions for the extinguishment of Indian title.176 During the last two decades of
the nineteenth century, administrators and jurists were confronted with resolving the
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tensions between an Indian policy of assimilation and railroad land grants that obligated
the government to extinguish Indians’ property rights, the sanctity of which was
presumably a core tenet of the very civilization the government sought to impose upon
Indians.177
In some cases, the “extinguishment” of Indian titles along railway routes
preceded the actual railroad land grants. Even in these cases, railroad and Indian policies
were closely linked and complex legal issues were presented. In 1854, for instance,
President Franklin Pierce selected the same person, Isaac Stevens, to lead the survey of
a potential northern transcontinental route and to become the superintendent of Indian
affairs for Washington Territory. The following year, in conjunction with both duties,
Stevens entered into a treaty with the confederated tribes of the Salish (or Flathead),
Kootenay, and Upper Pend d’Oreilles Indians. It called for the removal of these groups
from that portion of the Bitter Root valley below the Lolo Fork—an area Stevens
identified as ideal for the transcontinental route to cross—and designated a portion of
these groups’ lands in the Flathead River valley, out of the way to the north, as a
reservation.178 As for the area of the Bitter Root valley above the Lolo Fork, the treaty
called for it to be temporarily reserved from settlement to allow time for government
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surveys to ascertain whether it was “better adapted to the wants of the Flathead tribe
than the general reservation provided for in [the] treaty.”179 The treaty directed the
president, if he determined that the lands met this condition upon completion of the
survey, to set the land aside as a separate reservation for the benefit of the Indian nations
privy to the treaty.
This survey would take years, during which time the land remained in a sort of
legal limbo. Finally, in November of 1871, President Ulysses S. Grant issued an
executive order declaring that the land had been surveyed and examined in accordance
with the treaty and that the land had proven “not to be better adapted to the wants of the
Flathead tribe than the general reservation.” Accordingly, the president ordered “all
Indians residing in said Bitter Root Valley [to] be removed, as soon as practicable” to
the reservation specified in the 1855 treaty.180 Congress complied in June of 1872,
passing an act providing for the removal of Indians in the valley to the Jocko reservation,
and for land above the Lolo Fork to be opened to settlement “in quantities not exceeding
160 acres to each settler, at the price of $1.25 per acre.”181 However, Congress allowed
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some Indians to remain above the Lolo Fork, but only if they met certain conditions
demonstrating their willingness to assimilate into the American way of life. In essence,
Congress required they comply with certain “actual settler” requirements that mirrored
the more general preemption and homestead laws—and disavow their tribal
identities.182 Notably, upon meeting these conditions, Indians received patents to the
land, but these patents did not convey full fee simple absolute but rather the “Indian
title” derived from Marshall’s opinion in Johnson v. McIntosh decades earlier. These
settlers—unlike their Euro-American counterparts—thus continued to lack the power of
alienation, normally seen as a fundamental “right” of property owners. 183 Under this
system, the Department of the Interior issued dozens of patents to Indians, but many of
their recipients declined to receive them on the basis that acceptance would dissolve
their tribal relations.184 The legal status of the Indians remaining in the valley above the
Lolo Fork, therefore, remained uncertain for several years.
In the time between the president’s 1871 order and Congress’ legislation
providing for the removal of the Indians, the Northern Pacific filed with the GLO the
general map of its projected road through Montana and through those lands above the
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Lolo Fork. This only further complicated the legal status of lands above the Lolo Fork
in the Bitter Root valley. The GLO followed its standard practice at the time of
withdrawing lands potentially falling within railroad land grants from entry and for the
benefit of the railroad.185 Faced with interpreting the competing interests of Indian
residents, Euro-American settlers, and the railroad, the Land Department initially
interpreted Congress’ legislation of 1872 (which called for the removal of Indians from
the area above the Lolo Fork while recognizing their right to remain given their
satisfaction of certain legal conditions) as excluding such lands from the railroad
withdrawal. The Land Department instead considered such lands subject to disposal to
individual Indians pursuant to the 1872 legislation or otherwise to white settlers under
preemption or homestead entry.186
The Land Department continued to follow this construction until 1880, when
newly appointed Commissioner Noah C. McFarland canceled the homestead entry of
James Phelps, to the extent it encompassed an odd section, for the reason that it was
previously withdrawn for the benefit of the railroad. The attorney for Phelps, who
represented many white settlers in the valley, appealed this decision to the secretary.
Over two years later, Secretary Henry M. Teller reversed McFarland’s decision and
affirmed the Department’s prior interpretation. In resolving the controversy, Teller held
that the lands were not public lands free from “other claims and rights” at the time of
the 1872 withdrawal, such that they were, by law, excluded from it. The executive order

185

186

Phelps, 1 Pub. Lands Dec. at 370.

Phelps, 1 Pub. Lands Dec. at 371. This is yet another example of the land office not
favoring the railroads as against settlers, in this case, even including Indian homesteaders or
preemptors.

85
of November 1871 did not extinguish Indian title, according to the secretary, but rather
“reserved to the Indians a preference right to the lands, upon conditions, not to be
determined until after the time the company filed its map of route.”187 Further, when
Congress later acted to remove Indians “not disposed to remain,” it called for a
disposition of all the lands without reserving the odd sections of the grant for the benefit
of the Northern Pacific. Instead, the secretary reasoned, it called for a disposition of all
land in the valley with proceeds going into a trust for the benefit of the Flathead Nation,
without any recognition of the purported rights of the Northern Pacific.188
The secretary still faced the problematic issue of whether Congress, in enacting
the 1872 law, breached its agreement with the Northern Pacific to extinguish Indian title
to lands along the railroad, including those in the Bitter Root valley. The Northern
Pacific attorneys claimed that the GLO’s acceptance of the Northern Pacific’s general
location triggered that obligation. In previous cases, the Land Department itself had
agreed with the Northern Pacific’s contention. However, in these cases, the secretary
pointed out, the Indians’ titles consisted only of their “aboriginal” rights of occupancy,
and he argued it was a different situation entirely where the lands in question were part
of permanent or temporary Indian reservations at the time of the grant, as the lands in
this case were. In short, the government's obligation to extinguish Indian title applied
only to lands “clearly granted,” and this included lands covered by the Indian right of
occupancy but did not include lands otherwise explicitly reserved for Indians.189 A
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contrary holding, the secretary reasoned, would deprive the government from fulfilling
its agreement with the Flathead Nation, particularly in the event that the president found
that those lands were “better adapted to their uses than the Jocko reservation.” In that
case, the government would have been required to set the land aside for the benefit of
the Indians. Thus, Teller held that the requirement to extinguish Indian title could not
apply to those lands “set apart for special uses,” including the important government
objective of civilizing “wild tribes.”190
As the Phelps case indicates, Land Department officials did not always follow
the precedents their predecessors had established. Another important change in
interpretations occurred after Delano replaced Jacob D. Cox as President Ulysses S.
Grant’s secretary of interior in 1870. Delano was presented with the issue of what
happened to the status of parcels of land within railroad grant place limits and where
homestead or preemption claims were active as of the date of definite location but
subsequently abandoned. Did the lands pass to the railroad (assuming it had yet to
receive its full allotment of lands) or revert to the government? From 1866 to 1871, the
department had held that “an abandonment or termination of [valid homestead] claims
[after the road was definitely fixed] operated to invest the railroad with title to the
land.”191 However, in 1871, Delano, a former attorney, changed course and held that if
a homestead claim “has attached at the time the line of the road is definitely located,
then the railroad is excluded,” and that it was “immaterial what became of the claim
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after that.”192 In other words, if the claim is later abandoned, the land goes back to the
government (in most cases to be subject to homestead and preemption laws) and not to
the railroad.193
Such reversals begged the question as to whether the Land Department could readjudicate prior decisions (made pursuant to the discarded rule) under the new—and
implicitly “correct”—rule. In the judicial system, final decisions made pursuant to
subsequently discarded legal rules remained final rather than being subject to retroactive
application of the new rule, but it was less than clear the extent to which officials in the
Land Department acted as “judges” for the purposes of adjudicating disputes. Delano
sought the help of U.S. Attorney General A. T. Ackerman, who advised Delano that,
while “it [had] not yet been settled how the decisions of the head of a department have
the conclusive force of the judgments of courts,” he still thought that “the better opinion
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certainly is that such decisions should not be disturbed except in extraordinary cases.”194
Further, “extraordinary cases” were apparently only those where there was “haste, …
surprise, … [or] inadvertence” in the previous ruling.195 Absent any of those
characteristics, a decision of the secretary should be considered “the final adjudication
of [the] Department,” even if later found to be incorrectly decided. A year later, the
assistant attorney general clarified that the secretary and commissioner did act as
“judges” in regard to land disputes. He wrote that “the Commissioner, under the
Secretary, was vested by the [railroad land grant] act with limited judicial powers.…
[W]hen Congress directed that the Secretary should cause the lands granted to be
certified and conveyed to the Company, it evidently intended to give him power, as a
quasi-judicial officer, to construe the act and declare what lands should be conveyed.
The Commissioner derived through the Secretary a like jurisdiction and power.”196
The Land Department also occasionally reversed course because the judicial
branch overruled its interpretations. Given the number of complex legal issues and
simply the vast number of conflicts regarding lands and resources encompassed in them,
the judiciary came to play an increasingly important role in the administration of the
railroad land grants. It did this both through the judicial review (by the Supreme Court)
of administrative adjudications and through litigants bringing actions (normally either
for ejectment or trespass) directly in the federal court system.
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IV.

Railroad Land Grants as a Challenge to Judicial Lawmaking

The Supreme Court’s 1874 opinion in Schulenberg v. Harriman established the
foundational judicial principles for interpreting railroad land grants. Writing for the
majority in that case, Justice Stephen Field held that “unless there are clauses in a statute
restraining the operation of words of present grant, these must be taken in their natural
sense to import an immediate transfer of title, although subsequent proceedings may be
required to give precision to that title and attach it to specific tracts.” 197 While this
holding followed Attorney General Cushing’s opinion from eighteen years earlier,
Justice Field did not cite to Cushing’s reasoning; nor is it clear he was even aware of it.
Rather, he found dispositive earlier Supreme Court opinions that did not even concern
railroad land grants. His opinion thus demonstrated a key difference between
lawmaking at the administrative level and lawmaking at the judicial level. Even as
administrators in the Land Department attempted to be good judges, their style of
reasoning was markedly different. While both incorporated the concept of precedent—
whereby decisions in past cases were binding upon future decisions—for administrators,
these “precedents” remained unconnected from one another, such that a resolution of a
particular legal issue was only constrained by past precedent regarding that same
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specific issue. The judiciary, in contrast, increasingly sought to systematize all
precedents into a coherent, logical whole, whereby even issues of first impression could
be decided based on how they fit into the overarching system.
Speaking on the eve of the Civil War, David Dudley Field—a renowned legal
expert from New York, the architect of New York’s Code, and Justice Field’s brother—
gave a speech at the opening of a law school at Northwestern University in Chicago. To
D. D. Field, law was a science, and he implored those in attendance to teach and to study
law as if it were any other “natural science.” In the address, D. D. Field provided two
metaphors for understanding the nature of law. First, the law was like “the streams of
your own Mississippi Valley, where there is the great parent stream, the father of all
rivers; into this pours the Arkansas, the Ohio, the Missouri; into these again pour lesser
rivers; and still smaller into these last, and so on, till you reach finally the myriads of
rivulets, all over the valley, and trace them to their springs.” But it was also like “a
majestic tree that is ever growing,” one with “a trunk heavy with centuries, great
branches equal themselves to other trees, with their roots in the parent trunk; lesser
branches, and from those lesser branches still, till you arrive at the delicate bud, which
in a few years will be itself a branch, with a multitude of leaves and buds.”198 Like small
streams into a river, individual decisions combine into general (or “first”) principles,
and like branches from a growing tree, these principles produce, according to laws as
neutral and universal as the laws of biology, an ever-growing array of new rules to
govern the growing society.
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Stripped of poetic imagery, what D. D. Field saw as “legal science” was simply
a process of systematizing the law through the application of logic. The first task for
legal scientists was to induce a set of legal principles from the sources of law, primarily
court decisions. This process involved the gathering of seemingly disparate rules from
decided cases, generalizing them into “first principles,” then classifying these principles
and grouping them together in a cohesive and uniform structure. It was from this
structure that judges and attorneys could deduce specific rules and apply them to
specific cases predictably, impartially, and consistently. Any preexisting rules that could
not be deduced from the general principles were considered to be faulty judgments not
in line with “the law” and were eliminated.199 “Classical legal thought,” as this style of
reasoning has come to be known, became closely linked with the concept of
“formalism,” a term much maligned throughout the twentieth century. As Robert W.
Gordon outlined it in his influential 1983 article, “Legal Thought and Legal Practice in
the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920,” the central task in making law “scientific”
was indeed “to make the whole system formally realizable, that is, to standardize the
definition of rights and duties,” so that parties and lawyers could predict how law would
apply to particular activities and judges could “enforce the rules without exercising any
discretion of [their] own.”200
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While D. D. Field presented, and perhaps intended, his notion of American law
to be descriptive rather than normative, it was not an accurate portrayal of legal
developments in America up to that time. Rather, early American law was typified by
what he saw as the stark alternative to his view of law as a science; it was a system in
which “the decision of litigated questions [depended] upon the will of the Judge or upon
his notions of what was just.”201 In previous decades, law had depended upon judges’
notions of which legal rulings would best serve what they defined as the public interest,
namely the promotion of economic activity and growth. However, in the decades
following the Civil War, jurists and attorneys increasingly took up the task of making
the law into a science.202 D. D. Field’s account became a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy,
as those trained in the “legal science” he advocated came to conceive of the law as a
science and of themselves as scientists, and as they filled law firms and judicial seats
later in the century, law in fact became what they conceived it to be.
The development of classical legal thought can be seen as an effort to
depoliticize law, something that legal historian Morton J. Horwitz has argued “has
always been a central aspiration of American legal thinkers.”203 The specific problem
legal scientists attempted to resolve, according to legal philosopher David Delaney, was
“how to insure that the processes and products of judicial practice [were] sufficiently
201
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neutral and objective so as to bear the weight of legitimacy. Their answer was to make
legal meaning sufficiently determinate so that any judicial decision could “plausibly be
portrayed as being necessitated by ‘law’ rather than as simply the outcome of subjective
or ideological choice.”204 In short, judges maintained or even enhanced their power by
denying they had any will, any choice, or any power at all. Rather, the power resided in
the law itself, and they merely neutrally and objectively, employing their expertise in
the methodology of legal science, deduced the law and applied it to the facts at hand.
It would be an over-simplification, however, to point to the self-interest of
judges as an explanation for the effort to depoliticize law. As legal scholar Duncan
Kennedy argued in his influential 1975 paper—long unpublished but widely circulated
among legal scholars for years—classical legal thought was likely a legitimate attempt
at promoting justice through reason, not a right-wing, reactionary attempt to protect selfinterests through a retreat to “formalism.”205 The supposed apolitical nature of law was
thought crucial not just to the promotion of justice but also to civilization itself. If law
was anything but an objective set of rules to which all members of society must conform,
D. D. Field argued, “there could be no civilization and no order, since order is but
another name for regularity, or conformity to rule.”206 American governance was best,
in his estimation, because it was a sovereign of laws rather than of men, an attribute
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which he saw as “our great security against the maladministration of justice” and the
essential condition “of all free government, and of republican government above all
others.”207 In such a government, he explained, the objective application of a system of
formal rules derived from “first principles” decided legal questions rather than the
judge’s personal notions of what was fair or just.208
One important “first principle” in classical legal thought was crucial in Justice
Field’s decision in the Schulenberg case, and that was the distinction between “public”
and “private” law. “Public law” was broadly thought of as a set of laws defining
relationships between the government and its citizens, and it was typified by criminal
and regulatory law, both coercive in their basic structures. “Private law,” on the other
hand, broadly referred to the set of legal doctrines that defined relationships among the
government’s citizens, and it was typified by the laws of tort, contract, property, and
commerce.209
Railroad land grants, because they involved a relationship between the federal
government and railroad corporations vis-à-vis the public domain, arguably constituted
public law. But these grants also constituted contracts between the government and the
railroad corporations, and involved primarily the deeding of property between these two
parties, such that it could have been found that the private law of contracts and/or
property should apply. Which category of law Justice Field decided to apply was
dispositive of his resolution of the Schulenberg case. As he himself framed the issue

207

Field, “Magnitude and Importance of Legal Science,” 530.

208

Field, “Magnitude and Importance of Legal Science,” 530.

209

See Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960, 10-11.

95
before the Court, the timing of the conveyance to the railroad company depended upon
its characterization as “public law” or “private law.” The specific issue in the case was
whether the granted lands had, without any subsequent action taken by Congress,
reverted back to the federal government due to the failure of the state to provide for the
construction of the railway within the permitted time. Before arriving at the issue of
reversion of title, the Supreme Court first had to determine whether any title had even
passed to the state prior to the specific lands being ascertained and the railway being
constructed.
Had he deemed the railroad grant to be “private law,” he would have considered
the Court bound by rules applicable to private transactions, which held grants of lands
not yet designated to be “mere contracts to convey” rather than “actual conveyances,”
since the validity of any private transfer required the “possibility of present
identification of property to the validity of its transfer.”210 However, Justice Field found
a different line of precedent for public laws involving grants of land. He cited to an 1817
case in which the Supreme Court interpreted a 1782 North Carolina land grant as
immediately vesting a title in the grant’s recipient, though surveys were necessary to
give “precision to that title and [to attach] it to the lands surveyed.” 211 He also cited to
a similar construction of the land grant provisions of the 1820 legislation admitting
Missouri into the Union, which the Supreme Court characterized as a “present grant,
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wanting identity to make it perfect.”212 Based on these precedents, Field held that, where
a legislative grant contains words indicating a present transfer of title, and “unless there
are other clauses in [the] statute restraining the operation of words of present grant, these
must be taken in their natural sense to import an immediate transfer of title, although
subsequent proceedings may be required to give precision to that title and attach it to
specific tracts.”213 In this case, the grant used language of immediate transfer—“that
there be, and is hereby, granted”—that would be incorporated into all subsequent
railroad land grants, and Field held the clause calling for the reversion to the United
States of all unsold lands if the road was not completed within a specified time frame
not to restrain the operation of these words.214
Justice Field’s opinion is as notable for what it did not say as what it did. In its
briefing, the plaintiff argued against regarding the grant as in praesenti based primarily
on public policy grounds. Congress issued the land grant, the plaintiff urged, for a
“defined purpose,” one that did not “require the construction that the [recipient] State
takes the legal title in praesenti.” Rather “it must be presumed,” the plaintiff reasoned,
“that Congress in passing the acts considered that the general good would be best
subserved by such application of a portion of the public lands, and so made provisions,
through the agency of the States and their representatives, the railroad companies, to
dispense, as the improvements go on, the fund provided to further such object.”215 This
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argument may have been persuasive even a decade earlier, but Field, in 1874, did not
even explicitly consider it. He did not interpret the grant in terms of public policy or in
terms of what Congress may have desired, but rather interpreted the words actually used
through reliance upon past judicial precedent. Had he explicitly considered policy
concerns, he might have thought of the effect his opinion would have on the
development of the West, one of the primary purposes behind all of the railroad land
grants. That he did not do so shows he bought in fully to the tenets of classical legal
thought. Policy was for Congress; applying the law pursuant to established rules was
for the courts.
Legal science was not in fact value-free, however, and classical legal thinkers
valued certainty, stability, and predictability, both in society and in law, above all. As
regards society, this showed up most notably in doctrines promulgated to protect “vested
property rights” and the sanctity of the “free market” from governmental redistribution
of wealth or other interference. Such doctrines are the principal reason that many have
criticized classical legal thought as being essentially a reactionary pretext for protecting
privilege.216 As for making the law more stable and predictable, legal scientists believed
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they had found a way to perfect lawmaking by making law fully cognizable and, hence,
predictable, and they claimed this to be the primary virtue of the system.217
The law as applied to railroad land grants, however, never reached near that level
of predictability. That might have become evident even to Justice Field just a year after
his opinion in Schulenberg, when a majority of the Supreme Court disagreed with Field
as to how his precedent should be applied. In that case, a majority of the Supreme Court
held that because the land grant was in praesenti, it extended only to public lands owned
absolutely by the United States as of the date of the grant. It did not extend to lands that
Congress reserved for other purposes, including for the establishment of Indian
reservations, even if such lands were later restored to the absolute ownership of the
United States by the date of definite location.218 Justice Field wrote a dissenting opinion
in which he held that the date of definite location was the only important date for
defining the extent of the land grant; just as the size of the land grant could be reduced
by occurrences after the date of the granting legislation, so too could it be enlarged. 219
Seventeen years later, in 1892, Field acknowledged, “after a much larger experience in
the consideration of public land grants,” that the majority opinion was correct after
all.220 Interestingly, his rationale was not based on the majority’s logical persuasiveness,
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but rather on what was better for society. As he stated it, the rule holding that “a grant
of public lands only applies to lands which are at the time free from existing claims is
better and safer, both to the government and to private parties, than the rule” for which
he had advocated in 1875.221 That Justice Field, one of the leading devotees of legal
science, changed his mind shows that his science was not determinative—that judges
still had to make choices. That Justice Field did so explicitly on policy grounds shows
that even the most ardent legal scientists could be instrumentalist in their reasoning.
Justice Field’s opinion in Schulenberg was not even determinative of the nature
of the title that passed in praesenti. During the 1880s, the Interior Department and
judiciary continued to struggle with this issue, and each resolution seemed only to make
the land laws less—rather than more—intelligible, and even the Supreme Court failed
to clarify the legal milieu. In one line of cases, the Supreme Court stood firmly for the
proposition that the railroad land grant acts passed to the railroad companies a present
title to the lands in fee, at least to the extent that the government held the fee at the time
of the grant.222 This interpretation relied principally on the fact that the railroad land
grants always incorporated language of “absolute donation,” with the usual language
being the following: “That there be and is hereby granted….”223 In another line of cases,
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the Supreme Court characterized the title which passed to the railroads as merely an
equitable interest, with the government retaining legal title until the railroad met its
obligations in paying the expenses of surveying, selecting, and conveying the lands
within the grant.224
Some lower-court federal judges used the resulting legal latitude to disregard—
or creatively distinguish—binding Supreme Court precedent. In a few cases decided
during the 1880s, Judge Matthew P. Deady of the federal court for Oregon, for instance,
gained some notoriety for his judicial creativity as it came to getting around Supreme
Court precedent.225 In one 1882 case, he reasoned that the section of the grant calling
for the conveyance of lands to the Northern Pacific only after completion of each
twenty-five mile section of railway was just such a clause “restraining the operation of
words of present grant” so as to render the grant not a present one. Deady further
explained that while the grant evidenced the intention of Congress “to set apart and
devote the lands in question absolutely to the construction of the Northern Pacific
Railroad,” it did not, when taken as a whole, evidence intent “to part with the title” as
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of the date of the grant, but rather “only so fast as they were earned by completion of
the work.”226 Deady thus concluded that the legal title to unearned portions of the grant
remained in the United States.227 His holding was a plausible, albeit strained, reading of
Schulenberg, but it conflicted with other Supreme Court precedent, including at least
one opinion that Field himself also wrote. In an 1878 opinion, Field held a grant
containing language identical to that which Deady later found to render the Northern
Pacific grant a future grant to be a present one.228 Deady was either ignorant of this other
opinion or he chose to ignore it.
Even as the Supreme Court had recently reaffirmed the principle that railroad
land grants, including the one to the Northern Pacific, passed present legal titles in fee,
Judge Deady doubled down on his previous holding in an 1887 case, United States v.
Ordway. In this case, however, he addressed the seeming incompatibility between his
interpretation and that of the Supreme Court. In particular, he reasoned that a Supreme
Court opinion from the previous year, one that seemingly affirmed that court’s prior
holdings, did not in fact mean what it said. While acknowledging there to be “language,
in the opinion of the [Supreme Court], which, abstracted from its surroundings, may be
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so construed … as authority for the proposition that the [land grant was] an unqualified
present grant of the odd sections included therein, whether earned or unearned,” Judge
Deady instead interpreted the opinion as standing for two propositions, both consistent
with the titles to unearned lands remaining in the United States. First, the filing of a map
general route results in the odd sections within the limits of the grant being withdrawn
from sale or preemption. Second, the grant became absolute and unqualified upon the
lands being earned.229
Only months after Deady’s opinion in United States v. Ordway, Justice Field
and Judge Deady sat together on the circuit court for the District of Oregon, and they
decided a case that again called into question the nature of the Northern Pacific’s land
grant. Writing for the court, Justice Field took the opportunity to reaffirm the precedent
he had helped establish from his seat on the Supreme Court. He first reiterated that “the
present title here mentioned is a legal title, as distinguished from an equitable or
inchoate interest arising upon a contract or promise of the government,” and that the
railroad land grants “transfer a present legal right to the sections designated, which
become attached to them specifically whenever they are identified.”230 To Justice Field,
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the Supreme Court had consistently given railroad land grants this same interpretation.
He explained that the grant is “in the nature of a float,” with the legal title not becoming
“definitely attached to specific sections until they are capable of identification,” at
which time, “the title attaches as of the date of the grant, except as to such parcels as in
the mean time … have been otherwise appropriated.”231
Justice Field dealt specifically with Judge Deady’s interpretation. Regarding
Deady’s argument that the section calling for the issuance of patents only after
completion of each twenty-five miles of road qualified the language of absolute
donation, Justice Field reasoned that the issuance of patents, rather than conveying the
government’s fee title, merely served as evidence of the grantee’s title—as in effect
“deeds of further assurance” that the railroad had met all the conditions of the grant, as
confirmation of the grantee’s title, and as “source[s] of quiet and peace in their
possession.”232 The government, in other words, used patents not just to convey title to
lands, but often as confirmation of a previously existing title, and that was the case here.
Regarding Deady’s argument that an absolute grant of legal title would allow the
Northern Pacific to dispose of lands prior to construction, thereby potentially defeating
the ability of the government to complete the railway in the event of the company’s
failure, Justice Field held that the legal title the company received did not include the
power to dispose of it prior to receiving a patent, unless Congress explicitly consented
to such disposal.233 In legal terms, the present title was a fee simple defeasible, and it

231

Denny, 32 Fed. Rep. at 903.

232

Denny, 32 Fed. Rep. at 905-06.

233

Denny, 32 Fed. Rep. at 905-06.

104
only became a perfected, indefeasible fee simple upon completion of the road and
receipt of a patent.
Having adequately—at least to his satisfaction—disposed of Judge Deady’s
arguments, Justice Field then went on the offensive. Citing to Congress’s 1870
authorization for the Northern Pacific to issue bonds to aid in the construction of the
railway and to secure these bonds by mortgaging its land grant, Justice Field argued that
Congress could not have allowed this mortgage if the company had no legal title to the
lands it was to use as security for investors in the event of default. “To suppose that
Congress would sanction such a proceeding,” Field reasoned, “would be to impute to it
complicity in a fraud, which cannot be entertained for a moment.”234 The conclusion
thus followed, according to Field, that Congress allowed for the mortgage because it
had already transferred to the company a legal title to the lands “hereby granted.”235
This legal title benefited both parties to the contract, in that it secured the application of
the property for the construction of the railway and telegraph line, the central purpose
of the granting act and the land grant itself, and it secured the company’s right against
the government allocating the lands to other purposes. For these reasons, Justice Field
stated that he was compelled to reject “the conclusion of the learned judge [Deady] who
is so generally right in his decisions that one may well hesitate to dissent from his
judgment.”236

234

Denny, 32 Fed. Rep. at 906.

235

Denny, 32 Fed. Rep. at 907.

236

Denny, 32 Fed. Rep. at 907.

105
Justice Field also felt compelled to clarify the apparent split in Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding the nature of the land grant. Just as Judge Deady five years
earlier had explained away apparently disparate Supreme Court precedent—including
some of Justice Field’s opinions—by contending that the Court did not mean what it
said, Justice Field took the same approach to explaining the meaning of cases holding
the railroad title to be merely equitable rather than legal up to the issuance of the patent.
As he insisted, “it is not believed that the court intended to hold that a legal title to the
lands had not passed by the grant to the company, and thus overrule or qualify a long
line of decisions, announced after the most mature consideration, and discredit the
security which … Congress had authorized by mortgage on the lands to raise funds to
construct the road.”237 Rather, the Court intended only “to declare that the power of
disposition by the grantee was stayed until the payment of [the cost of surveying,
selecting, and conveying the lands] was made, and that the right of the government to
enforce such payment could not be defeated by the tax laws” of any territory or state.238
This declaration, as Justice Field pointed out, was consistent with his interpretation of
the nature of the railroad’s present title prior to patent issuance, namely one burdened
with a government lien incorporating the terms of the granting act and excluding the
right to transfer the legal title.
For his part, Deady avoided an open revolt against Justice Field’s views. In an
opinion remarkable for its brevity, Deady found the question as to whether the grant
was merely an agreement to convey land upon certain conditions precedent, a grant that
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only takes effect as each 25-mile section of road is completed, or a present grant of legal
title with a restraint on the power of alienation until construction to be immaterial to the
case before the court. He then concluded with the following statement: “As to all the
other points covered by the opinion of the court, I fully concur in both the conclusions
and the reasons given in support of them.”239 Despite the seeming meeting of minds,
because most of Field’s opinion dealt with the question Deady dismissed as irrelevant,
“all the other points” seemingly referred to a very small number of points.
In mailing his opinion to Deady, Justice Field confided in him a “good deal of
trouble with the opinion,” and he even acknowledged the trouble being due to the
Supreme Court’s decisions on grants similar to the Northern Pacific’s having “not
always been consistent.”240 He indicated to Deady that he endeavored to secure the
Northern Pacific’s lands “against any arbitrary alienation to others attempted by
Congress,” while at the same time ensuring that they be devoted to railway construction
and not diverted by the Northern Pacific “to other purposes.”241 He concluded the letter
by proclaiming that he had done his best “to work out what [he] believe[d] to be a just
result.”242 After Deady had replied with his concurring opinion, Field wrote that he was
“glad” that Deady could concur “as far as [he] did, while also expressing his hopes that
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the opinion would have “a good effect.”243 These letters thus seem to confirm that the
formalistic reasoning employed by Field and other jurists during this era was at least
occasionally more of a rationalization than the axis of decision-making. Even the most
formalistic of judges considered the foreseeable results of their opinions, even if they
could not articulate such considerations in their opinions. This revelation might be one
reason that three years later Field wrote Deady regarding the “great many letters” he
had written Deady during the last quarter of a century and asking that he “destroy them
all.”244
Deady’s opinions caught the attention of at least one federal judge in Montana,
Judge Hiram Knowles. In an 1891 opinion, he agreed with Deady that the general
language in land grants evidenced a congressional intent not to grant a present legal title
to the lands included therein, but rather only an equitable title. But Knowles found the
preponderance of Supreme Court precedent to favor the opposite conclusion, and he
reluctantly acknowledged that “the views of the Supreme Court must control this.”245
However, in an opinion published ten days later, Knowles disregarded decades
of legal precedent in finding against the Northern Pacific. The case involved the issue
of whether mining claims could attach to land after being withdrawn for the benefit of
the railroad pursuant to Section Six of its land grant.246 Although both the Land
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Department and the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, had consistently held that
Section Six operated to exclude lands from any other rights attaching, Knowles held
that the section should not “be so construed as to withdraw any land from market until
the line of plaintiff’s road should be definitely fixed opposite the same, and a plat thereof
filed.”247 Knowles did not completely ignore precedent but rather reasoned around it.
As to the prior Supreme Court holdings to the effect that Section Six “withdraws the
land granted from sale and entry or preemption from the time the general route is fixed,”
Knowles stated he found them “unsatisfactory,” such that “this court is not precluded”
by them.248
In his interpretation of Section Six, Knowles was influenced by the fact that so
much time had passed between the date of general location and definite location. “It
could hardly have been contemplated,” he wrote, “that it would be eighteen years after
the grant was made before the fixed route of that road would be established in Montana.”
He asked rhetorically the following question: “Can it be supposed that Congress

United States, no. 390, October term, 1894, Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Junius G. Sanders
et al. (hereinafter referred to as “Sanders Transcript”), available at The Making of Modern Law:
U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 5.
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Sanders, 46 Fed. Rep. at 245. Field had interpreted Section Six to exclude lands from
sale, preemption, or entry in at least two Supreme Court opinions in the previous five years.
Buttz, 119 U.S. at 71-72; St. Paul and Pacific v. Northern Pacific, 139 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1891)
(“The Northern Pacific act directed that the President should cause the lands to be surveyed 40
miles in width on both sides of the entire line of the road, after the general route should be fixed,
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sections of lands granted should not be liable to sale, entry, or pre-emption before or after they
were surveyed, except by the company. They were, therefore, excepted by that legislation from
grants, independently of the withdrawal by the Secretary of the Interior. His action in formally
announcing their withdrawal was only giving publicity to what the law itself declared. The
object of the withdrawal was to preserve the land unincumbered [sic.] until the completion and
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intended, 10 years before the fixed route of plaintiff’s road was established, to withdraw
the lands granted to plaintiff from market, and leave it to subsequent explorations and
surveys to determine what would be the lands granted?”249 Clearly the answer, to
Knowles, was “no.” By even asking the question, though, Knowles violated a central
tenet of classical legal thought, that being the principle that words have a fixed meaning
independent of context. If legal rules can change their meaning based on changed
circumstances, law ceases to be a closed, logical system.
Knowles’ opinion surprised all of the parties to the dispute. Neither side had
even argued the issue of whether Section Six excluded lands from preemption, sale, or
entry. They assumed that point settled beyond dispute. Accordingly, the Northern
Pacific filed for a rehearing so that the parties could present arguments on the point. In
his argument for the railroad, Fred M. Dudley contended rightly that Knowles’ opinion
was contrary to precedent and that it rendered Section Six effectively meaningless, just
as Northern Pacific attorneys had successfully argued before the Land Department
almost two decades earlier.250 Knowles got around Supreme Court precedent by
contending any holdings as to Section Six were not essential to the disposition of those
disputes and hence not binding. As to the binding effect of administrative rulings,
Knowles acknowledged that Land Department practices, especially where they were
“begun so early and continued so long, would be in the highest degree persuasive, if not
absolutely controlling.” However, he held that to be the case only where there was any
“ambiguity” in the statutory language, and Knowles found no such ambiguity in the

249

Sanders, 46 Fed. Rep. at 247.

250

Motion for Rehearing, Sanders Transcript, 40-41.

110
Northern Pacific land grant. To him, the language was “clear and precise” such that
there was “no room for construction”: Section Six did not exclude lands from sale,
preemption, or entry until after definite location.251 Knowles did not venture a guess as
to how countless members of the judiciary and Land Department had managed to miss
something that was so blatantly obvious to him. As to the issue of his interpretation
rendering Section Six superfluous, Knowles admitted that was the case. He shrugged
off the issue though by stating simply that “there is nothing unusual in finding in a
statute words which might have been omitted.”252 Rules of statutory construction be
damned.
The Northern Pacific appealed Knowles’ decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals and then to the Supreme Court, both of which upheld the decision, albeit on
narrower grounds. Eleven years later, however, the Supreme Court, in another case
involving an attempt by the Northern Pacific to eject a settler from a parcel of land,
agreed with Knowles that “withdrawn” lands were still open to settlement up to the date
of definite location, so long as the settlement was made in good faith. Similarly to
Knowles, Justice John Marshall Harlan, in writing for the majority, explained away
Field’s holdings to the contrary by explaining that “this language is not to be taken
literally.”253 Unlike Knowles, however, Harlan did not attempt to hide the fact that his
interpretation of the Northern Pacific’s grant was influenced by the specific equities
involved in the case before him. The settler, Holmes noted, “was not a mere trespasser,
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but went upon the land in good faith, and, as his conduct plainly showed, with a view
to residence thereon, not for the purposes of speculation, and with the intention of taking
the benefit of the homestead law by perfecting his title under that law, whenever the
land was surveyed.”254 Moreover, “for sixteen years before this action, he maintained
an actual residence on this land.”255 Harlan was not a classical legal thinker, and he felt
no need to pretend that he was. That Harlan’s opinion incorporated such reasoning to
overturn a unanimous Supreme Court judgment, one which the Land Department
universally followed for nearly twenty years, indicates that the hold of classical legal
thought over the judiciary was already beginning to wane as early as 1903, two years
before the Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, issued an opinion that would come to
represent the entire era—the “Lochner era”—of Supreme Court jurisprudence.256
*******
By the turn of the century, it had become evident to some that legal science had
failed in its promise of making law certain, stable, and predictable. As early as 1897,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who would later lead the Supreme Court away from strict
formalism, rightly predicted that “certainty … and repose” would not be “the destiny”
of American law in the years to come.257 The sheer volume of legal cases involving the
Northern Pacific’s land grant indicates the legal uncertainty regarding its provisions.258
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Where law and the relevant facts are both certain (meaning that disputants agree how a
judge will decide), disputants have no reason to assume the costs in terms of both time
and money to litigate. They will instead settle based upon their mutual understanding of
their respective rights and obligations and hence save the costs of litigation.259 In most
land grant cases, parties agreed upon the facts, such that the only questions typically
regarded the law and its application. Apparently, there remained many questions
regarding the legal meaning of statutory provisions that Congress enacted three decades
earlier.
Holmes had been critical of classical legal thought from the start. In 1881, for
instance, he disputed its premise that law was a closed, autonomous system induced and
refined through the application of logic free from political influence. As he wrote, “[t]he
life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”260 The experience was one of
increasing complexity, not clarity, and this was a foreseeable result of the project. In his
1859 speech, for instance, D.D. Field implored the audience to join the project of
making American law more “complete,” even as he recognized that making the law
“complete”—something he equated with progress or “civilization”—came at the cost of
sacrificing simplicity.261
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Both classical legal thought and the United States’ public land system
incorporated a high level of abstraction and generality. Legal professionals sought to
standardize all rules governing social phenomena into set categories of rights, duties,
liberties, and liabilities, such that judges and bureaucrats could administer the law
objectively, neutrally, and predictably. Similarly, Congress sought to systematize its
land holdings to allow for their quick and orderly privatization, primarily in 160-acre
blocks, the rationale being that this was the minimum size thought to be capable of
supporting a family farm. The basic problem for both was that any such system depends
upon its lack of detail, and the real world is full of detail. Forms can make the real world
legible through abstraction and generalization, but the substances that the forms
represent remain concrete and particular. The blindness of judges and policymakers to
the reality of the western physical, social, and legal geographies would come at a
profound cost, one typified by rampant fraud and corruption, the monopolization and
depletion of western resources, and continuing legal uncertainty regarding their
exploitation or protection. It also paved the way for a paradigm shift in legal thinking
from classical legal thought to legal realism, the latter of which would come to have a
profound influence on law over the twentieth century.

holds the land, how far his use is absolute, and how qualified by the rights of his neighbors, or
the paramount rights of the State, the relative rights of the wife and husband, the persons who
shall succeed when the owner dies, the rights of the adjoining proprietors in the stream which
runs through the pasture, the rights of the tenant who tills the meadow, what right the owner has
in the shore of the lake, how far he may build into it and on what conditions, the relative rights
of himself and the public in the highway before his house, the right which he has to the pew in
the church, whose spire shines through the trees, and in the family vault where he expects in
due time to be borne.”). To Field, it was the task of the legal profession to make sense of the
morass through the learning and development of legal science, including at institutions of higher
learning. It is no accident that the rise of legal science and classical legal thought accompanied
the rise in formal legal education.
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CHAPTER 2 – AVOIDING A PUBLIC LANDS TRAGEDY
THE RIGHT OF EXCLUSION AND THE ORIGINS OF FEDERAL FOREST
MANAGEMENT

Andrew B. Hammond and his business partner Richard Eddy had already cut
most of the merchantable timber along the Clark Fork River in the mountains between
Missoula and Helena by the summer of 1885, when their company, the Montana
Improvement Company, established a new sawmill on the river to process timber from
the tributary Cramer Gulch.1 Having arrived in Missoula just fifteen years earlier,
Hammond had helped build Missoula into a “thriving city of five thousand” while also
building himself into one of the state’s wealthiest (and hence most powerful) people.2
Hammond and Eddy had formed, along with E.L. Bonner, a merchandising firm in
Missoula nine years earlier, and in 1881, that company entered into a contract to supply
the Northern Pacific with lumber for ties and other materials, despite the company
lacking construction experience. Just a year later, in 1882, Hammond, Eddy, and Bonner
joined with Montana copper magnate Marcus Daly and Washington Dunn, the Northern
Pacific’s superintendent of construction, to form the Montana Improvement Company.
Because Dunn and other Northern Pacific officials held a bare majority of the shares,
people thought of the company as a Northern Pacific subsidiary, though nobody was

Gregory Llewellyn Gordon, “Money Does Grow on Trees: A. B. Hammond and the
Age of the Lumber Baron” (PhD diss., University of Montana, 2010), 172-74, 189. The sawmill
was near to Bonita, Montana.
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acting in that company’s interests.3 Upon its creation, the Montana Improvement
Company received a twenty-year contract to supply the railroad’s lumber needs for
construction and maintenance of the railway from Miles City, Montana to The Dalles,
Oregon.4
When Hammond and Eddy arrived at their new Cramer Gulch mill in the fall of
1885, however, they were surprised to encounter some fifty loggers, all employees of
rival Bill Thompson, on the site cutting down trees. Fights ensued but ownership of the
timber remained unresolved. As the situation worsened, the parties even violated the
custom of respecting at least the rights of others to trees properly branded.5 They
eventually reached a compromise to honor that custom, but still with neither having the
exclusive rights to any unbranded timber. It thus became a race as to who could log the
fastest. As a result, “there were few gulches in Montana,” historian Gregory Gordon
concluded, “that were stripped of their timber faster than was Cramer Gulch that winter
[of 1886].”6
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As historian Gregory Gordon summarized the situation, “with no clear-cut
demarcation of ownership, total mayhem broke out.”
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Gordon, “Money Does Grow,” 173-74. Gordon rightly pointed to this story, which
repeated itself across the Northwest, as representing the battle among the federal government,
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as an example of the right to access. Really, neither contested the other’s right to access because
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This story exemplifies what economist Garrett Hardin labeled the “tragedy of
the commons.”7 Wherever there is lacking an ownership system that functions to limit
access to and consumption of a given resource, Hardin wrote in his influential 1968
essay, each member of the community is “locked into a system that compels him to
increase his [consumption of the resource] without limit—in a world that is limited.
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest
in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.”8 Some have mistakenly
explained the tragedy as the failure for individuals to see community interests over their
own self-interests.9 No, the story is a tragedy rather than merely an unfortunate
occurrence because even when an individual recognizes the “ruin” towards which the
community is headed, and even if that individual values community interests, that
person will still over-exploit the resource absent some coercive mechanism to restrict
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the access of others. The reason is that if he were to forego exploitation based on concern
for long-term sustainability, he knows that others will still over-exploit the resource,
causing him to suffer along with everyone else but without the incremental benefit he
would have derived from having fully exploited the resource. The only rational choice
is to get what he can before the others do, even if it destroys the resource. Hardin
proffered two solutions to the “tragedy”: to restrict access through the vigilance of the
community as a whole—“mutual coercion mutually agreed upon”—or to privatize the
resource so that each private owner has the capacity to exclude others.
What Hardin labeled a “tragedy of the commons” was really a tragedy of openaccess resources, of non-property, or of an unregulated commons. In the AngloAmerican common law tradition, the terms “commons” or “common property,” on their
own, normally imply some form of communal control over access and use. They in short
embody precisely the “mutual coercion” that Hardin pointed to as the solution to the
tragedy—not the tragedy itself.10 For example, beginning as early as the seventh
century, settlements in what is now England employed a system of common fields,
meadows, and pastures, all with limitations on use. After the Norman Conquest in 1066,
communities increasingly regulated who had access to certain portions and the manner
of their use, including the enactment of quotas on the amount of livestock allowed to
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graze on a given pasture.11 English colonists much later exported such customs to
communities from New Brunswick to Virginia.
By the nineteenth century, however, many Americans had come to view the
“commons” differently, and in conflating “commons” with “open-access,” Hardin
unwittingly aligned himself with nineteenth century American thinking. Hammond,
Eddy, Thompson and others all across the American West largely viewed timber as an
open-access resource—at least prior to the government privatizing it. The notion of
public timber being free for the taking was not just one of extra-legal, local custom; it
had its defenders in Congress as well. For some in Congress, open-access was even an
important component of the American constitutional tradition: exclusion was for
monarchies, open access for democracies. In 1826, for instance, Senator Thomas Hart
Benton admonished his fellow senators that they were “an assembly of legislators”
rather than “keeper[s] of the King’s forests.” As representatives of the people, surely
they all understood, Benton implored, that “the Public lands belong to the People and
not to the Federal Government; who know that the lands are to be ‘disposed of’ for the
common good of all, and not kept for the service of a few.”12 Then, in 1852, when agents
of the General Land Office (GLO), the agency charged with administering federal
public lands, seized timber illegally cut from public lands in Wisconsin, a representative
from that state, Ben Eastman, insisted that the agents were acting “without the least
authority of law.” He even complained that lumbermen had been “harassed almost
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beyond endurance with pretended seizures and suits, prosecutions and indictments until
they have been driven almost to the desperation of an open revolt against their
persecutors.”13
That same year, Representative Galusha Grow, from Pennsylvania, defended the
rights of every person to share in the federal government’s supply of timber:
[W]hatever nature has provided ... belongs alike to the whole race, and
each may, of right, appropriate to his own use so much as is necessary to
supply his rational wants. And as the means of sustaining life are derived
almost entirely from the soil, every person has a right to so much of the
earth’s surface as is necessary for his support .... As it is man’s labor,
then, applied to the soil that gives him a right to his improvements ... so
he is entitled to a reasonable quantity of wood-land, it being necessary
to the full enjoyment of his improvements; for wood is necessary for
building purposes, fencing, and fire-wood. Therefore, he becomes
entitled out of this common fund to a reasonable amount of wood-land.14
As these quotes demonstrate, Americans viewed more than just timber as an openaccess resource. As Greeley once remarked, “free timber” was merely one part of the
American “free land” tradition represented in the preemption and homestead laws.15
Preemption laws, the most significant of which Congress passed in 1841, provided for
qualified persons to acquire legal title for up to 160 acres by inhabiting and improving
the land and paying $1.25 per acre.16 The law applied retroactively to validate the claims
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of people who had previously settled land, even without legal right. 17 Passed in 1862,
the Homestead Act expanded upon the preemption laws by providing settlers the option
of securing lands for free simply by living on the land for five years and cultivating it.18
Greeley might have added to that list of laws the nation’s mining laws—which declared
public lands to be “free and open” to mineral exploration and development—and its lack
of restrictions on the use of public rangelands.19 As late as 1884, a congressional
committee charged with reviewing the nation’s land laws found cattlemen to be illegally
holding roughly fifteen million acres of the public domain, yet it also acknowledged the
government lacked any legal mechanism for prosecuting the trespasses. 20 Indeed, the
term “public lands” itself came to be understood not as those lands in governmental
ownership, but only as those lands free and open for the American public to enter and
to acquire.21
To a limited extent, the government did assert control of resources prior to
privatization. It dictated who could have access to what resources and defined the
conditions by which parcels could be privatized, even if such conditions were minimal.
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The Preemption Act of 1841, for example, allowed only heads of families, widows, or
single men to settle lands and ultimately secure legal title to them, and it limited the size
of tracts to 160 acres. It also required settlers to follow several steps. After inhabiting
and improving particular parcels, qualified settlers had thirty days to file a declaration
of intent to preempt, and they had a year to prove the settlement and improvement, to
submit an affidavit testifying that they met all of the requirements of the act, and to pay
$1.25 per acre.22 However, from the start, these restrictions were frequently violated,
sometimes with the backing of extra-legal, vigilante organizations known informally as
“claim clubs.”23 Such a development was foreseeable. In the debates over the
preemption law in 1841, in fact, Senator Henry Clay predicted that the federal
government would not be able to control the “lawless rabble” that he said would settle
lands ahead of surveys. Clay’s warning, however, went unheeded, and at great expense.
Thirty years later, Henry George lamented the extent to which speculators had exploited
the land laws to benefit themselves at the expense of the public:
A generation hence our children will look with astonishment at the
recklessness with which the public domain has been squandered. It will
seem to them that we must have been mad...to every importunate beggar
to whom we would have refused money we have given land—that is, we
have given to him or to them the privilege of taxing the people who alone
would put this land to any use.24
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The Homestead law contained similar restrictions and requirements, but they too
were often circumvented.25 One prominent public lands historian, Paul Wallace Gates,
once wrote that speculation and land monopolization—in part executed via fraudulent
homestead entries—characterized the homesteading era, with “actual homesteading
[being] generally confined to the less desirable lands distant from railroad lines.”26
Gates cited to Commissioner of the GLO William A. J. Sparks, who complained in 1885
that the Homestead Act, “both in Washington and in the field, was frequently in the
hands of persons unsympathetic to its principle” and that “Western interests, though
lauding the act, were ever ready to pervert it.”27 In his memoir, Gifford Pinchot, the first
head of the United States Forest Service, described one method for circumventing the
Homestead Act’s requirements: “The law required a dwelling on a homestead claim. So
the claimant would build a toy house, swear to the existence of a dwelling on his claim
‘14 by 16 in size,’ but omit to mention that the said dwelling was 14 by 16 inches instead
of 14 by 16 feet.”28
The federal government also passed laws prohibiting the unauthorized taking of
timber from public lands. Congress enacted the first one in 1817, when it authorized the
Secretary of Navy to reserve timberlands for shipbuilding purposes and imposed
penalties for commercial exploitation of such forests. Then, in 1831, Congress expanded
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the prohibition to all public lands.29 These pieces of legislation, however, went largely
unenforced. The GLO only began prosecuting timber trespass in 1852.30 Even then, the
government’s prosecutions were sporadic, and its policies focused not on preventing
illegal timber harvests but rather merely on ensuring the government received the value
of the trees illegally cut. Commissioner of the GLO Willis Drummond reported to
Congress in 1873, for instance, that when registers and receivers received reliable
information that “spoliation of public timber is committed, their instructions require
them to investigate the matter, to seize all timber found to have been cut without
authority on the public land, to sell the same to the highest bidder at public auction, and
deposit the proceeds in the Treasury.”31 While Drummond increased prosecutions, he
emphasized that their purpose was “not to indulge in vindictive prosecutions.” Instead,
he advised prosecutors “to compromise with the parties” to pay only a reasonable price
for the stumpage plus the government’s costs in bringing suit.32 By merely fining
trespassers for the value of the timber taken, the federal government ignored the
negative impact of the timber harvest on the land’s future productivity. This is why
James Willard Hurst saw this approach as yet another example of the legal system’s
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preference for present over future yield, a preference that resulted from the perceived
abundance of land and resources and perceived shortage of capital.33 It also contributed
to countless timber “tragedies,” at least on the local scale, as Hurst’s history of the
Wisconsin lumber industry demonstrates.34
Railroads initially exacerbated such tragedies by creating demand for timber and
by linking timber to distant markets. They stimulated timber demand both because they
required timber for railroad construction and because they made industrial-scale
mining—requiring large amounts of timber—feasible. In the Missoula Valley for
instance, sawmills remained small-scale water-powered mills, intended only to supply
lumber for immediate local consumption, until the arrival of the Northern Pacific, when
railroad contracts allowed Hammond and others to build dozens of steam-powered mills
to supply railroad construction and the burgeoning mining industry such railroads made
possible.35 Railroads also participated, typically through “improvement company”
subsidiaries, in the trespasses themselves, as the Northern Pacific’s relationship with
Hammond’s Montana Improvement Company exemplifies.36
However, railroads can also be seen as having helped save American forests
from tragedy, at least on a national scale. Environmental historian Robert Bunting, for
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one, has argued that the acquisition of extensive timber holdings by powerful
corporations like the Northern Pacific led to a decline in timber trespasses in the Pacific
Northwest.37 One reason is that railroads possessed the motivation to enforce rights as
to which the government had long been indifferent: the right to exclude others. The
Supreme Court has referred to this right as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle
of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”38 The right to exclude is indeed
the reason that Hardin advocated privatization as one of the two solutions to the tragedy
of the commons.39 Whereas the federal government, at least until the latter part of the
nineteenth century, lacked the combination of will and means to enforce its right of
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exclusion, railroads had both a pecuniary incentive to protect their resources and staffs
of investigators and attorneys to do so.
*******
That railroads were both willing and able to enforce their rights of exclusion is
perhaps best demonstrated by the great number of land contests and ejectment actions—
both legal mechanisms for enforcing an exclusionary right—railroads initiated, as
discussed in the previous chapter of this dissertation. Railroads became embroiled in
litigation over the nature and extent of their rights to particular tracts of land as against
the rights of preemptors, homesteaders, mining claimants, Indians, federal and state
governments, and other railroads. Indeed, no public lands legislation produced more
litigation than railroad land grants. The Northern Pacific, on its own, was a party to over
three-thousand formal legal disputes involving its land grant.40
The approach of another railroad, the Oregon & California, was typical. Upon
having a selection list approved and receiving patents to sections of land, the company
first made its possession of lands clear to all would-be settlers, both by recording its
patents in the various counties in which the lands lay, and by keeping on record its
approved selection lists as well as patents issued by the government. The company also
established its ownership by paying the taxes on such lands.41 When the company found
a party occupying a parcel of its unsold lands, it sent agents to ascertain the situation
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and to determine the rights, if any, of the possible trespassers to the land. If the person
was indeed without legal right to occupy the land, the company asserted its ownership
and demanded that the party either take a lease on the land or vacate it. If the individual
refused, the company then filed an ejectment suit to force them from the land.42 The
company made “a good many leases” of lands for grazing purposes, according to land
official Brian A. McAllaster; in many of these cases, the company's purpose was to
prevent the statute of limitations running against the company by virtue of the
occupancy.43 The company also took efforts to prevent depredations, destruction, or
waste of timber by persons not entitled to it by law.44
Because so much of the railroads’ grants remained unpatented even at the turn
of the century, they developed policies on how to treat timber trespassers on lands not
yet patented to them. In the case of the Northern Pacific, wherever the company
suspected timber trespasses, the company’s land commissioner sent out an investigator
to gather information as to any past transgressions and to prevent future ones. That
person then reported to the land office, which then referred any prosecutable trespasses
to the Western Land Attorney with a directive to settle for the amount cut. The Northern
Pacific typically would demand $1.50 per thousand board feet, but the company’s land
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department usually authorized the company’s land attorneys to settle for $1.25 or even
$1.00 per thousand board feet.45
Some did not take well to the Northern Pacific’s demands. In late 1896, for
instance, a Northern Pacific investigator, Charles E. Woodworth, notified the sheriff of
Missoula County, William H. McLaughlin, that he was responsible for taking timber
from Northern Pacific lands. Frank M. Dudley, the Northern Pacific’s Western Land
Attorney in Spokane, Washington, later followed up with McLaughlin demanding
settlement at $1.50 per thousand board feet unlawfully cut.46 The sheriff responded by
requesting both an extension of time and for the amount to be lowered to one dollar. As
to the need for an extension, he confessed that he was “unable to pay just now” and
needed until May or June of the following year, the reason being that his lumber mill
was seasonal: it had shut down on October 1 and would not reopen until spring. As for
the price demanded, McLaughlin considered it “out of all reason the way lumber is
selling and was selling when the timber was cut.”47 He stated that he would be “perfectly
willing to pay the going price for timber,” which he estimated at $1.00 per thousand
board feet, based primarily on the price for processed lumber at the railway car being
less than $6.00. He finished with a plea: “Hoping you will consider the price of timber
very carefully.”48 What McLaughlin sought, in short, was to pay the market value for
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the timber without paying anything for violating the Northern Pacific’s right of
exclusion.
In its reply, the railroad made clear it wanted redress not just for the value of the
timber taken, but also for being deprived its right of exclusion. First, Dudley forwarded
McLaughlin’s letter to Land Commissioner William H. Phipps with a request for
instructions on how to proceed. In reply, Phipps acknowledged the rate of $1.50 per
thousand board feet to be high, but he emphasized that such was intentional: he sought
“to make it unprofitable for people to cut our timber without authority.”49 Unlike the
federal government, the Northern Pacific recognized that its property rights entitled it
not just to the market value of commodities on the land, but also to decide how and
when they were to be extracted and to determine who would receive the benefits from
their use. Moreover, it perhaps also recognized that the value of the property was not
just in its present value, but also in its future productivity. Still, Phipps authorized
Dudley to settle for $1.25 per thousand board feet, an amount splitting the difference
between the railroad’s initial demand and McLaughlin’s estimated market value. As to
the extension of time, Phipps thought that was fine, so long as the railroad received
sufficient security.50
Because railroad construction was a primary impetus for timber trespasses, the
Northern Pacific sometimes caught people cutting timber for the purposes of selling it
to another railroad, just as the Northern Pacific sometimes purchased timber stolen from
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another’s land. In the spring of 1897, for example, a railroad investigator discovered
piles of ties in multiple locations along the Montana-Idaho border. He soon concluded
that they had been taken from within the place limits of the Northern Pacific’s land grant
and were earmarked for use on the competing Great Northern line. Upon the investigator
reporting the matter to the land department, Land Commissioner Phipps sought the
advice of Dudley, who directed that the company wait for the Great Northern to inspect
and accept the ties before calling its attention to the Northern Pacific’s claims. The
reason was simple: if the Northern Pacific were to sue prior to the other railroad’s
acceptance, it would have to proceed against each of the individual trespassers, possibly
entangling the company in twenty or more lawsuits.51 Though not made explicit, that
the Great Northern had deeper pockets than small-scale timber operators likely played
a role as well.52
Another issue confronting the company in this case was that the ties had been
taken from lands not yet surveyed. Because there were not yet specific parcels of land
to which the Northern Pacific could point where its future interests had been violated,
the Northern Pacific could not technically sue the Great Northern. Rather, that
obligation fell to the United States Department of Justice. As in other cases, the Northern
Pacific notified the U.S. district attorney and solicited his agreement to bring suit for
the trespasses. The agreement called for the Northern Pacific to draft the complaint and
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otherwise aid in the prosecution; in exchange, the district attorney agreed to give half
of the suit’s proceeds to the company.53
Lands remaining unsurveyed for so long was especially difficult given the
exclusion of mineral lands from railroad grants.54 The Supreme Court compounded the
uncertainty in 1894 when it held the exclusion of mineral lands to include those
unknown to contain minerals at the time of the route being fixed, so long as minerals
were discovered prior to patent.55 That case involved land in western Montana on the
outskirts of Helena. The railroad fixed the definite route through that area in 1882, at
which time nobody knew the land at issue to contain minerals. Six years later, however,
a group of four men entered the land without the consent of the railroad and located
quartz lode mining claims on it. They subsequently discovered gold, silver, and other
precious minerals on their claims. The Northern Pacific then asserted its right of
exclusion in filing a complaint, in federal court, for the recovery of the possession of
the land, for the value of minerals extracted, and for the costs associated with the
litigation. The railroad’s attorneys insisted that the grant’s exclusion of mineral lands
applied only to those known to contain minerals as of the date of definite location or to
those the railroad identified as mineral in its definite location.
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Writing for the Supreme Court’s majority, Justice Stephen Field rejected the
railroad’s argument. He first made a formalistic statutory construction argument. He
reasoned that the company’s position amounted to adding the word “known” into the
statute, something he was unwilling to do. As he interpreted the plain meaning of the
land grant, “the intention of Congress was to exclude from the grant actual mineral
lands, whether known or unknown, and not merely such as were at the time known to
be mineral.”56 Field then offered an additional rationalization for his opinion, this one
relating to the policies behind the land grants. He first noted that when Congress passed
the land grant, it was impossible to know what parts of the vast tract contained minerals;
rather, the mineral character of lands “could only be ascertained after extensive and
careful explorations.” He then surmised that “it is not reasonable to suppose that
Congress would have left that important fact [as to the mineral character of the lands]
dependent upon the simple designation by the [Northern Pacific] of the line of its road,
and the possible disclosure of minerals by the way, instead of leaving it to future and
special explorations for their discovery.”57 Such a reading of the statute, according to
Field, would amount to an imputation to Congress that it intended its exclusion of
minerals to be defeated, something that Field found “impossible to admit.”58 To Field,
those “future and special explorations” were to take place as part of the GLO’s
investigation prior to issuing patents. Once the government issued patents to the
railroad, they were final and determinative absent fraud.
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Field’s holding had the practical effect of calling into question the right of
exclusion of railroad land grant recipients, including the Northern Pacific, prior to
patent, at least as to those entering lands to explore for minerals. That was especially
the case given that private entry and exploration remained the primary legal mechanism
for the government to identify which lands contained minerals (and hence which lands
were excluded from railroad land grants). At the very least, railroads could no longer
eject an alleged “trespasser” once a discovery of minerals had been made. Since many
years, if not decades, typically passed between submitting maps of definite location and
applying for patents, this was quite a troubling development for the Northern Pacific
and other land grant railroads.
Another problem was that the GLO had neither the means nor the explicit legal
authority to investigate lands as to their mineral character, as Field seemingly assumed
it did, prior to issuing patents. Field’s opinion spurred Congress to action, however, as
not even a year passed before Congress, in early 1895, directed the president to appoint
three commissioners for each of four designated districts in western Montana and Idaho.
Congress directed such commissioners, once appointed, to classify—based on personal
examinations and the taking of affidavits—lands within the limits of the Northern
Pacific grant as to their mineral character. Further, Congress showed real urgency in
providing actual money to fund the enterprise and in directing the commissioners to
begin “immediately upon their appointment.”59 There would be no waiting for the
Northern Pacific to file its selection lists.
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The exclusion of mineral lands from railroad land grants raised legal questions
not just as to railroads’ rights to exclude prior to receiving patents, but their duty to do
so. Railroad attorneys recognized that American law not only bestows upon owners of
property a right of exclusion, but also imposes a duty to exclude. This doctrine, the
doctrine of “adverse possession,” holds that where a deed holder allows another to
possess its land in an actual, hostile, exclusive, and continuous fashion, under a claim
of right and for some requisite period, that deed holder loses the right to eject the
trespasser.60 Given that the Northern Pacific acquired its interest in lands over several
steps, with arguably increased property rights at each step, questions were raised as to
the time at which the Northern Pacific’s duty to exclude adverse uses of its lands
attached. This was of concern not just to the Northern Pacific, but also those who
purchased or were considering purchasing lands from the company. One such case
involved Miles J. Cavanaugh, a miner and a member of the Mineral Land Classification
Commission for the district encompassing Butte. In the summer of 1899, Cavanaugh
purchased a section of land just to the west of Butte near the mining town of Anaconda,
a section he and the commission had classified as non-mineral in a report approved by
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the Commissioner of the GLO the previous summer.61 Prior to Cavanaugh’s purchase
of the property, however, a portion of it—the northeastern part—had reportedly been
enclosed by someone with the last name Hays, and before that by someone with the last
name McCleary, as part of what locals knew as the Saw Mill Ranch.62
Early in the spring following his purchase, Cavanaugh began to remove the
fence before receiving a complaint from Hays claiming the tract as his own. Hays sought
an ejectment of Cavanaugh and his employees, accusing them of having, “without right,
unlawfully and without the consent of the plaintiff, entered upon said premises and
trespassed thereon.”63 “Unless restrained by the order of this Court,” the defendants
would, according to Hays,
enter upon the same and tear down, take away and destroy plaintiff’s
fence enclosing said premises, and may themselves, their servants,
agencys and employes [sic.], continually enter and trespass upon said
premises and destroy the said grass and hay, and will allow stock and
cattle to enter and trespass upon the same, and that if they are permitted
to remove or break or tear down or destroy said fence of any portion
thereof, stock and cattle will continually enter upon the same and tread
down said grass and render said premises worthless to the plaintiff for
the purpose of raising grass or hay thereon.64
Neither Hays nor McCleary had received patent from the United States, neither claimed
to have purchased the land from the Northern Pacific, which had received a patent, and
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neither claimed to have rights under the land settlement laws of the United States.
Rather, Hays based his claim on the doctrine of adverse possession.
A Butte law firm of Miles J. Cavanaugh Jr., the defendant’s son, and Edward W.
Beattie, Jr., the surveyor general’s son, represented Cavanaugh.65 In March 1900, after
a judge had ordered a preliminary injunction against Cavanaugh entering the premises
and had scheduled a court date for trial, the firm wrote to the Northern Pacific’s division
counsel, William Wallace, asking for information and for other assistance in the
defense. The question was important enough for Wallace to forward it to Assistant
General Counsel James B. Kerr. Wallace summarized the plaintiff’s claim as relying
upon “the proposition that the statutes of limitation begin to run on the definite location
of the line and the fixing of the grant.”66 He also predicted what authority plaintiff’s
attorneys would use as support, all cases from California.67
Wallace initially thought that the Supreme Court had settled this question in an
1889 case.68 In that case, the Court held that “[w]hile the title to public land is still in
the United States, no adverse possession of it can, under a statute of limitations, confer
a title which will prevail in an action of ejectment in the courts of the United States
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against the legal title under a patent from the United States.”69 He was surprised to have
found, however, that he was unable to locate another similar holding in his “hurried
examination.”70 He hoped that Kerr might have access to some such decisions “where
you can lay your hands on them” and asked Kerr to “furnish me with them by return
mail.”71 Wallace ended his letter by relaying Cavanaugh’s request that the NP help
defend his title and asking what Kerr’s desire was in that regard.72
Kerr did not have an answer. As he characterized it, Wallace’s question was “a
very difficult one.”73 He did cite to one case, from just a few years earlier, that he
thought could potentially support a claim that the statute of limitations had not begun to
run until mineral classification. In that case, Michigan Lumber Company v. Rust, the
Supreme Court held that legal title did not pass under the Swamp Land Grant Act until
lands were determined to be “swamp.”74 Since the Northern Pacific only received title
to lands determined to be non-mineral under the Mineral Classification Act, he thought
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the case could be analogous, though he acknowledged “not [being] satisfied that the
case falls within the doctrine of [that Supreme Court opinion].75
As to whether the Northern Pacific should aid in Cavanaugh’s defense, Kerr
answered in the negative. He reasoned that the issue was “such a dangerous one that it
seems to me it is better to have it undecided than decided adversely and the common
understanding is likely to be that the statute did not begin to run until the issuance of
patent.”76 In other words, the common understanding was better for the railroad than the
great weight of precedent, and it was best not to risk alerting potential adverse claimants
(as well as the attorneys representing them) to that fact.
Even as Kerr thought it best for the Northern Pacific not to be directly involved
in the lawsuit, he urged Wallace to make it clear that “the company stands ready at any
time to refund to Mr. Cavanaugh the whole or such portion of the purchase price as he
is entitled to receive,” especially since the portion of land involved is small.77 Kerr also
wrote to attorneys Beattie and Cavanaugh directly to offer them some legal advice. In
particular, he recommended “a strong effort ... be made to show that the nature of the
possession of McCleary and Hays was not such a nature as to come within the statute.”
He also summarized his understanding of the law regarding when the statute of
limitations began to run. After recounting that the Supreme Court’s prior decisions had
“uniformly been to the effect that on definite location the full legal and beneficial title
to land in the place limits passed to the company,” he surmised that the Mineral
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Classification Act may cast some doubt upon that issue, again citing to Michigan
Lumber Company v. Rust. Kerr hoped such “authority may be of some assistance to
[Beattie and Cavanaugh.]”78
The Northern Pacific’s legal department encountered the same issue a few years
later in 1903, and the issue’s resolution remained uncertain. One party, E.C. Pace, from
Whitehall, Montana, wrote to Assistant Land Commissioner F. W. Wilsey asking two
deceptively simple questions: (1) does the statute of limitations run against the Northern
Pacific as it does against an individual, and (2) does it begin to run on the date of patent
issuance, on the date of definite location, or on the date of filing of maps of definite
location with the land office? Pace also desired any Supreme Court opinions on the
issue.79 Wilsey forwarded the letter to Land Attorney J. B. McNamee, who replied to
Pace that his questions “cover so much ground that a complete answer to them would
be equivalent to writing a brief on the subject.” Moreover, McNamee claimed that such
a brief “would be unsatisfactory to [Pace] because of the impossibility of foreseeing just
how the question will arise as to a given tract of land.” Like Kerr, he did not want “to
pass on the general question, as the answer might prove misleading.”80
Purchasers of land from the railroads also faced legal obstacles in an uncertain
legal environment. Railroad companies typically sold land by contracts under which
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several years might pass before actual titles changed hands. Under American law as of
the turn of the century, this posed a problem, namely that to maintain an ejectment suit,
persons were required to show that they had “a valuable and subsisting interest and
immediate right to the possession.”81 Because persons under contract to purchase lands
from the railroad did not receive title until fulfilling the terms of their contract, they
arguably lacked the “immediate right to possession” necessary to exercise in court any
exclusionary right.
John H. Jackson encountered this issue. On Christmas Eve in 1898, Jackson
contracted for the purchase of Northern Pacific land in southeast Washington near the
town of Pomeroy.82 Almost four years later, he sought to eject someone from the
property who had been occupying it with a claim of ownership, but he could not do so
because his contract with the Northern Pacific, like all others, was silent as to
possession. Accordingly, his attorneys, from Pomeroy, wrote to the railroad’s land
department requesting that a company official sign a document confirming that the
contract indeed entitled Jackson to possession of the land from the date of its
execution.83 Assistant Land Commissioner Wilsey refused, stating his understanding
that the railroad did not in fact “place purchasers of its lands in possession thereof” but
rather makes possession contingent upon all of the conditions included in the
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contracts.84 He thus advised the attorneys to take the matter up with the company’s
division counsel in Spokane, H. M. Stephens. They did just that.85 Stephens disagreed
with Wilsey’s interpretation and did not object to signing the instrument attached. He
forwarded the letter to Kerr to confirm, and Kerr agreed. Kerr then asked Land
Commissioner Phipps to sign the instrument.86
Railroads also contributed to the avoidance of tragedy by making it so that
policymakers could no longer ignore the problem. By accelerating the demand for
timber and other resources, they sparked concerns about timber famine, thereby
precipitating a paradigm shift in how the government approached both its forests and its
public domain more broadly. First, in the 1880s, the GLO began to police the public
domain much more aggressively, including against trespasses. Then, in the 1890s,
Congress shifted policies from one of disposing of its lands as quickly as possible to
retaining and centrally managing certain lands—including the best remaining forests—
in perpetuity.
A major shift in the GLO’s stance towards land and timber depredations
occurred after the election of Grover Cleveland as president in 1884. During the
campaign, Cleveland had specifically argued for reforms in the GLO to address its
acquiescence to the rampant frauds and timber poaching up to that time. Upon assuming
office, he appointed Lucious Q. C. Lamar as secretary of interior and William A. J.
Sparks as commissioner of the GLO, both of whom already garnered reputations as land
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reformers. Their appointments spelled trouble for the lumber interests that had grown
dependent upon “free timber” from the public domain. The administration’s stated
policies even caused Hammond, a fervent Democrat, to switch party allegiances. 87
As head of the GLO, Sparks confirmed Hammond’s worst fears. While he was
not the first head of the GLO to seek to clean up the office’s administration of the public
domain, Sparks was more aggressive—and, hence, more successful—than any of his
predecessors. Most notably, he effected a major shift in the GLO’s approach to timber
depredations. When he first arrived at his post, he found not just a gross indifference
among land officials in the government to protecting the public domain, but actually a
firm belief that the administration in fact lacked the legal authority to prevent or punish
depredations at all. As Sparks lamented in his first annual report to Congress, in 1885,
“It seems that the prevailing idea running through this office ... was that the government
had no distinctive rights to be considered and no special interests to protect.”88 Notions
of “free land” and “free timber” not only pervaded communities of “looters,” but it also
extended to those supposed to be standing guard at the gates.
Sparks committed resources to investigating and prosecuting timber trespasses.
Within his first year, he sent over twenty special agents to Washington to investigate
over a thousand cases of timber trespass involving the alleged theft of timber worth
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more than nine million dollars. This was not just for show, as such investigations led to
prosecutions by the following year.89 Sparks did not just go after minor offenders. In
July of 1885, he filed suit against the Northern Pacific and Hammond’s Montana
Improvement Company for their illegal cutting of federal timber in western Montana.
Unfortunately, this prosecution would demarcate the limits of Sparks’ power. In
defense, Hammond and other officials claimed that they only took timber from railroad
lands (i.e., odd sections), but this seems implausible given that much of the land
remained unsurveyed. They also claimed that the previous administration, including
Secretary of Interior Henry Teller, had authorized their activities. That argument seems
believable, given the laxity of the previous administration’s protection of the federal
domain. Regardless of the merits of the government’s case and the companies’ defenses,
Hammond won victories outside the courtroom. For example, he was able to rally local
support by temporarily closing down mills and blaming the closures on the
government’s suits. By the fall of 1886, Sparks had found that it would be difficult to
secure witnesses to testify against the companies, and by 1887, Sparks ran out of money
and had to suspend the investigation. This gave Hammond and the other officials in the
Montana Improvement Company an opportunity to insulate themselves legally from
further prosecution.90
From the start, Sparks also committed himself to cleaning up land office
operations, including addressing the rampant frauds that had long been a feature of the
public lands administration. The Timber and Stone Act, which Congress passed in 1878,
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seemed to invite more fraudulent entries than any past legislation. That law provided
for the sale of California, Oregon, Nevada, and Washington “timberlands” (defined as
lands “valuable chiefly for timber, but unfit for cultivation”) in 160-acre tracts for $2.50
per acre.91 Each applicant had to submit an affidavit declaring, under oath, that the land
was primarily valuable for timber, unimproved, and unfit for cultivation; that the
applicant had not previously applied for land under the act; that the application was not
for speculative purposes but rather “in good faith to appropriate it to his own exclusive
use and benefit”; and that the applicant had not agreed to sell the title to another person
or company.92 In truth, timber companies routinely paid dummy locators to file
applications under the act with the understanding, if not explicit written agreements,
that they would convey the lands to the companies upon receiving title.93 Indeed, Sparks
investigated 2591 entries made pursuant to the act and found 2223 of them—over
eighty-five percent—to have been fraudulent. In response, in 1886, Sparks suspended
all entries under the Timber and Stone Act and most entries under other land laws in the
western states and territories, wherever frauds were most prevalent. In defending his
extreme actions, he bluntly pointed to the fact that the “public domain was being made
the prey of unscrupulous speculation and the worst forms of land monopoly through
systematic frauds.”94
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Sparks was so aggressive that one Montana paper, in 1885, suggested that Sparks
had preservationist motives. It wrote, “Sparks must be of the opinion that timber is one
of the most sacred products of nature, not to be defiled by the rude hand of man but
intended by God to grow and die and rot, safe from the profanation of the axeman’s
stroke, and that it were sacrilegious to use it for fuel, building or mining purposes.”95 In
the West in the 1880s, there was perhaps no greater insult. Though there is no evidence
that Sparks in fact cared about nature per se, his goals aligned with those of an emerging
conservationist movement, the very movement to which the Montana newspaper sought
to link the commissioner. Beginning in the 1860s, the acceleration in the exploitation of
natural resources including timber contributed to a growing awareness in the United
States (and elsewhere) of the scarcity of resources and of the need for some sort of
rational management of their use. What came to be known as the conservation
movement had many strands: some sought to ensure a broad segment of the population
had access to resources, some sought to ensure a resource base for future generations,
some sought to preserve the watershed-protection functions of certain forests
(particularly those in the mountains), some sought to protect certain areas for their
aesthetic or recreation value, and yes some (albeit a far smaller number) sought to
protect nature for nature’s sake. Each of these “conservationist” goals were impossible
to achieve given the broken land law system and the rampant fraud and theft of public
resources, the same problems Sparks aggressively confronted for his own reasons.
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Sparks’ term as head of the GLO set the stage for great conservationist victories
in Congress in the 1890s. In response to the perceived waste and destruction of the
nation’s forests, as well as the anticipated threat of a timber famine, Congress, in 1891,
passed what Gifford Pinchot later called “the most important legislation in the history
of Forestry in America.”96 In the legislation that came to be known as “the Forest
Reserve Act,” Congress authorized the president to “[s]et apart and reserve ... public
land bearing forests ... or in part covered by timber or undergrowth, whether of
commercial value or not, as public reservations.”97 Pinchot was not alone in forestry
circles in his praise of the act, which many indeed saw as the first step towards protecting
public timberlands from waste and depredations.98 Soon after it was passed, GLO
Commissioner Thomas H. Carter predicted the act would “do much in the way of caring
for portions of the public lands bearing forest which it is needful to preserve from
spoliation.”99 In his report to Congress a few months later, Secretary of Interior John
Noble concurred. He noted that if the law were “prosecuted systematically and
thoroughly, posterity will look upon the action as that to which the country owes much
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of its prosperity and safety.”100 Notably, the legislation—one of the first calling for the
conservation or protection of resources—did not call for any sort of management but
rather was one simply of excluding others from designated reserves.
Despite the enthusiasm for the act in the Department of the Interior, Secretary
John W. Noble initially advised that the government withdraw only those forests “not
absolutely required for the legitimate use and necessities of the residents,” the
promotion of settlement, or the development of natural resources in the immediate
vicinity.101 Still, in the next two years, President Benjamin Harrison, a Republican,
designated fifteen reserves encompassing over thirteen million acres.102 In addition,
while Noble took a conservative view of the qualification of lands for inclusion in the
reserve system, he took a liberal view of what activities were prohibited within the
reserves, namely all commercial activities. This interpretation received great applause
from those who had advocated for forest reserves for aesthetic, preservationist reasons.
Noble’s commitment not to reserve lands desirable for settlement or
development may have been a ploy to gain favor—or at least minimize dissent—
amongst the public. However, it may also have had to do with the simple fact that neither
the GLO, nor the Department of the Interior of which it was a part, had the capacity to
enforce the act’s provisions even to the lands that still qualified for reservation. While
Congress passed legislation calling for the GLO to exclude others from forest reserves,
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it failed to provide any money for the GLO to implement Congress’ directive. The GLO,
already overworked, simply lacked the work force to take on this new task. It not only
had too few special agents to monitor the reserves, but these agents also had many other
responsibilities, a combination that led to them only giving “cursory attention” to the
reserves.103 In 1893, after legislators ignored his request for the establishment of a new
corps to supervise the reserves, Secretary of Interior Hoke Smith complained that the
reserves were no better protected than unappropriated, unreserved lands.104 Smith was
right; at the time, the GLO employed only eighty-two part-time special agents to
investigate frauds, timber depredations, illegal fencing, and other transgressions over
the entire public domain consisting of not just the thirteen million acres of forest
reserves, but the entire public domain then exceeding over five-hundred million acres.105
Accordingly, the secretary determined no new reservations should be created until
Congress gave them the means—both financial and legal—to protect and manage
them.106
In 1894, Smith promulgated regulations calling for the prosecution of trespasses
within the reserves.107 However, Smith still encountered the same issues as his
predecessors: a lack of enforcement power. The regulations made Smith unpopular in
the West. Even the relatively few prosecutions that Smith instituted were enough to lead
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western stock and timber interests to push Congress to open reservations to resource use
and extraction. They also led to legal challenges regarding the validity of the
regulations. In one notable case, ranchers in Oregon insisted the regulation violated their
fundamental rights of open access to the range resource, as well as every other resource,
on public lands. The circuit court disagreed, finding there was “‘no implication of a
license to use the [forest reserves] to the destruction or injury of these forests,’ and
reiterated the judicial doctrine that the federal government had the right to protect its
interests against the threat of trespass and injury.”108 This opinion sparked outrage
among cattlemen.
With the government’s right of exclusion legally vindicated, a grand
compromise became feasible. Nobody wanted the reserved forests to go completely
unused, while government officials in the GLO and Interior recognized a complete ban
on entry would be impossible to enforce anyway. In early 1896, Smith recognized the
opportunity to enact a real management system for federal timberlands, and he asked
the National Academy of Sciences to appoint a commission to study and to advise on
the use and management of the reserves. In his letter to the academy, he exhibited a
sense of urgency, in part due to the time already wasted:
My predecessors in office for the last twenty years have vainly called
attention to the inadequacy and confusion of existing laws relating to the
public timber lands and consequent absence of an intelligent policy in
their administration, resulting in such conditions as may, if not speedily
stopped, prevent a proper development of a large portion of our country;
and because the evil grows more and more as the years go by, I am
impelled to emphasize the importance of the question by calling upon
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you for the opinion and advice of that body of scientists which is
officially empowered to act in such cases as this.109
Smith requested the academy issue the report during that session of Congress, but there
was not enough time.110 Nearly one year later, at the end of Cleveland’s term, the
committee’s work remained incomplete. However, prior to Cleveland leaving office,
the commission made oral recommendations to Smith’s successor, Secretary David R.
Francis. The oral recommendations included the establishment of thirteen new reserves
encompassing twenty-one million acres. Cleveland agreed and decided to issue the
order creating the reserves on February 22, George Washington’s birthday. If the intent
was to link forest reserves with the proud American tradition of representative
democracy, it failed. Indeed, echoing Senator Benton’s statement from decades earlier
linking restrictions on access to public resources to monarchism, the Seattle Chamber
of Commerce represented a large segment of Western opposition when it complained
bitterly that even “King George never attempted so high-handed an invasion upon
[Americans’] rights.”111 Laws can change, but customs die hard.
Even with strong resistance remaining, Cleveland’s action signaled that the era
of free land and free timber was over, at least as applied to the remaining federal
timberlands. Thus, when President William McKinley submitted the committee’s full
report to Congress in May of 1897, there was ample support for a compromise measure
that would recognize federal authority over its timberlands while still allowing for use
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to meet the existing resource needs of local communities. Within a month, Congress
passed a bill providing for the management of federal timberlands to sustain the timber
resource and to provide watershed protection, while allowing for timber cutting, mining,
and livestock grazing—just the privilege westerners claimed to possess, though it would
no longer be unrestrained or free.112
*******
Railroad companies were primary beneficiaries of the federal government’s
nineteenth-century policy preference favoring the rapid disposal of its public domain,
for the most part at prices far below market value if not for free. Beyond its massive
land giveaways, the federal government also long exhibited an indifference to protecting
its public domain for as long as lands remained public. Railroad companies—or, more
accurately, their officials and employees—benefitted from that laxity as well.
However, railroad land grant recipients also played a key role in bringing this
policy preference to an end. Because these companies had both a pecuniary interest in
protecting their lands from trespasses and theft and the means to police their massive
land holdings (as well as neighboring federal lands), they confronted and challenged a
frontier custom treating all public resources as free for the taking in ways that the federal
government failed to do. At the same time, because railroads accelerated the rate of
resource exploitation, it also awakened the public to the perils of unfettered degradation
of the nation’s resource base to such a degree that government officials could no longer
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ignore the need to reform its land policies. The model of conservation embodied in the
Forest Management Act required not only planning and restraint on the part of the
government (or other property holders), but also the willingness and ability to exclude
others from exploiting the land’s resources. In this regard, railroads showed the way,
even if most policymakers and government officials were slow to see it.
Still, by the late nineteenth century, the customs of free land, free minerals, and
free timber had become too entrenched to be eradicated. And the divergence between
federal policies as promulgated, federal policies as enforced, and local informal legal
regimes—of which this chapter’s story is a prime example—would continue to
influence and constrain land management well into the next century.113 This may not be
a tragedy, but it is unfortunate.
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CHAPTER 3 – LAWYERING FOR THE RAILROAD
LAW AND CULTURAL ECONOMY IN THE AMERICAN WEST

Lawyers were omnipresent across the West in the last half of the nineteenth
century. In many ways, developments in the legal profession in that region mirrored
those occurring elsewhere. First, the role of lawyers greatly expanded. The complexities
of laws (including those covered in this dissertation) led business officials to seek legal
advice in navigating the uncertain legal terrain with the purpose of avoiding unnecessary
conflict rather than just relying on lawyers to litigate disputes once they arose. Given
the expanding role of legislatures in making law, lawyers also began to serve as de facto
lobbyists on behalf of their clienteles. Second, as the role of lawyers expanded, new
structures of practice emerged such as the law firm and “in-house” corporate law offices.
Within law firms, lawyers were encouraged to represent only certain categories of
interests, primarily to avoid conflicts, and this resulted in a bifurcation of the bar
between “corporate lawyers” and the plaintiffs’ bar. Lawyers also began to specialize
in certain areas of legal practice, both due to the growing number and complexity of
laws and as a way for a single firm to meet all of its clients’ needs. At the same time,
lawyers solidified their position within the burgeoning industrial economy through the
formalization and standardization of a legal culture that included measurable standards
for entry and practice.
There was a distinct quality to practicing law in the West, however. Given the
distance between population centers that were home to judicial tribunals and the rough
terrain that in most cases separated them, lawyers in the West learned quickly of the
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need for reliable reports of court decisions to be available to them where they lived and
practiced. This contributed to a transformation in legal publishing, one that has had a
profound impact on the American legal profession to today.
*******
Even as the legal profession changed dramatically in the late nineteenth century,
one important feature remained the same, namely the profound role of lawyers in
political bodies. Writing in the 1830s, French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville
wrote, based on his travels in the United States, that lawyers “occup[ied] the highest
stations” in the American political order.1 Tocqueville indeed saw lawyers as an
“American aristocracy” in a country where “the wealthy, the noble, and the prince” were
all “excluded from the government.”2 Much later, political scientist Mark C. Miller
wrote in The High Priests of American Politics that “[l]awyers are, and always have
been, omnipresent in American political institutions and in the American public-policymaking process…. And it seems that the more important the political office, the more
lawyers occupy that office.”3 Empirical data supports the generalizations of both
Tocqueville and Miller. From the second decade of the nineteenth century to the middle
of the twentieth century, at least half of all members of the U.S. House of
Representatives in each decade were lawyers.4 During the period of this dissertation,
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the number never dipped below sixty percent.5 Lawyers have typically been even better
represented in the Senate, with roughly two-thirds of Senators from 1790 to 1930 having
law backgrounds.6 This phenomenon held true as much, if not more, in the West. In
Oregon, for instance, nine of the ten Senators elected between 1865 and 1905 were
attorneys, with three of whom having represented either the Northern Pacific or the
Oregon & California railroads.7 Likewise, in Montana, one of the most powerful
politicians in Montana’s late-territorial and early-statehood periods was Wilbur F.
Sanders, who represented the Northern Pacific in Montana land matters through the
1880s.8
Scholars continue to debate why lawyers have been so omnipresent in American
politics generally. The one takeaway is that there seemingly is no single explanation.
Some scholars have emphasized, for instance, the social status of lawyers, whether it be
that they represent a “high status” akin to an aristocracy or that they represent the middle
class interests in a society oriented towards the middle class. 9 Echoing Tocqueville’s
observations from the 1830s, Stevens perhaps best represented the “high status” thesis,
albeit with an instrumentalist flavor, when he wrote the following in his 1983 work on
legal education: “Without a monarch or clearly defined aristocracy, with a practical
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utilitarian outlook, with little by way of competing professions, the new nation was
almost inevitably bound to rely on lawyers to perform a wide range of functions.
Lawyers became the technicians of change as the country expanded economically and
geographically, a development that partly explains why even today lawyers play a more
significant role in the United States than in any other developed society.”10 Another
explanation points to the role of America’s political culture in treating policy questions
as legal or constitutional ones, while yet another posits that lawyers gain political power
primarily through exploiting the same skills that make them successful attorneys,
namely in advocating, communicating, negotiating, and compromising.11
One last explanation deserves some discussion, namely that the practice of law
is flexible enough in terms of time commitments to allow for political aspirations.
Lawyers have typically been able to devote sufficient time to political endeavors while
still practicing, and they are often able to leave practice if necessary to serve in state of
federal political roles. Add in the prospect of courting new clients and making other
powerful allies while serving in a public office, and entering into politics becomes an
even more attractive option.12 Sometimes getting out of politics was more difficult than
lawyers envisioned, however. After being elected for a second term as Oregon’s
governor in 1907, for instance, George E. Chamberlain expressed that he had “no
senatorial aspirations” and seemingly no desire to run for any political office again. He
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stressed that he had reached “a time in my life where it is necessary for me to endeavor
to build up a practice and accumulate something for declining years. I cannot do it in
any political office, for as you know, public life has kept me poor all these years.”13
Chamberlain also expressed concern about the amount of money politics required, not
in campaigning for office, but in actually governing once elected. Being a politician
required entertaining, and that required money. Chamberlain wrote that even if he could
be “elected Senator without effort I could not afford in my financial condition to go to
Washington and undertake to do my whole duty to the public, for there you know most
of the work is accomplished around the banquet table and not in the halls of the Senate.
To entertain properly costs a mint of money, and no poor man has any business in the
Senate of the United States, under conditions as they exist there at this time.”14 Despite
these concerns, Chamberlain ultimately ran for and won one of Oregon’s Senate seats,
holding that office from 1909 to 1921. When he finally retired from public office, he
parlayed his time in the nation’s capital to a position at a prestigious Washington D.C.
law firm. Law begets politics; politics begets law.
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To understand the impact of legal decision-making on American society then,
one must look beyond the scope of judicial opinions to the perspectives of lawyers
serving in American legislative bodies. If in law school and in practice, lawyers are
socialized into “thinking like a lawyer,” how does that thought process impact
policymaking when lawyers enter into politics? As early as the 1830s, Tocqueville
argued that lawyer-politicians would act as defenders of “order” and “security” against
what he saw as “the excesses of democracy.”15 Scholars agree with Tocqueville’s
observations regarding the conservatism of the bar. Friedman, for example, believed
that lawyers generally disfavor radical social change based on the legal profession’s
emphasis on predictability and stability.16 Similarly, in his study of lawyer-politicians,
Miller added that lawyers tend to emphasize the regularity of socio-legal procedures
over the substantive justness of results.17 Moreover, when lawyers do advocate for social
change, they tend to do so by pushing for changes in the law’s definition of rights and
in its protection of formal equality.18 Their impact can be seen in the number of policy
issues that have been framed as legal questions.
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A professional legal culture has shaped how lawyers have answered those
questions. During the late nineteenth century, the legal profession changed in important
ways, including in the Northwest. First, the emergence of the corporate law firm and inhouse legal offices represented a major transformation in American legal culture. Legal
historian Lawrence M. Friedman went as far as to call it “one of the most striking
developments of the late nineteenth century.”19 As of 1850, legal issues remained simple
(and even understandable by non-lawyers), and the most successful lawyers were
“generalists” whose primary role was to represent their clients’ interests in court in
regards to a variety of legal concerns. In the last decades of the nineteenth century,
however, law became more complex, and the most powerful lawyers were increasingly
“specialists” housed in law firms. As historian Jerold S. Auerbach concluded, “[b]y the
turn of the century corporate law firms were edging to the pinnacle of professional
aspiration and power …. [T]he emergence, rapid proliferation, and growth of corporate
law firms, their impact upon patterns of recruitment and styles of practice, and their
appeal to ambitious young attorneys invested them with significance (and their partners
with professional power) that far exceeded their number and size.”20
With the emergence of law firms also came a bifurcation of the bar between
corporate and plaintiffs’ attorneys. In his study of railroad attorneys in the American
South, historian William G. Thomas III showed how the emergence of corporations
contributed to the bifurcation of the bar between those with “corporate clientele” and
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those who “represented plaintiffs confronting corporations.”21 This bifurcation of the
bar was due both to the lawyerly duty not to represent clients whose interests were
directly adversarial to the interests of other past and present clients, but also to the fact
that the increasing complexities encouraged lawyers to specialize in one area of the law.
The “railroad lawyer” epitomized the corporate side of the bar. He was, for the most
part, detested.22
At the same time, the role of lawyers shifted from advocate to counsel, their
forum from court to office. For Friedman, the New York Code of Civil Procedure,
promulgated in 1848, symbolized this change in lawyers’ functions. For one, a code was
only necessary because lawyers had begun to lose “the art of pleading” due to spending
less time in the courtroom. This was merely the start of what Friedman called “[t]he
slow estrangement of the lawyer from his old and natural haunt, the court.”23 While
Friedman acknowledged that most lawyers still went to court, at least on occasion, at
the end of the nineteenth century, “the Wall Street lawyer, who perhaps never spoke to
a judge except socially, made more money and had more prestige than any courtroom
lawyer could.”24 As legal historians Kermit Hall summarized the changed work of
lawyering, “the leading lawyers [at the end of the nineteenth century] were negotiators
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and facilitators, and practical men of business who knew the uses and means of
wealth.”25
For its part, the Northern Pacific contributed to these transformations in
maintaining its own extensive law department, in utilizing its legal labor for much more
than litigation, and in giving work to firms in cities along its railway network. At the
head of the department was the General Counsel office, established in 1873. By the turn
of the century, the department also included an assistant general counsel, western and
eastern division counsels, a land attorney, western and eastern land attorneys, and
Washington D.C. counsel, in addition to their support staffs.26 These lawyers were
involved in litigation, to be sure, as particularly chapters one and two of this dissertation
demonstrate. But they also advised the company’s president and land officials on
policies to protect the Northern Pacific’s interests without litigation.27 Moreover, the
Northern Pacific, the Oregon & California, and other railroad companies utilized
extensive legal networks, including many law firms, not formally in their employ.
Divisions not only arose between corporate lawyers and plaintiffs’ lawyers, but
among lawyers within firms based on their unique skill sets. This happened even at
small firms in small cities in the Northwest, as the experiences of Miles Cavanaugh Jr.
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exemplify. Upon graduating from law school in the East, Cavanaugh returned to Helena,
Montana and was admitted to the state bar in 1891. Cavanaugh joined the law office of
Carter & Clayberg in Helena. Even in this small firm, with only two partners, legal work
was divided not by client, but by type of work. Tom Carter, who would later become a
U.S. Senator, was the “business getter” and litigator, while Clayberg handled the
preliminary research and briefing of legal issues. The division of labor took advantage
of each partner’s strengths. As Cavanaugh assessed Carter, he was a “political genius,
a natural advocate, and one of the most understanding students of human nature I have
ever known.”28 To Cavanaugh, these skills all stemmed from Carter’s “hypnotic”
personality. As Cavanaugh explained, “I have seen him many times enter a train to
assume a journey, and whether in smoking or parlor car within fifteen the bulk of the
passengers would be crowded about him, absorbed in his conversation, whether about
politics, religion or ordinary topics. He was a marvellous [sic.] story teller.”29 While
Carter was not “a plodding student of the law,” the hard work of studying the law and
preparing cases could fall to Clayberg and Cavanaugh, while Carter assumed the much
more public role of “trial lawyer.”
Of course, it took much more to be a trial lawyer than a “hypnotic” personality;
one also had to have an intimate familiarity with the law and facts of the case. In that
regard, Cavanaugh raved at Carter’s ability to absorb information and develop new
strategies in the matter of days. After consulting with Clayberg, Cavanaugh noted,
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Carter “would know more about the facts and the law than all the rest of us. He simply
absorbed the whole case as if it were water and he a sponge, and by a sort of lixvation
the soluable was separated from the insoluable, and often under the microscope of his
reasoning an entirely new case was disclosed, and presented to court or jury in all its
beauty and strength.”30
Scholars have offered several explanations for the rise of the law firm. A
consensus seems to have formed, though, that the shifting demands of economic entities
on the legal profession at least played a role. According to Auerbach, for instance,
increasingly large and complex business enterprises required efficient legal practitioners
to service their needs, not just in advocating on their behalf in court, but in organizing
the companies and their relationships and preventing litigation in the first place.31
Thomas has proposed a different—albeit, still instrumentalist—interpretation in
contending that it was the strategic attempts of corporations to monopolize the best legal
talent to promote their interests that contributed to new structures such as regional and
national law firms and in-house corporate legal departments.32 Once one member of a
firm represented a particular client, it became difficult if not forbidden for any other
member of the same firm to represent a client with conflicting interests. Auerbach’s
Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America also points to a deeper
cultural element that contributed to its transformation, namely the legal profession’s
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“search for order in a complex society.”33 Similarly, legal scholar Robert Stevens has
argued that there was an “urge to professionalize” that combined with the economic
changes “to promote the growth of a new type of law firm, with several partners and
assistants, catering to the needs of the developing corporations.”34
This “urge to professionalize” can also be seen in the re-emergence and rapid
growth of bar associations and in the rise of formal legal education. What separates
professions from mere occupations is the “special power and prestige” they hold in
society, to quote sociologist Magali Sarfatti Larson.35 Though the boundaries of what
defines something as a “profession” are blurry, there are generally two components, one
of knowledge, the other of norms. Both are necessary to justify the special advantages
bestowed on professions. As historian Burton J. Bledstein summarized the knowledge
component, a profession requires its members attain and demonstrate, typically through
“a fairly difficult and time-consuming process, … an esoteric but useful body of
systematic knowledge.”36 As for normative values, professions tend to be those
occupations purportedly dedicated to public service rather than individual accumulation
of wealth.37
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Whatever the field, professional associations normally have served an important
purpose in the formation and maintenance of a professional culture, namely in ensuring
compliance with both the intellectual and the normative requirements of a profession.
Thus, it is no coincidence that in the generation following the Civil War there was what
Hall called a “rebirth of bar associations.”38 Legal communities in the Pacific Northwest
were at the leading edge of this “rebirth.” Founded in 1866, the Portland Law
Association was part of this rebirth. Speaking at the association’s first meeting, Matthew
P. Deady, a federal judge for the U.S. District Court of Oregon, lectured before the
newly-formed Portland Law Association. He described the association’s purpose to be
“the advancement of its members, in a knowledge of the law, considered both as a
science and an art.”39 Deady also felt it a “necessary auxiliary” that within the scope of
the organization’s purpose was “to cultivate an acquaintance with history, English
literature, logic, eloquence, and polemics or debate.”40 He seemed to recognize already
that lawyers would comprise the leader class in communities across the West, a privilege
he felt implied a reciprocal duty to the public that lawyers be honorable, well-rounded
citizens.
Deady also gave the audience of lawyers what seemed like sound advice.
Quoting to the famous Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, he warned them that “[l]aw
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is a jealous mistress.”41 What he meant was that law was a rewarding career, but it was
one that demanded the full attention of its practitioners. It was not just the job itself that
required a lawyer’s full attention, but also its professional culture. Specifically, the
profession could not claim to be composed of neutral, disinterested advocates for the
public good while its members also moonlighted as self-interested capitalists. The
lawyer’s dedication to public service could never be a part-time job. Over the following
decades, however, lawyers continued to exploit their legal expertise and connections
with business leaders, politicians, and land office bureaucrats to gain personal wealth
and power in communities all across the West. Sometimes this even involved defrauding
the very legal systems lawyers proclaimed to uphold.
While bar associations tried to promote the development of a professional legal
culture through informal means, states imposed higher standards on admission to the
bar. Whereas in 1860 admission standards were “largely nonexistent,” to quote one legal
historian, by 1890 admission had “tightened noticeably.”42 In that year, nearly all states
required bar applicants pass an examination, and over half of the states also required
either some duration of legal education or a formal apprenticeship to enter the
profession.43 According to Lawrence Friedman, this was a form of unionization “to
protect the boundaries of the calling.” As he explained, “[t]he organized profession
raised (or tried to raise) its ‘standards’; [sic.] tried to limit entry into the field, and (above

41

Deady, Law and Lawyers, 2.

42

Stevens, Law School, 25.

43

Stevens, Law School, 25.

167
all) tried to resist conversion of the profession into a ‘mere’ business or trade.” 44 If
professions require their members to have a certain intellectual expertise and to hold
certain ethical values, admission standards (as well as standards of practice) were meant
to ensure lawyers measured up to the bar, so to speak.
Although few state bars, even at the end of the century, required formal legal
education prior to practicing, law schools still played an increasingly important role in
the development of a professional legal culture. The last half of the nineteenth century
indeed saw a dramatic rise in the number of law schools. In 1850, there were just fifteen
law schools; by the end of the century, there were more than a hundred. Accompanying
this increase in schools, of course, was a similar explosion in the number of law students,
as in just twenty-four years from 1870 to 1894, the number of law students more than
quadrupled.45 In 1900, more than ten-thousand were enrolled in law schools across the
country.46
If professionalization required an occupation be grounded in “an esoteric but
useful body of systematic knowledge,” legal educators provided that system of
knowledge. It is hence no coincidence that a philosophy regarding law as a science
accompanied the rapid growth in legal education as an institution. Beginning as dean of
Harvard Law School in 1870, Christopher Columbus Langdell developed what came to
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be the model of law school curriculums for at least the next century. His “case method”
of teaching was rooted in his scientific view of law. As he prefaced his first case book,
Contracts,
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines.
To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant
facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what
constitutes a true lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the
business of every earnest student of law. Each of these doctrines has
arrived at its present state by slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth,
extending in many cases through centuries. This growth is to be traced
in the main through a series of cases; and much the shortest and best, if
not the only way of mastering the doctrine effectually is by studying the
cases in which it is embodied…. If these doctrines could be so classified
and arranged that each should be found in its proper place, and nowhere
else, they would cease to be formidable from their number. It seemed to
me, therefore, to be possible to take such a branch of the law as
Contracts, for example, and, without exceeding comparatively moderate
limits, to select, classify, and arrange all the cases which had contributed
in any important degree to the growth, development, or establishment of
any of its essential doctrines; and that such a work could not fail to be of
material service to all who desire to study that branch of law
systematically and in its original sources.47
To Langdell, law was a science, and it was an empirical one whose object of study was
confined to the universe of reported cases. The “legal science” that Langdell expounded
and that came to dominate legal education was not value-free. Rather, through the case
method, students learned most notably that law was inaccessible to lay people, that law
was impartial and defined through logic, that law’s development was divorced from all
other social and political processes, and that legal change occurred slowly if at all. 48 In
this way, the modern law school founded on Langdell’s vision came to be a crucial
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component of socializing aspiring members of the legal profession into accepting its
core ideologies.49
Even if not required for entry into the bar, a degree from a law school held a
prestige that an apprenticeship at a law office lacked. This prestige came with a price,
however, namely the cost of tuition. Here too, Cavanaugh’s experiences exemplify this
development. After Cavanaugh graduated from Butte High School in 1882, he became
interested in attending college and law school in the East so that he could become a
lawyer.50 As he later wrote, for three years after his graduation, he “diligently devot[ed]
my spare time to reading while working and saving with a view of entering college to
finish my law course.”51 His father, Miles Sr., who was then developing a gold property
owned by Phil Sheehan near Bannack, concocted a plan to subsidize Cavanaugh’s
education. As Miles Sr. also roomed with the Sheehans, he was able to observe that Mr.
Sheehan (who was “about seventy-four years old”) and his wife (“a very beautiful
blonde with soulful blue eyes”) were “unstable play fellows” and that their marriage
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could “not long endure.”52 Miles Sr. also speculated that “upon a separation [Mr.
Sheehan’s] wife would acquire quite a sum of money.” As Miles Jr. later surmised, his
father broached the topic to Mrs. Sheehan of his plan for her to file for divorce and to
apply a portion of her settlement to pay for Miles Jr.’s education, apparently in exchange
for Miles Jr. marrying her after completing his schooling. He thus invited Miles Jr. to
stay at the house in December of 1882 to become acquainted with Mrs. Sheehan.53
Miles Jr. accepted his father’s invitation. He apparently made a good impression
too, as Mrs. Sheehan was very open with him. As Miles Jr. recounted, she "frankly
discussed with her plans, though without discussing Father's part in the conspiracy ….
Her intention was to divorce her husband in the near future, she would finance my
college career, wait until I finished, set me up in business and become my wife. This
plan was brazenly presented. She advertly [sic.] arranged that she and I should be alone
as much as possible during this visit.” This time alone included at breakfast, when Miles
Sr. and Mr. Sheehan were at the mine. Mrs. Sheehan would appear, Cavanaugh
remembered, “in attractive morning wrapper, her blue eyes swimming provocatively,
and we would spend a unnecessary length of time chatting at breakfast table while her
maid would wait upon us.”54 Miles Jr. was clearly attracted to Mrs. Sheehan, even as he
felt uncomfortable with his father’s scheme and his own prurient thoughts, given his
emotional attachment to a teacher in Butte named Isabelle. His attraction and discomfort
came to a head one morning when she approached him in the library and asked if he
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minded if she were to kiss him. When he replied, “I should say not,” she gave him “such
a kiss as almost take my breath. It terrified me, and there and there determined to cut
short my visit. I did not openly reject or favor her plans, but she seemed to take my
silence as consent, but my mind was so full of Isabelle, that as soon as I could
conveniently do so, without showing disrespect for the hospitality shown me I returned
to Comet and my adored Isabelle.”55 Mr. Sheehan sold the mine in the spring to an
English syndicate for $450,000, after which Mrs. Sheehan filed for divorce and
obtained, by Cavanaugh’s estimate, “a goodly portion of her husband’s wealth.” Miles
Jr. would not get any of it. Worse yet, his Isabelle, whom he claimed never to have
kissed, married a miner and moved away. Still, by 1887, Miles Sr. had saved enough
money to send Miles Jr. to college and law school in the East.56
Langdell’s vision of law required not only the development and availability of
“case books” with selected cases for law students to learn fundamental doctrines, but
also the publication and distribution of legal materials for practicing attorneys across
the country. If the law library was a lawyer’s laboratory, all lawyers needed access to
one. It was not just that lawyers needed access to books, as the practice of law has always
depended upon written materials (it is a “bookish profession,” as Michael H. Hoeflich
labelled it).57 In the antebellum era, though, lawyers could get by with access only to a
given state’s statutes and one or two general treatises, such as William Blackstone’s
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Commentaries on the laws of England—originally published in the 1760s but later
reprinted specially for American audiences—and James Kent’s Commentaries on
American Law—a work originally published in the late 1820s but periodically updated.
Lawyers of the postbellum era required specialized treatises (to match their increasingly
specialized practices) and up-to-date reports on cases.58 Unfortunately, into the 1870s,
case reporting—whether state-licensed or not—was both slow and unreliable.59
Even if reports had been timely and reliable, the physical and economic
geographies of the West, including the Northwest, presented unique problems, namely
that of distance between population centers and rough terrain. Although lawyers could
order law books by mail, many did not have the financial capacity to build their own
libraries. Lawyers thus occasionally had to solicit necessary information from other
attorneys known to have more extensive collections, such as the corporate legal office
for the Northern Pacific, whose records are filled with such requests. Lawyers especially
needed information regarding public land laws. This was because land and resource law
was an important component of many practices, because the necessary materials came
from a variety of sources, mostly far away in Washington, D.C., because the materials
were voluminous, and because most of the materials remained difficult to find at least
until the 1870s.
With problems came opportunities. In 1874, Henry N. Copp, a lawyer and
publisher in Washington, D.C., published and self-distributed a monthly periodical
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called Land Owner with legal materials relevant to land and mining attorneys, as well
as to land agents, land claimants, and mineral prospectors. When Copp began
publishing, there was no official reporter of decisions by the General Land Office or
Interior Department. Although that changed in 1881, Copp’s combination of materials
made it so that his periodical remained useful. Even as late as 1887, Copp could
advertise that the material contained in his Land Owner editions “cannot be found in
any other paper in the country.”60 Not only that, but Copp selected only the “important”
decisions, saving attorneys the effort of sifting through every decision made in every
tribunal with any authority over land laws. They contained congressional enactments;
important decisions, instructions, and regulations of the General Land Office and
secretary of interior; important judicial opinions impacting land law in both state and
federal courts; and lists of patents issued. Copp advertised the periodical as being “of
incalculable value to Attorneys, Miners, and Settlers,” even as he charged three dollars
for a yearlong subscription.61 The following year, Copp published a stand-alone volume
compiling similar materials going back to 1869; in 1882, he did the same for the
intervening years. As even the “selected” land-law materials he published came to be
overwhelming in scale for some, he published in 1887 an even more selective collection
of materials intended for non-lawyer settlers.62
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The year after Copp began his Land Owner newspaper, John B. West, a
bookseller in St. Paul, Minnesota—the location of the Northern Pacific’s
headquarters—and his brother, Horatio, established a weekly periodical to provide
Minnesota lawyers with current and reliable excerpts of all decisions from the Supreme
Court of Minnesota. The idea clearly struck a chord, as within a year the two brothers
had expanded to covering Wisconsin as well, under the new moniker The Northwestern
Reporter, before expanding to Iowa, Michigan, Nebraska, and the Dakota Territory in
1879. In 1882, the West brothers formed the West Publishing Company with additional
investors, and they continued to grow their operations. In 1887, at John’s direction, the
company began efforts to catalog every case by legal issue—or issues—so that lawyers
could find the cases they needed quickly and reliably. In this way, John found a way to
provide lawyers with all decisions, without the editorial interference of publishers, while
not overwhelming them with the pure volume of them. After the American Bar
Association witnessed an early demonstration of the digest system, it celebrated West
Publishing as “the nation’s acknowledged leader in indexing as well as reporting the
case law of the country.”63 The company has yet to relinquish that title.
Before legal opinions could be indexed and distributed, they had to be produced.
The work of the judiciary also profoundly changed during the last decades of the
nineteenth century. Most notably, justices struggled to keep up with an increasing
caseload, one made even more daunting considering the increasing complexity of the
law throughout the period. From the 1860s to the end of the 1880s, the court’s caseload
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more than quadrupled.64 In 1860, the court had just over three-hundred cases on its
docket, and it decided ninety-one of them. In 1886, the court had almost fourteenhundred cases on its docket, and it decided 451 of them. By 1890, the court was over
three years behind on its docket, and it remained obligated to dispose of them all. The
more cases the court decided, the greater the number of cases seemingly remained on
its docket.65 The court’s appellate caseload was just one part of each justice’s work, as
each was also required to “ride the circuit.” Through the 1880s, Congress mandated for
Supreme Court justices to preside with district court judges throughout the United States
as a way to ensure justices participated in trials and remained familiar with their
practices.66
This was an especially burdensome requirement for justices with circuit duties
in the West, given the time involved in traveling to and from the region and from court
to court within the region. The experiences of Justice Stephen J. Field show how
difficult it was to keep pace. President Abraham Lincoln appointed Field, from
California, to the court in 1863 to fill its new tenth seat and to be assigned to fulfill
circuit court duties in the newly formed Tenth Circuit comprised of California and
Oregon. When Congress reorganized the circuits and reduced them from ten to nine
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three years later, Field’s circuit duties remained on the West Coast in the Ninth Circuit.67
In arranging his circuit trips and in communicating regarding the substance of cases and
the writing of opinions, Field often wrote to district court judges in California and
Oregon, including Judge Matthew P. Deady of Portland, Oregon. In these letters, Field
often complained of being overwhelmed with his judicial responsibilities. Occasionally,
circuit court duties had to give way to the justice’s Supreme Court appellate obligations.
In one April 1875 letter, Field apologized for not having the time to write the opinion
for a case the two had heard together the previous term. Deady had agreed to write it for
Field. Field wrote, “I can only promise by way of atonement that I will not again leave
Oregon, after hearing a case, until it has been decided and the opinion written.” He
claimed he had never been “so absolutely absorbed by the business of the Supreme
Court as during the present term.”68
For the next several years, Field continued to express frustration at his being
overworked. He also had a plan to reform the federal judiciary to account for its
expanded caseload. While some had proposed the establishment of an intermediate
appellate court (between the district or circuit trial courts and the Supreme Court) to
handle appeals as of right, with the Supreme Court having some power to select which
cases it would hear, Field doubted whether the House of Representatives would pass
such a measure. As he summarized in an 1883 letter to Deady, “[t]here is too much
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uncertainty as to the appointment of the Judges for either party to be very anxious that
eighteen new offices of so high a grade should be filled.”69
Field’s plan—one he thought had a much better chance of getting through
Congress—was to expand the Supreme Court to twenty-one justices and to divide the
court into sections. As he explained to Deady, “One section could then take the equity
cases, another section the common law cases, and the third the patent cases and perhaps
the revenue cases also. If a Constitutional question should arise or a question upon the
construction of a treaty which would have to be determined for the decision of the case,
then the case could be turned over to the full bench.”70 This plan, Field boasted, would
allow for one court to hear constitutional questions and the equivalent of three courts to
hear all other matters. While he admitted that the federal Constitution would possibly
need to be amended to allow for the plan’s implementation, he insisted that it “grows
more and more every day into favor.”71 In the event Deady needed any more convincing
of the efficacy of Field’s plan, Field concluded the letter by stating that he expected
Deady to be among the judges that would be tapped to fill the twelve new seats on the
Supreme Court were Field’s plan adopted.72 It wasn’t.
At times, Field relied upon Deady to keep his work in Oregon to a minimum. In
August of 1885, Field wrote Deady from San Francisco to advise him that he hoped not
to spend more than a couple days in Portland and to plead with him to “arrange it so that
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my judicial duties will not extend much beyond the hearing of one or two cases.”73 Field
may have just been flattering Deady to make him more agreeable, but Field also
implicitly recognized the value of the circuit judge position in easing his caseload. He
wrote to Deady that “[y]ou always are very good in regard to this matter. Indeed I do
not see why I am called to hear any cases in your district inasmuch as you and [Circuit]
Judge Sawyer dispose of all the cases as fast as they come up, and with an ability and
learning which is above all praise.”74
In 1891, Congress finally gave Field and the other justices some real relief. It
did so in two ways. First, it created a level of federal appellate courts beneath the
Supreme Court to handle appeals as of right, allowing the Supreme Court the discretion
to reject hearing certain types of cases. Specifically, it made the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction discretionary in cases where federal courts only had jurisdiction due to the
parties residing in different states and in certain other specific types of cases. “Diversity
jurisdiction” cases were “the most numerous class of cases,” but they still only
comprised less than thirty-percent of the court’s caseload.75 Second, it alleviated justices
of the obligation of “riding the circuit.” Given the limited reduction in the number of
cases the Supreme Court was required to hear, this provision was perhaps more
important than the creation of another layer of appellate courts. As Field’s letters show,
circuit obligations were a huge strain on justices even though they did not show up in
the Supreme Court’s docket or case reports.

73

Field to Deady, August 25, 1885.

74

Field to Deady, August 25, 1885.

75

Sternberg, “Deciding not to Decide,”5-6.

179
*******
Western lawyers did not heed Deady’s advice to devote themselves entirely to
the legal profession. In particular, lawyers used their knowledge of the web of public
land laws not just to represent clients in acquiring and securing legal rights to land and
its resources, but also to enter into land and mineral deals themselves. As the last
chapters of this dissertation demonstrate, some also used their knowledge of the law to
subvert it to their own pecuniary advantage. Whatever their methods, lawyers
established and maintained an elite status in western society. While this also occurred
elsewhere, their stature took a unique form in the West. This was in part due to the
American tendency to rely upon law to determine human relationships with the land and
its resources. Indeed, if one institution has been more intertwined with American
political culture than a belief in the rule of “law,” it is the institution of property—that
which defines the web of social relationships as they apply to the enjoyment and
exploitation of land. As Tocqueville wrote, “[i]n no other country in the world is the
love of property keener or more alert than in the United States.”76 More recently, Donald
Worster argued that “[p]rivate property in land grew up as America did,” and that it
“may be our most cherished institution.”77 The last chapters also show the extent to
which the dependence on law to define relationships with nature can constrain the ability
of communities to adapt to changed circumstances in managing lands to promote public
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welfare, as well as the capacity of landowners themselves to change their approaches to
their lands even for their own self-interests.
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CHAPTER 4 – THE RAILROADS MUST HAVE TIES
THE BUILDING OF TIMBER EMPIRES AND THE RISE OF PRIVATE
CONSERVATION, 1887-1907

The end of the nineteenth century and start of the twentieth was a time of great
consolidation within the railroad industry. While the financial moves of the so-called
“robber barons” has garnered much attention, building and maintaining a railroad
empire required not just the outmaneuvering of opponents on Wall Street, but also the
obtaining of the physical resources necessary to construct, maintain, repair, and improve
the actual railway lines. That required timber, and a lot of it. The Northern Pacific, on
its own, required over two million cross ties each year just for the maintenance of
existing tracks; that does not even account for the construction of additional mileage.78
At the same time James J. Hill and Edward H. Harriman (and their financial
backers) fought for control of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, primarily for
its access to Chicago, they also fought to secure stable supplies of raw materials
including timber. In addition to seeking additional resource bases, they also reassessed
their approaches to the lands and resources their companies already owned. In the first
decade of the twentieth century, just as the federal government was establishing forest
reserves to sustain the national economy into the foreseeable future, two of the largest
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private owners of timber, Hill’s Northern Pacific and Harriman’s Southern Pacific,
sought to reserve timberlands as necessary to sustain their railways.
*******
In the same year that the Northern Pacific celebrated the completion of its
transcontinental railway, that railroad’s land department published yet another map and
advertisement meant to entice settlement on lands along its route, millions of acres of
which the federal government gave to the company. It described “an immense new
country, where almost anyone can make money, either in prolific and sure Wheat Crops,
in Cattle and Sheep Raising on the largest area of grazing country, growing the finest
Bunch Grass in the World, and in the best Gold and Silver Regions in the United
States.”79 It announced “millions and millions of acres” for sale by the Northern Pacific,
lands traversing the Dakotas, Montana, Idaho, Washington, and Oregon. It was common
to distribute such maps to communities not only in the eastern United States, but also
throughout Western Europe. All of this seemed to be calculated to fill up the country in
a hurry.80 The Oregon & California made similar efforts at attracting settlers.
Still, the companies sold very little land in the Pacific Northwest prior to
completion of their roads. Of the millions of acres the Oregon & California had acquired
prior to 1887, for instance, the railroad had disposed of only 163,430 acres by the middle
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of 1887. Most of that was to actual settlers and in small quantities, though in a few
instances sales were made in quantities exceeding 160 acres and for prices slightly in
excess of $2.50 per acre.81 There was very little movement on the company’s
timberlands prior to 1887, aside from a small number of cases in Clackamas County
near Portland, where a few Germans bought parcels on which they made small clearings
for homes and sold timber to sawmills, and this was sufficient to survive. 82 Robert A.
Booth later confirmed that the timberlands of the Oregon & California grant had no
market value in 1880 for timber purposes or otherwise, aside from a few small tracts of
forty to 160 acres used by mills to meet local needs.83
Most of the settlement in Oregon was in the Willamette valley, where much of
the land capable of cultivation was taken under the public land laws prior to the railroad
land grant taking effect. In addition to having good soils, the valley had the additional
advantage of not being heavily timbered. As one early settler recounted, even the
removal of scattered timber could be difficult to clear, given the prevalence of Douglas
fir in the region. Removing timber from more heavily forested or more mountainous
areas—a necessary condition even for grazing—was often cost prohibitive. In the words
of one settler, “[i]f one would undertake the job of burning down one of these big fir
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trees and burning it up, it would … be a big obstacle.”84 Because no market for timber
existed at least until the 1890s, the costs of removing timber prior to that time could not
be recouped; that is, the timber could not be made to pay for the clearing. In many cases,
the costs of removing timber exceeded the value of the land once cleared. 85 According
to one credible estimate, the costs of removing timber in some areas could range from
$50 to $500 per acre, depending upon the contours of the land, the thickness of the trees,
and the amount of underbrush, and this far exceeded the value of the lands once
cleared.86
Prior to disposing of lands, the railroads first needed to ascertain what they in
fact possessed. Accordingly, the Oregon & California, once it completed its road in
1887, increased the size of the cruising force. In a few years’ time, there were three or
four cruising parties, each comprised of two or three men, in the company's employ.
William H. Mills, land agent for the Oregon & California, instructed these field men to
examine certain districts or townships and furnished them with books to record their
observations and calculations, including the quantity, type, and quality of timber.87 The
work done was extensive, but the work yet needed to be done was even more so. When
David Loring, the chief clerk of the Oregon & California’s land office, retired in 1894,
he reported that just over half the company’s lands, including those remaining
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unpatented, had been cruised in the field and reported upon. Not all work was delegated
to lower-level employees. For his own part, Loring traveled over a “greater part of the
lands” south of Roseburg, sometimes making use of annual hunting trips to do so.88
One of the main tasks of cruisers was to classify lands as to their potential uses
and value. There was little prime agricultural land within either land grant, and the little
amount there was had mostly been sold by 1890. Most of the remaining land of the
Northern Pacific was either grazing land or timberlands. The grazing land was of poor
quality and could only fetch fifty cents per acre, with some being assessed as low as
seven cents per acre.89 The bulk of the value in the land grant came from its timberlands,
in addition to any iron and coal, which the railroad nearly always reserved from sale.90
The same was true for the Oregon & California. The vast majority of its land
remaining unsold as of 1888 was deemed “non-agricultural”—meaning that it lacked
the capacity for cultivation.91 While acknowledging that a “small quantity might be
made available for settlement with a great deal of expense,” Loring later insisted that
transportation facilities were not the limiting factor for the great bulk of the lands.92
Indeed, he surmised there were not any large tracts remote from the Willamette valley
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that could be settled and upon which “a man could make a living.”93 Even the parcels
theoretically capable of being cultivated were too small and scattered as to feasibly be
settled. As Loring described, “there were some small places which would make a very
good residence and perhaps could make a garden, but he would have to clear the heavy
timber to do anything further, and they were not very near together.”94
Accordingly, any sales the railroads made in this region were likely not of the
character Congress envisioned when it passed the land grants, namely, to settlers who
would establish sustainable family farms on 160-acre spreads. This presented a special
problem for the Oregon & California, since Congress not only expected that its land be
sold to “actual settlers,” but required it be so at terms mirroring the Homestead Act. The
demand for Oregon & California’s timberlands began in 1889 or 1890, with most of the
company’s sales occurring after 1894.95 The majority of the lands sold were done so in
violation of the grant’s homestead clause. From 1894 until 1903, in fact, out of the
820,000 acres the railroad disposed of in total, it sold 524,000 acres in parcels exceeding
160 acres, and “substantially all” of those were not to “actual settlers” and were for
prices in excess of $2.50 per acre. A mere thirty-eight purchasers accounted for 370,000
of the acres purchased, with each parcel exceeding 2000 acres and with prices ranging
from $5.00 to $20.00 per acre. The largest such sale was a sale of 45,000 acres at $7.00
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per acre to a single purchaser. However, the vast majority of the sales (rather than the
amount of land sold) were for parcels less than 160 acres.96 While there was “scarcely
much of anything” prior to 1894 (maybe only “a few scattering cases”), the interest
increased gradually in the coming years as timber men came out to Oregon from
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.97 When the demand for timberlands began, the
Oregon & California encouraged it. It sent experienced timber cruisers to examine
timberland with reference to watershed, rather than confining themselves to township,
so that they could report the large bodies of timber that could be sold and operated
together.98
A large portion of the timberlands the Oregon & California sold at the turn of
the century was to the Booth-Kelly Lumber Company, which was very active in the
area. The attention of Booth-Kelly was first drawn to the Douglas fir timber at Saginaw
in 1896, after which Oregon & California officials examined that area over the period
of two seasons. Negotiations were then entered into between George H. Andrews, in the
Oregon & California’s land department, and John Kelly of Booth-Kelly, ultimately
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leading to the first large transaction between the two companies in 1898.99 In all, BoothKelly acquired about 70,000 acres from the railroad from 1898 to 1902, much of which
it used to supply its large mills at Eugene, Springfield, and Wendling. Booth-Kelly also
made numerous purchases from individual holders who had taken title directly from the
government—pursuant to either the Homestead or the Timber and Stone acts—or from
the railroad, amounting to over 30,000 acres.100 In one purchase, Booth-Kelly secured a
body of over 17,000 acres in the area of Wendling, the nearest point of which was
seventeen miles from a railroad. Though the land was originally on the market for
between six dollars and $6.50 per acre, the purchase price ended up being seven dollars
per acre. The increase was based on the fact that Booth-Kelly took less land than was
originally contemplated.101 As part of this agreement, Booth-Kelly also agreed to
furnish the ties and right of way for the Southern Pacific to construct a branch line to
connect the timber with a shipping point.102
The Oregon & California’s relationship with Booth-Kelly was not exclusive. In
the summer of 1901, in fact, the company sold over 45,000 acres of timberland in
Tillamook, Yamhill, and Washington counties of northwest Oregon to Charles J.
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Winton, who had come to Oregon from Wisconsin, Andrew B. Hammond, from western
Montana, and two of their business associates.103
Occasionally, deals fell through. When Winton returned to sign the above
contract in September of 1901, he spoke with Andrews about the prospect of further
purchases of timberlands, and to his understanding, he in fact procured a verbal option
from Andrews on the purchase of 100,000 acres in addition to the 45,000 acres for which
he had already contracted. They were to be selected in lots of at least 10,000 acres,
excluding burned and bare spots. The price was eight dollars per acre, with a ten percent
down payment and the balance in nine annual payments with six percent interest.104
Winton’s understanding was that the lands would be withdrawn from sale until such
time as Winton could make the selections. There was no definite deadline for deciding
to make the purchase, but the understanding was that it would be within a couple weeks,
just enough time to allow him to return to Wisconsin to confer with his associates. Then
once deciding, these Wisconsin lumber men would have one year to make the selections.
Nothing was reduced to writing.105
Upon his return home to Wisconsin, Winton decided not to exercise the option
and informed Andrews accordingly. Winton continued to favor the deal because it
allowed a chance to do a “big amount of business on a small amount of money,” and in
much less time than going through individual homesteaders—which Winton predicted
would take at least two years. He thought if they could select out the “choice tracts” at
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eight dollars per acre, they could “in turn sell them and make a good turn on them at an
advance over what we had paid.”106 His associates did not agree, however. They thought
they could get the lands being offered (on the Kilches River) for less money (from six
dollars to $6.50 per acre) by purchasing them from homesteaders rather than from the
railroad, and that they should just “rest a little bit and await developments.”107 Winton
also suspected that his associates were simply wary of entering into a transaction of such
greater magnitude than they had originally contemplated. Without the backing of his
business associates, Winton had no choice but to decline exercising the verbal option.108
Sales of timberlands around the turn of the century were so substantial that
Charles W. Eberlein concluded that the railroad had already disposed of the “best
timberlands” prior to his appointment as land agent in 1903. By his estimate, some
400,000 acres in the heart of the sugar pine belt in Oregon had already passed into
private ownership.109 Also by this time all of the principal valleys of western Oregon—
those lands most suitable for agriculture or grazing—had generally been settled, and the
railroad owned very little if any land in the valley.110
Although lumber companies generally preferred to own the lands on which their
timber stood, in some cases, smaller enterprises contracted with railroads for the right
to cut timber without acquiring title to the underlying lands. In 1901, for example, the
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firm of McKeen & Erickson paid the Northern Pacific $2100 to be “let, license[d] and
permit[ted] ... to cut and remove the pine and other merchantable timber for suitable for
saw-logs” on a half-section in Missoula County, Montana. The license was to
automatically expire on May 15, 1904, if not terminated before then. McKeen &
Erickson promised not to cause undue damage to other standing timber, and to release
the Northern Pacific from any liability due to such timber during the license term. The
Northern Pacific reserved the right to sell the land during the license’s term, albeit
subject to McKeen & Erickson’s lien.111
Beginning in the last years of the nineteenth century, the Northern Pacific also
sold millions of acres of its Pacific Northwest timberlands, most to just a handful of
corporations.

Timber

empires—including

most

notably

that

of

Frederick

Weyerhaueser—were built from such sales. Weyerhaueser had become a trusted friend
of Hill in the years since he moved next door to Hill’s mansion on Summit Avenue in
Saint Paul in 1891. Over the next decade, the two formed a powerful business alliance.
In 1894, Hill sold Weyerhaueser 900,000 acres of his St. Paul and Pacific railroad land
grant.112 Transactions such as this one helped Weyerhaueser to become the dominant
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figure in the lumber industry in the upper Midwest if not the entire Mississippi valley.113
Hill allowed his friend to control the timber while he sought to establish control of
transportation from the Mississippi Valley to the Pacific Northwest.
Like other upper Midwest lumbermen, Weyerhaueser turned his attention to the
Pacific Northwest in the final years of the nineteenth century. In 1899, Weyerhaeuser
formed a new company, the Weyerhaueser Timber Company, to acquire Northern
Pacific lands in that region. Within a year, Weyerhaeuser, through his new company,
bought 900,000 acres of western Washington timberlands from the railroad at six dollars
per acre.114 One sticking point in the negotiations was over the Northern Pacific’s
insistence on a requirement that Weyerhaeuser’s transportation of processed lumber to
the east be via the Northern Pacific line. Such a provision had become standard practice
for the railroad company, but Weyerhaeuser balked. The railroad came back with a
demand of $7.50 per acre without such a requirement, but that was also unacceptable to
the lumber magnate. Ultimately, the parties reached a compromise whereby the sale
price stayed at six dollars, and whereby the exclusive transportation requirement
remained but was only operative for fifteen years.115
At that time, Weyerhaeuser also secured an option for the purchase of additional
lands, at the same six dollars per acre, as they became patented to the railroad. Given
the normal annual rise in timberland values, this was an astute move for Weyerhaeuser
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and one Northern Pacific officials would soon regret. On March 1, 1902, Weyerhaeuser
wrote William H. Phipps, land commissioner for the Northern Pacific, with an offer to
exercise his option for the purchase of all of the railroad’s lands, including those
unsurveyed and unpatented, west of the Cascade Mountains in western Washington.
After specifying certain surveyed lands in particular townships that Weyerhaueser
requested be sold to him at the option price of six dollars per acre, Weyerhaueser also
offered to buy, also at six dollars per acre, all other lands in that part of the state, whether
they were then “surveyed, unsurveyed, upatented, or unexamined, acquired or to be
acquired” by the Northern Pacific. Weyerhaeuser qualified this otherwise allencompassing provision by specifying it applied only to “lands which in the aggregate
will average not less than 16,667 feet per acre of live standing fir, cedar, spruce, larch
and pine timber.”116 The total amount of land covered by the option was believed to be
just over 200,000 acres.117
Weyerhaeuser thought he had a deal in place with Phipps by the next day.
However, Phipps’ superiors on the Executive Committee apparently withheld approval
of the deal. The Committee argued that Weyerhaeuser’s option did not cover lands
containing iron and coal, as it had become such a standard practice for the company to
reserve any such lands from sales as to be an implied condition in the original contract.
On May 28, 1902, nearly three months after Weyerhaeuser first sought to exercise his
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option, the Committee authorized President Mellen to accept the deal, but only with the
condition that lands containing coal, iron, and other hard minerals be reserved to the
company.118 Weyerhaeuser responded by insisting that the option covered all other
timberlands as soon as they were surveyed and patented. This included, according to
Weyerhaeuser, not just timberlands containing minerals, but also all lands owned by the
Northern Pacific subsidiary, the Northwestern Improvement Company.119 The parties
reached a compromise agreement in November of 1904. It provided that mineral rights,
but not the lands containing such minerals, be reserved. This would allow the Northern
Pacific to extract or convey such minerals for its benefit, while also allowing
Weyerhaeuser to harvest the timber on the land above. The deal also included
Northwestern Improvement Company lands, as Weyerhaeuser demanded, but at a price
exceeding six dollars, with the specific price depending upon the amount of
merchantable timber.120
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In all, Weyerhaeuser purchased some 1.5 million acres of timberland from the
Northern Pacific, roughly eighty percent of its total holdings.121 These purchases helped
make the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company the second largest holder of timberlands in
the United States, with holdings totaling roughly 95 billion board feet of standing
merchantable timber.122 Its holdings were exceeded only by those of the Southern
Pacific, which through its land grants, including the Oregon & California’s, owned over
four million acres of timberland with an estimated 105 billion board feet.123
Interestingly, even with its sales to Weyerhaeuser and others, the Northern Pacific had
the third largest timber holdings in the country as of 1910. At that time, it still owned
over three million acres with an estimated thirty-six billion board feet. As with
Weyerhaeuser and the Southern Pacific, the vast majority of the Northern Pacific’s
timber holdings were within the Pacific Northwest.124
Part of the reason the Northern Pacific, as of 1910, still held so much timber was
that, in 1903 or 1904, the Northern Pacific shifted policies from disposing of
timberlands to maintaining ownership of those lands it deemed necessary for supplying
the company, and its subsidiaries, with ties.125 In addition to ceasing sales, this policy
required much work from the company’s land department, including acquiring
additional timberlands and solidifying its holdings through exchange of its lands within
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federal Forest Reserves, and determining the quantity and quality of its tie timber
through field examinations.126 The “principal objective” of such work, as Land
Commissioner Thomas Cooper summarized it, was “to secure control of the largest
possible quantity” so as to have a supply that could be considered “fixed, determined
and unalterable.”127
The Northern Pacific entered into few sales over the succeeding few years.
When it did so, it was not for revenue but rather to reduce the risk of catastrophic fires.
In 1907, the work was still ongoing when Weyerhaeuser again applied to purchase
timberlands, this time in the timber-rich region of northern Idaho. Cooper urged his
superiors to reject the deal and to hold onto its remaining timberlands until the land
department’s work was done and until it could verify the company’s tie supply was
adequate. In the meantime, Cooper implored, the value of timberlands would only
increase, at least if recent history was any guide. It was a no-lose proposition. The
Executive Committee agreed. From then on, any offer purchase of timberland would be
investigated completely regarding the potential impact of the proposed sale on the
company’s resource base.128
Oregon & California officials, under Harriman’s leadership, also seemingly
came to disfavor the selling of timberlands. According to his contemporaries and
subsequent scholars, Harriman, in 1903, ordered the termination of all land sales.129
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Scholars have disagreed as to why. Historian David Maldwyn Ellis concluded that
“apparently his aim was to keep for his company any rise in stumpage values” (i.e., for
speculative purposes), though his support is wanting, as Ellis’ use of the “apparently”
qualification indicates.130 Subsequent scholarly works have followed suit, though they
have seemingly relied principally upon Ellis’ work.131
Much evidence, however, indicates that the order was not based on a change in
policy at all but was rather meant to be temporary to allow for re-organization of the
railroad’s land operations.132 By 1901, Harriman had already earned a reputation for
rehabilitating damaged railroad properties.133 He did so by focusing on improving
efficiency, both in the transportation networks themselves and in their business
administration. For Harriman, everything was to be seen as part of a system; each part
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was required to work with all others for the good of the larger whole. Thus, when
Harriman acquired effective control of the Southern Pacific, along with its constituent
lines including the Oregon & California, he sought to integrate their land portfolios into
systems he had established as head of the Illinois Central and Union Pacific.
Maintaining a system that included the Union Pacific, Central Pacific, and
Southern Pacific lines, among others, required a massive amount of timber. Among the
best sources of timber was the area of Oregon traversed by the Oregon & California.
Thus, systematizing land policies necessitated a changed approach to the Oregon &
California’s land grant. While the various land departments of the constituent railroads
had previously enjoyed much autonomy within the Southern Pacific empire, Harriman
sought to centralize authority and to develop a comprehensive land-use plan, whereby
any of his railroads’ lands would be used to benefit his entire system.134 As Eberlein
later explained, the land department tried to administer the land grants with reference to
one another to serve the common interests of the constituent companies and of the parent
company, such that, for example, ties could be purchased in Oregon not only for the
lines in Oregon but for all other Southern Pacific or Union Pacific lines. 135 The basic
intent was to administer the land grants in a “careful, conservative, economical way in
which they would produce the greatest results, both in money and in other ways for the
roads.”136
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Prior to Harriman’s takeover, each railroad company had official control over
its land policies, and they operated entirely independently of one another. Centralization
thus first required an extensive review of what each of the constituent lines had done to
that point, as well as of their respective land holdings. Accordingly, Harriman sent
Eberlein to the West Coast to examine the affairs of the Southern Pacific lines, including
the Oregon & California.137 Upon his arrival, Eberlein encountered three completely
separate organizations in regards to the land grants, the Southern Pacific, the Central
Pacific (which had jurisdiction over the California & Oregon land grant), and the
Oregon & California, “all of them running on different plans—plans that had been the
growth of a great many years.”138 Because of the divided control, he found many
discrepancies in the organizations’ record keeping, including the form of their books
and blanks, their method of doing business, and their methods of accounting. 139 Even
worse, he uncovered “a great many errors and omissions … in the tract books,”
preventing him from ascertaining the status of the grants, including the financial
situation of the sales and the condition of the taxes. In some cases, deeds had been
issued, consideration received, and the lands afterwards lost. Often sales occurred on
unpatented lands in which the patents were later denied.
Complications also arose from the significant amount (as many as 10,000)
donation land claims found within the limits of the grant in Oregon, claims whose
boundaries were irregular since there were no quadrangular surveys in Oregon at the
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time the lands were taken.140 A large portion of these lands remained unsurveyed.
Eberlein concluded that changes were long overdue, and that “complications in title”
called for a radical overhaul of the land departments.141 Eberlein did not blame Andrews
for the condition of the Oregon land grant, clarifying that Andrews was “subject to very
vexatious limitations.” Specifically, the divided control between Andrews, who held the
title of acting land agent of the Oregon & California, in Portland and Mills, the land
agent of the Central Pacific, in San Francisco allowed for Mills to interfere in the
business of Andrews, including about matters “he did not know anything about.” It was
this interference that led to the “confusion in the records,” according to Eberlein.142
It would make sense that Harriman would also suspend land sales to allow for
a cleaning up of their operations, only to resume once the review was complete and the
land offices reorganized. At least that was Eberlein’s understanding of the situation. In
the fall of 1904, Eberlein notified his superiors that sales could resume since the “affairs
of the two land grants had been thoroughly reorganized,” minus some “general cleaning
up.”143 Under Eberlein’s direction, the department had examined its lands to determine
which lands the company should reserve for operating and traffic purposes, including
for the extension of yards, for water supply for engines, and for fuel supply. It had been
his experience with the Union Pacific that the expansion of traffic resulting from
increased settlement required larger stockyards at central shipping points. Once his
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work was done, Eberlein transferred all of the records, files, and property of the land
department to San Francisco to be kept with the records of the Southern Pacific Railroad
Company under his care and supervision.144
Eberlein later insisted that his central focus remained divesting the railroad
company of its land grant, which he considered a burden. He thought it was in the
interests of the railroad to promote population growth and industry, an objective which
could be thwarted by withholding large bodies of land from sale. “There was no
advantage,” according to Eberlein, “to this line of road, or any line of road, to have a
contiguous land grant without settlers, without people on it.”145 His recommendation in
1904, one which he reiterated in 1906, was that the land grant
should be sold out reserving only so much of it as was necessary to the
operation and to the traffic of the road.… That would mean simply
reservation for stations and rights of way for various purposes, stock
yards for traffic, and land that had water for engine supply, gravel banks,
and thing of that kind, which were of more value to the road than to
anybody else and which the road would have to acquire from someone
else if it disposed of them; and after those reservations had been made,
to sell that grant in such a manner as to produce the best business results
for the Railroad Company and by doing so it would produce the very
best results for the community.146
The company even advertised its Oregon lands as being for sale. In the fall of
1904, Eberlein spoke with A. L. Craig, the general passenger agent of both the Oregon
Railroad and Navigation Company and the Oregon & California. Because his concern
was also securing passengers for the lines, Craig urged that lands capable of settlement
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be opened to purchase by settlers. While they both acknowledged that there was “very
little land in this grant” that would be suitable for settlement, they still felt that “any
movement at all” by the railroad “would probably stimulate people to come in and buy
land here, and settle.”147 Based on their conversations, Eberlein and Craig advertised for
the sale of land in a railroad pamphlet intended for general distribution across the
country and beyond.
Sales were soon thereafter again suspended, seemingly indicating that Eberlein’s
superiors had overruled him. However, this suspension in sales was due to legal
complications, not any change in permanent policy. In particular, W. W. Cotton, the
legal advisor of the Oregon Railroad and Navigation Company, called Eberlein to
Portland late in 1904 to inform him that sales could not in fact proceed because of
complications arising from the fact that taxes remained outstanding on some of the
lands, and because the records were still in such a shape that the railroad could not know
which lands had already been lost due to delinquencies.148 Having to reverse course
because of issues he had neglected embarrassed Eberlein a great deal.149
As to the course that needed to be taken, Cotton advised Eberlein that there
needed to be a thorough examination of the tax records of the assessors' offices in every
county in which the grant lay, as to each tract of land, for a period of fifteen years.
Cotton recommended the appointment of W. C. Bristol to lead that review and to
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organize a staff to make that examination.150 This process was so cumbersome in part
due to the “peculiarity in the laws of Oregon,” which allowed for lands to be assessed
to the owner, if known, or to an “unknown owner.” Cotton believed there to be much
land assessed to “unknown owners,” and that some of it had been lost (or “gotten
away”).151 In any event, this investigation into tax matters, according to Eberlein, “was
a very long-winded affair” that took over a year to complete. Eberlein turned over the
results of that investigation on a piecemeal basis to O'Brien, with the final report being
on March 30, 1906. Enclosed with this report was a request that O'Brien “place it in the
hands of attorneys to be cleaned up.”152
Ultimately, only a very small amount of land—not enough to justify the time
and expense of the investigation in Eberlein’s estimation—was lost due to unpaid taxes.
The loss of land was due to failing to pay taxes in instances where the purchaser from
the railroad had neglected to pay the taxes as required by his contract, causing the land
to become delinquent, and the contract forfeited. Not only did the railroad neglect
paying taxes on land it owned, but it also continued to pay taxes on some lands it no
longer owned.153 The root cause of the confusion, Eberlein quipped, was that “things
had been run … very lax in the [land] department.”154 The typical process that the
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railroad had followed was that the land agent would send out a list of lands to each
county and ask for an extension of the current taxes, and the county officer, perhaps
because of being overworked, would normally send back the list with a memorandum
stating the total taxes due, without regard to specific legal subdivisions. In response, the
railroad’s land office simply paid the full amount without regard to specific tracts of
land.155
While the suspension in sales was likely originally intended to allow for the
standardization and re-articulation of land policies, and while it was only extended to
allow for the resolution of certain tax complications, Eberlein’s investigation convinced
him that sales to one prominent lumber company, Booth-Kelly, should perhaps be
permanently curtailed, if not ceased altogether. Specifically, he became troubled by
what he characterized as the “exceedingly favorable contracts” Booth-Kelly had
received from the railroad, the terms of which often included very small initial cash
payments and sales prices at which the company could use the credit to raise money.
These terms were well known throughout lumbering circles both on the West Coast and
in the East. Eberlein received many “bitter complaints” from other timber buyers of
Booth-Kelly’s preferential treatment.156
Not being able to answer the questions of other lumbermen as to why BoothKelly received such favorable deals, Eberlein commenced a specific investigation into
Booth-Kelly’s past dealings with the railroad.157 These investigations showed that a
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substantial reason for Booth-Kelly’s apparent beneficial treatment was the system that
company pursued in acquiring timbered tracts. Eberlein described Booth-Kelly’s tactics
as follows:
they would go through three townships, and take a string of forties [fortyacre sub-sections] down through the center, in some cases, of a section,
take a piece off another section, and so on down through the entire
purchase, and in that way they beat down the value of the remaining
timber, and they then came in immediately on the heels of this, and
would say, ‘Now, here is the rest of the timber in these townships, and
nobody will want it, nobody can use it but ourselves. We will give you
$2.00, or some such price, an acre for it.’158
The simple fact was that the railroad had become too dependent on Booth-Kelly
for its supplies of timber. There were no mills within the grant of any size not controlled
by that company. Eberlein suspected that this was partly because Booth-Kelly often
purchased the mills of small proprietors just to shut them down.159 He was committed
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not to allow Booth-Kelly to monopolize the timber operations in Oregon and to hold
both the railroad and the state hostage. Believing that the company already “had all the
timber at that time that was necessary to a profitable operation for a great many years to
come,” he concluded that further sales to that company “would only foster a monopoly,
and that in the end it would result in curtailment of product in detriment to both the state
and the railroad.”160 The system Booth-Kelly utilized to control the timber market in
Oregon, according to Eberlein, “was not good for the railroad and was good for nobody
but the people interested in that enterprise,” and “that is all.”161
Despite his reservations regarding Booth-Kelly, Eberlein remained convinced
during his tenure (which ended in 1908) that the railroad should sell not only so-called
“agricultural lands,” but also timberlands, provided that such sales were done in a
manner which protected the railroad’s interests in a secure timber supply. He
recommended that the land should be sold to “responsible people who would within a
reasonable time develop” the land with the railroad reserving the right to traffic any
products. He called for covenants running with the land which would guarantee to the
railroad the transportation of the land's products, much like the Northern Pacific
included in most of its contracts.162 As far as Eberlein knew, his proposal was never
adopted, however.163
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Once the tax issues were finally resolved on March 30, 1906, Eberlein was
poised again to begin offering lands for sale. Not three weeks later, however, an
earthquake and resulting fire in San Francisco made the resumption of sales impossible.
The fire destroyed everything that the land departments of the Southern Pacific owned
in the way of records and correspondence, aside from about ten boxes of files which
were only “partially charred” but unfortunately of very little value. Officials in the land
department learned that there were downsides to the centralization of the land
departments’ operations, at least in regards to record-keeping. All of the tract books that
Eberlein had prepared were destroyed, as were records of deeds and sales contracts.164
The company only recorded duplicate originals if for the purposes of a lawsuit, and
neither California nor Oregon required executor contracts for the sale of land to be
recorded with the state. The fire was so devastating that even several years later Eberlein
reported that thinking about the fire made “the back of [his] head ache.”165
Still, after the fire, the company again showed a willingness to sell lands, at least
under the right conditions. The “right conditions” apparently included that the
purchasers be small operators and that the sales include an agreement to supply the
Oregon & California with lumber. Eberlein, for one, felt that “small mill men should
have a chance and not be compelled to go to these large holders and get at a large price
what they needed for their mills.”166 Accordingly, Eberlein allowed for the sale of
several sections of timber to such “small mill men,” including the Cole Brothers and
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Fisher Brothers. These contracts provided that the purchasers would pay for the land by
agreeing to provide the railroad with all of their output each month at current prices for
timber.167
Some timber companies, however, sought to exploit the railroad’s plight by
taking some of its best timberlands off its hands. As Eberlein accounted, “before the
remains of the city was cool,” there was “an immediate and fierce onslaught” on the
land office for the sale of timberlands. Those leading the charge were timber investors
including Booth-Kelly and the Weyerhaueser Timber Company.168 It appears they
sought to exploit the company’s lack of records to acquire some of the best timberlands
at less than their value. In one instance, Weyerhaueser made an application to purchase
timber from the area around Pokegama, where his company already owned 12,000 acres
of railroad land.169 Its application was for about 50,000 acres at a price of $5.00 per acre.
This offer precipitated much discussion in the railroad offices, including between
Eberlein and his superiors Kruttshnitt and William D. “Judge” Cornish. Eberlein argued
against taking any action at that time, because the company was simply unprepared, no
longer having any cruising reports from that country, regarded as having the “heaviest
timber” (sugar pine) in the grant.
The others disagreed, however, and they ordered Eberlein to have the land
cruised. He complied and sent “as many cruisers” as the company could rely upon to
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examine the land in the fall of 1906. From this cruise, Eberlein confirmed his suspicions.
It showed that Weyerhaueser had asked for just the “nucleus” of the country, such that
the 50,000 acres would render the remaining 70,000 acres tributary to it of little value
to anybody but Weyerhaueser. He thus insisted the 120,000 acres be sold together—a
reasonable request but one which prompted Weyerhaueser to cease negotiations. That
company’s effort to monopolize the timber in one of the best timber regions of the entire
grant had failed. Though the deal fell through, the railroad, for its part, evidenced a
willingness to sell timberlands, provided that the condition of the lands were adequately
ascertained and the terms were right.170
As for getting its records back in order, the company was fortunate that O’Brien,
vice president of the Oregon & California, held many of the lists that Eberlein had
prepared in the preceding years at Portland rather than in the San Francisco
headquarters. They classified the railroad's lands by their location (section, town, range,
and county) and by whether the land was patented, unpatented, selected, unselected, or
unsurveyed. They also provided each tract's contract number if it was under contract.
However, they did not list the other contracting party and were only current as of the
date they were originally prepared and sent to him.171
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Even with their shortcomings, the lists at least gave Eberlein’s department a
foundation from which it could rebuild the railroad’s land records. Regarding lands
under contract, railroad employees had to examine the General Land Office records, as
well as the deed and contract records, going back to 1866. At that time, such records
were held not in a centralized location, but rather in the recorder's offices in every county
of the grant. With this examination, the land department was able to supply much of the
missing information, but in many cases deeds had not been properly recorded, a result
of either ignorance or in some cases the intention of the purchasers themselves.172
Further, the land department asked for the assistance of purchasers under contract with
the railroad, who the railroad asked to send in their contracts so that they could be copied
and the information could be recorded. In most cases, the purchasers acquiesced, though
many found that they too had lost their contracts.173 Finally, in cases where a tract of
land had been deeded to a private party, but the deed had been lost, the law department
determined whether the purported purchaser had made a sufficient showing warranting
the issuance of a new deed. In some cases where the law department found the purported
landowner’s evidence to be lacking, the purchaser brought suit to restore their title, and
in other instances the company simply issued quitclaim deeds.174 There remained as late
as Eberlein’s departure in 1908 about twenty tracts of land where the company was
unable to ascertain, to its satisfaction, the identity of the landowner.175

172

Eberlein testimony, Oregon & California Transcript, 2254-55.

173

Eberlein testimony, Oregon & California Transcript, 2255.

174

Eberlein testimony, Oregon & California Transcript, 2256-57.

175

Eberlein testimony, Oregon & California Transcript, 2257.

211
O'Brien's lists allowed the land department to resume operations (at least in
regards to non-timbered lands) within six months of the fire, including giving notice of
the sale of such agricultural or grazing lands the company was able to sell at that time.
In late August, Eberlein notified his superiors that they could act upon applications for
agricultural or grazing lands, and he also distributed circulars notifying the public that
the railroad would begin accepting such applications.176 But Eberlein could not
remember any applications being accepted between 1906 and his departure in 1908. He
claimed this was because there were, in fact, no genuine applications for agricultural or
grazing purposes. On examination of the so-called “agricultural applications,” the land
department found them to be either for minerals, timber, or water power, not
settlement.177
As for timberlands, the company could not yet sell them, as selling those lands
required extensive cruising reports, forty-years worth of which had been “entirely wiped
out by the fire.”178 Selling those lands had to wait until Eberlein and the land department
could cruise them and restore of the records at least to a point where officials could “act
intelligently”—and this was being done, Eberlein later insisted, “as quickly as
possible.”179 While Cornish authorized Eberlein to sell agricultural and grazing lands,
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subject to his approval, Cornish never authorized the sale of timberlands, over the advice
and protest of Eberlein.180
While the no-sale order may have initially been intended to be only temporary,
the policy of the railroad, by 1907, had shifted to retaining certain lands beyond those
necessary for transportation facilities. When Brian A. McAllaster replaced Eberlein as
head of the land department at San Francisco during that year, Cornish advised him that
as soon as the records could be straightened out, after the fire, the intention was to offer
lands “not needed for company uses” for sale.181 Lands that were deemed necessary for
“company uses” included lands reserved from sale on account of timber, iron, coal, or
oil.182
The fire also contributed to this shift in policies. In addition to delaying sales for
long enough for railroad officials to reevaluate policies, it also showed them the danger
in being so heavily dependent upon lumber companies for their timber supplies.
Specifically, as a result of the fire, the price of ties nearly tripled overnight, with the
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threat that they would continue to rise, perhaps even above a dollar.183 This confirmed
to railroad officials that they had indeed become too dependent upon the large timber
interests in the region.
To protect itself and the public from being further exploited in the future, the
company thereafter reserved a large block of 100,000 acres of timberlands from sale for
the company’s uses. These lands were primarily along the Umpqua River and were all
near the railroad and convenient to transportation, such that they could be used for the
manufacture of ties and bridge timbers.184 Though some cited this move as proof that
the Oregon & California was bent on maintaining a land monopoly in the state, Eberlein
defended it based on the need to secure a supply of timbers and ties from its body of
timber, which, while still considerable, “was fast disappearing from its ownership.” This
reservation, Eberlein claimed, was not an effort for the railroad to monopolize the timber
of the area, but was rather an attempt to confront monopolies which were already
emerging in the state. In his examination of the purchases and activities of the large
timber interests in the state, including Booth-Kelly and the Hammond and Winton
interests, he had found that these interests were consolidating their holdings with the
purchase of even-numbered sections. It thus appeared to Eberlein that “the timber of
Western Oregon was gradually becoming consolidated into a few large holdings,” to the
detriment of not just the Oregon & California but also to the people of Oregon.185
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Later in 1907, Harriman confirmed the company’s changed approach to its
timberlands—one which extended beyond the 100,000 acre reservation. At the National
Irrigation Congress, held in Sacramento, California, Harriman reported that the railroad
would withhold timberlands from sale based on the need for conservation. He insisted
that his companies were not “holding those lands for speculation,” but were instead
“holding those lands to protect [the people] in the future.” Considering that “ties are the
foundation of the transportation line,” he stated his intent “to have a reserve with which
we can maintain these great transportation lines for those that come after, that they may
not accuse us of wasting the resources which we had at our command.” 186 Harriman’s
1907 speech was consistent with a statement he made to a newspaper reporter that same
year:
The Southern Pacific will sell land to settlers, but not to speculators. We
can tell a speculator from a settler as well as anyone. The agricultural
land we will sell, but the timber-land we will retain, because we must
have ties and bridge timbers, and we must retain our timber for future
supply. The Southern Pacific has an insufficient amount of timber now,
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and we have had to buy large tracts, looking to the future supply of ties
and material. Yes, we will sell to settlers, but speculators will get none.187
Harriman’s goal, in other words, was to prevent harmful speculation and to conserve
the timber for future railroad use.
At first glance, Harriman’s conservationist justification seems inconsistent with
the dominant brand of conservation represented by President Theodore Roosevelt and
Gifford Pinchot, neither of whom ever advocated massive curtailing of development.
Rather, they advocated managing forests with the goal of promoting more efficient and
prolonged development without sacrificing present yield. In one instance, at the meeting
of the American Forestry Congress in 1905, Roosevelt assured pro-development
westerners that the government’s policy was “consistent to give to every portion of the
public domain its highest possible amount of use.”188 Pinchot added that “[t]he
administration of the forest reserves is based upon the general principle ... that the
reserves are for use. They must be useful first of all to the people of the neighborhood
in which they lie.”189 On their face, Harriman’s policies appeared to violate this simple
rule of conservation.
Assuming that the termination of land sales thwarted development, it would
indeed seem that his policies contradicted the very conservationist principles he
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attempted to evoke. However, it is not at all clear that his policy impacted development
at all. Harriman had come to believe that selling lands cheaply in order to stimulate
development—a policy which the government and railroad had long-followed—in fact
impeded development by encouraging speculation. This was both because the annual
rise in value of the timber exceeded the taxes and interest payments required to retain
the land, thus making it profitable simply to hold the land, and because there was not
much of a market for the grant’s timber, due to its relative inaccessibility as compared
to the still-plentiful forests of Washington and California. Accordingly, only “a very,
very small fraction” of the timberlands that the Oregon & California sold, including
those which it sold either directly or indirectly to lumber companies such as BoothKelly, had been milled even by 1912.190 Based on these experiences, Eberlein ultimately
concluded that “anybody that comes in and wants to buy all the timber in [multiple]
townships of land has no immediate intention of doing anything with it.”191 Rather, the
lands were simply “held for the rise.”192 And the “rise” could be quite profitable, as
some of the lands the Oregon & California had sold for less than $10 at around the turn
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of the century would be worth over $100 a decade later.193 That the lack of development
was due more to physical and economic geography than to Harriman’s decisions would
later be confirmed both by government reports and the government’s own experiences
once it reacquired the lands in 1916.194
Given these realities, which Harriman and other railroad land officials
appreciated long before Congress did, Harriman’s termination of land sales can better
be seen not as anti-development but as a recognition that the market system, in this
instance, had failed—and would likely continue to fail—to promote the rational,
efficient use of the land’s natural resources.195 This rationale was thus consistent with
the conservation movement, which was above all, as Samuel P. Hays has articulated, a
scientific movement advocating that scientists take the lead in ensuring the efficient use
of natural resources rather than leaving such noble obligations to inhuman, if not at
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times inhumane, political or economic forces.196 Harriman was both a benefactor and
consumer of the emerging sciences of conservation.
Harriman had already demonstrated his personal support of the natural sciences
when he arranged and funded a maritime expedition to Alaska in 1899. What began as
a vacation for him and his family was radically transformed when Harriman conceived
of inviting an entire community of scientists to explore and document the coastlines of
Alaska. The expedition included biologists, botanists, geographers, geologists, and
zoologists, as well as several artists and intellectual writers. John A. Muir, C. Hart
Merriam (chief of the U.S. Biological Survey), William E. Ritter (president of the
California Academy of Sciences), Henry Gannett (chief of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic
Survey), George B. Grinnell (editor of Forest and Stream), and Bernhard E. Fernow
(former chief of the Department of Agriculture’s Division of Forestry) were among the
scientists on the journey.197
In the decade following their time together on what was referred to as the
“Harriman Expedition,” Muir and Harriman maintained a regular correspondence and
formed what environmental historian Donald Worster has labeled “an improbable bond”
based on a “mutual understanding ... [of] the value of an efficient railroad system and
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on the wisdom of establishing national parks.”198 Worster recently argued that, from the
expedition until Harriman’s death a decade later, Muir saw Harriman “as a wellmeaning friend and potential ally of the conservation movement.”199 Harriman even
once helped Muir recover from writer’s block.
Harriman was also a consumer of conservation science. In 1902, he personally
applied to the Bureau of Forestry for experts to be dispatched to Arden House, his
15,000-acre estate in Orange County, New York, to advise him on how to conserve the
estate’s 8,000 acres of dense forest.200 Upon receiving Harriman’s request, the bureau
sent nine men instead of the normal two to develop a working plan for improving
Harriman’s timber. The foresters reported being excited at the opportunity to use
“ingenious methods” for examining the abilities of various species of trees to bear shade,
to reproduce, and to withstand damage from forest fires. 201 The nine forestry students
completed the necessary fieldwork between April 1 and June 15, during which time they
created a forest map of the entire tract and compiled, according to the Department of
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Agriculture’s annual report, “a careful study of the forest, by which its character,
condition, present stand, and future yield were ascertained.”202
There is also evidence that Harriman was motivated not just by a form of
utilitarian conservation but also by a preservationist ethos. After visiting Harriman’s
New York estate, Muir for one concluded that Harriman had saved that timberland from
timber speculators out of a love for the forest and its wildlife. This indicated to Muir
that Harriman considered land something to cherish and conserve, at least in select
places and when consistent with economic development.203 Beyond preserving his own
8,000-acre timbered estate in New York, Harriman’s desire to leave certain places alone
was also demonstrated in 1905 when he lobbied in support of the Sierra Club’s efforts
to incorporate the Yosemite Valley into the national park which then surrounded it.
Later, in his 1907 speech before the National Irrigation Congress, he showed an
aesthetic concern for the preservation of Oregon’s natural beauty. He argued that
“Oregon ought to be the country’s playground. There’s a vastness of fine scenery
there.”204 Through his words and actions, Harriman was able to convince Muir of his
concern for nature beyond its mere economic value. In the spring of 1909, Muir visited
Harriman and his family in Pasadena, California, as Harriman lay on his death bed. Muir
was asked how he, “a nature lover, [could] happen to be visiting a cold-blooded
financier.” He answered, reportedly while fighting back tears, that “Mr. Harriman has a
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heart. People may not know it, but he loves the flowers and the trees. He loves nature
and human nature.”205
*******
Muir’s unabashedly gushing description of Harriman certainly came as a
surprise. The same year that Harriman seized control of the Southern Pacific, Muir
scoffed at how each of the transcontinental railroads invariably advertised its line as the
“scenic route.” He proposed a new and much more honest advertisement: “Come!
Travel our way. Ours is the blackest…. The sky is black and the ground is black, and
on either side there is a continuous border of black stumps and logs and blasted trees
appealing to heaven for help as if still half alive, and their mute eloquence is most
interestingly touching…. No other route on this continent so fully illustrates the
abomination of desolation.”206 Observations such as this one regarding the ecological
destructiveness of railroads have tended to obscure the fact that railroad companies
themselves were not necessarily enemies of the environment. Indeed, in some cases they
were at the forefront of the conservationist movements that were still in their infancy at
the time of Muir’s writing in 1901.207
That railroad officials had a profit motive in seeking to ensure a continuous
supply of timber for the maintenance their respective railroad empires should not
undermine their conservationist credentials. Indeed, notable conservationists within the
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federal forest bureaucracy recognized that the movement depended on the willing
participation of business interests. Writing just a year before Harriman’s supposed
termination of land sales, for instance, former chief of the Division of Forestry,
Bernhard E. Fernow, predicted that wealthy capitalists, like Harriman and Hill, “who
can see the financial advantages of the future in forest properties,” would quickly
become the newest “class” of conservationists. Fernow thus concluded that, aside from
being owned by the government, forest resources were most likely to be conserved when
in “the hands of perpetual corporations and wealthy owners.”208 Other conservationists,
including Pinchot, recognized that their movement would only succeed when private
commercial entities appreciated the extent to which their continued prosperity depended
on the rational management of natural resources. As Roosevelt asserted at the American
Forest Congress in 1905, the conservation movement—as well as America’s continued
economic growth—would depend not on philanthropists or the general public, but on
“the men who are actively interested in the use of the forest in one way or another.”209
Roosevelt defended his conservationist agenda by asserting that “the railroads must
have ties.”210 Decision-makers within the Southern Pacific and Northern Pacific
administrations agreed.
Still, others had stakes in the continued availability of timberlands on the cheap.
The frustration of lumber companies at having their supply curtailed was soon translated
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into public outrage against the Oregon & California and its land policies, which in turn
translated to political action against that company. The Northern Pacific largely avoided
this fate, primarily by keeping its policy of retention private. While Booth-Kelly
spearheaded the drive against the Southern Pacific subsidiary, “big timber speculators
alone,” in public lands historian David Maldwyn Ellis’ assessment, “could not secure
mass support for their selfish aims.”211 Rather, small speculators soon “joined the hue
and cry,” followed by business owners along the route who “favored any move which
would unfreeze the [railroad’s] timber holdings,” followed by those who simply disliked
railroad management in general, followed finally by politicians who recognized a
popular issue they could exploit.212 All of this led to a federal government lawsuit for
the forfeiture of the Oregon & California land grant. That is the subject of the next
chapter.

211

Ellis, “Oregon and California Railroad Land Grant,” 263.

212

Ellis, “Oregon and California Railroad Land Grant,” 263.

224
CHAPTER 5 – INERTIA AND UNDIRECTED DRIFT
FRAUD, FORFEITURE, AND LESSONS UNLEARNED, 1904-1916

The shift in railroad policies from rapid disposal (often at cheap prices) to
retention and management met with public resistance. Considering the custom of free
land and free timber that pervaded communities throughout the American West, and
considering the unpopularity of railroad corporations, this should not have been a
surprise. Indeed, opposition to railroad land policies came to unify the public in a way
no other issue could do. Using the Oregon & California land grant’s “homestead clause”
as its legal basis, the federal government responded to the public outcry by filing suit in
1908 seeking either the forfeiture of the land grant or a requirement for the railroad to
sell the remaining lands under the terms of the land grant.
This suit led to seven years of litigation and political wrangling, during which
time the status of over two million acres in Oregon remained in legal limbo. All this
time, railroad officials continued to insist that much of the remaining land was
unsuitable to the sort of settlement that the homestead clause required, and that, in
general, sales of timbered lands according to legal subdivision only encouraged
speculation and inhibited economic development and effective management.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed with the railroad that the homestead clause was
unworkable as applied to the remaining lands, but it also sided with the government in
authorizing Congress to dispose of the remaining lands in accordance with a “policy as
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it may deem fitting under the circumstances.”1 Although it should have been clear to
Congress that the remaining lands should be managed for a sustained timber supply
rather than being cleared and sold in legal subdivisions for the purposes of agriculture,
Congress disregarded not just railroad testimony, but the recommendations of
government experts, in providing for exactly that. This whole episode is thus a prime
example of James Willard Hurst’s famous thesis that, even in a time of rapid change,
the course of lawmaking tends to be driven more by “inertia and undirected drift put in
motion by the cumulative impact of countless narrowly focused actions than by plan or
conscious choice of values.”2
*******
The Oregon & California’s largest purchaser of lands, the Booth-Kelly Lumber
Company, spearheaded the campaign against the railroad. As part of the effort to force
the sale of lands, A. C. Dixon, a manager of Booth-Kelly, traveled to Washington, D.C.
in 1908 to testify before Congress. He testified to all of the development and settlement
that had been made possible through the railroad’s selling of lands prior to 1903,
processes which were then thwarted by the termination of land sales. He admitted that
the lumber interests were indeed “behind and favored every resolution [on the question
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of disposal of lands] adopted in the state and are still in hearty accord with the original
purpose of the movement, it being necessary for the perpetuation of their business.”3
John W. Blodgett and Arthur C. Hill, both officers and large stockholders in BoothKelly, accompanied Dixon to Washington. While Dixon was navigating the political
waters in Washington, Blodgett and Hill traveled to New York to meet with Charles W.
Eberlein, land agent for the Southern Pacific’s constituent lines, to try to resolve their
issues directly with the railroad. At this meeting, they not only reiterated their threat to
force the Oregon & California to sell its remaining land through the political process
but also complained about the railroad beginning to operate its own mills rather than
purchasing lumber from Booth-Kelly. Eberlein explained to Hill that the railroad only
started its mills because Booth-Kelly was unreliable; it had canceled contracts and was
unable to furnish materials when the Oregon & California most needed them—
particularly after the San Francisco fire when Booth-Kelly and others dramatically
raised the price of timber and ties.4
According to Eberlein, the people stirred to excitement by Booth-Kelly and
other lumber companies completely disregarded—and “brutally so”—the facts that the
San Francisco fire had left the railroad helpless in terms of the rapid disposal of lands,
and that the railroad was working rapidly to recommence the selling of agricultural and
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grazing lands.5 And the movement, Eberlein later argued, actually had the effect of
delaying sales, not speeding them up. In his words, “the excitement that was fomented
against the Railroad Company … had a very quieting effect on” applications for the
purchase of land. After the Weyerhaueser application in December of 1906, there were
no bona fide applications to purchase lands, according to Eberlein, though there were
“a number of cases where people asked that an application be filed.” In most of these
cases, however, there was no immediate desire for the land.6
Even as Dixon and other lumbermen advocated for action against the Oregon &
California based on its violations of the grant's terms by selling lands in large tracts,
they resisted all effort to void those sales as part of the remedy. As Dixon articulated,
“[i]t has never been contemplated that lands already sold and upon which development
has been in progress for years should be taken from the present holders and again placed
on the market.”7 His purported rationale was that doing so would “arrest development”
in the state and “give its chief industry a blow from which it would perhaps never fully
recover.”8 In a prophetic moment, Dixon also contended that “even attack[ing] the titles
of the present holders would be almost as serious a matter,” as “none of the lands,”
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whether on even or odd sections, could be logged during the duration of the resulting
lawsuit.9
Having been elected to serve a constituency frustrated with the railroad’s
apparently anti-development land policies, Representative Willis C. Hawley, from
Oregon, exploited Dixon’s testimony to procure the passage of a resolution, on April
30, 1908, authorizing the attorney general to institute proceedings to enforce the
government’s legal rights against the railroad.10 Attorney General George W.
Wickersham complied and filed suit in September of 1908 against the railroad, one of
its creditors, and many individuals and companies who had purchased lands in violation
of the grant’s terms.11 While Congress did not follow Dixon’s advice in not attacking
the validity of past sales made in violation of the Oregon & California grant’s terms,
years later, in 1912, Dixon finally got his way. That year, Congress dropped the
government’s claims against individuals and companies that had purchased large tracts
of land in good faith and without knowledge of the grant’s homestead clause forbidding
such sales.12 This legislation, the Forgiveness Act, was passed in no small part because
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the lawyers at the Department of Justice had convinced members of Congress that the
individuals who purchased the affected 524,000 acres were “small fry” settlers and were
so numerous that litigation would be virtually unending, meaning also that the land
would be tied up for decades. The legislation provided that innocent purchasers could
keep title so long as they paid the government $2.50 per acre, even though some of the
land was worth as much as $500 per acre.13
It is doubtful whether members of Congress actually believed most purchasers
of railroad lands were innocent, good-faith purchasers, given past experiences in Oregon
and elsewhere. Indeed, several of the purchasers were lumber companies and other
interests purchasing tracts in excess of ten thousand acres, and many of these “innocent
purchasers” had been indicted—and some convicted—of land frauds over the previous
decade. During that time, the brazenness of those committing frauds in Oregon land
deals had become a national spectacle, a real achievement given the pervasiveness of
public lands frauds across the West. The defrauders may have been justified in feeling
insulated from any legal repercussions, given that most of those charged with
implementing the land laws and reporting, investigating, and prosecuting irregularities
were themselves among the defrauders. In 1902, however, things began to change.
That year, a resident of Tucson, Arizona, Joost H. Schneider, wrote to the
General Land Office (GLO) to report on a land fraud ring operating in northern
California. Specifically, he wrote that two California real estate agents, John Benson
and F. A. Hyde, led an expansive ring that fraudulently bought up valueless lands at

13

See Oregon and California Land Grants: Hearings before the Committee on the
Public Lands (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1916) (hereinafter “Oregon &
California Hearings of 1916”), 203.

230
prescribed prices and then bribed land officials to have the lands included in proposed
forest reserves so they could be exchanged for valuable lands under the Forest
Management Act of 1897’s “In Lieu Land” provision.14 Schneider, a former employee
of the fraud ring, felt that Benson and Hyde had cheated him of his share of the spoils,
and this letter was his revenge. Unfortunately, Schneider’s first letter was ignored, as
were multiple follow-ups. The reason was likely that their recipient, Commissioner of
the GLO Binger Hermann, was himself complicit in land frauds in Oregon, and he
feared that increased attention on land dealings in California would ultimately lead to
Oregon. Schneider finally broke through Hermann’s stone-walling when he sent a letter
that arrived at GLO headquarters when Hermann was on vacation. The office directed
the letter to the assistant commissioner, who in turn sent a special agent to investigate.
When Hermann found out, he did not give in easily. He first tried to intercept the agent
and prevent him from interviewing Schneider. When that failed, he filed the completed
report away upon his receipt of it, hoping that would be the end of the matter. It was
not. The assistant commissioner searched for and ultimately found the report, which he
then forwarded to Secretary of Interior Ethan A. Hitchcock. The secretary sent special
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companies for many times more what the defrauder had paid.
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agents to California and Oregon to investigate the allegations further. 15 Even with
continuing interference from Hermann,16 the agents sent to Oregon found much more
than they were looking for, as they soon stumbled upon another fraud ring with
connections to some of the highest officers in Oregon and United States politics.17 This
ring, headed by Stephen A. D. Puter, a timber cruiser, Franklin P. Mays, an Oregon
attorney and state senator, and Horace G. McKinley, a small-time timber speculator,
had been in operation for years before the special agents’ arrival in 1903.
In one of the ring’s previous deals, Puter in 1899 agreed to supply Minnesota
lumberman Charles A. Smith with over nine thousand acres of prime timberland on the
South Santiam River in Linn County, Oregon. Puter lined up fifty-seven dummy
locators, mostly from Portland, to make claims under the Timber & Stone Act.18
Unfortunately for Puter, the Northern Pacific eyed the same tracts as potential indemnity
selections under its land grant. When that company learned of the entries, it formally
protested them, knowing that the vast majority of claims under the Timber & Stone Act
were fraudulent. Despite being a friend and frequent co-conspirator of Puter’s, Mays
represented the Northern Pacific in the proceedings before the Roseburg land office.
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Puter had asked him to represent his interests, but he had said he was too busy. When
Puter found out that his friend was representing his opponent, he confronted Mays, who
responded (“rather haughtily” according to Puter), “[d]on’t you know that I am one of
the regular attorneys of the Northern Pacific Railway Company?”19 Mays reassured
Puter that Puter would still be “well represented” and that Mays would “be easy with
him.”20 After Puter’s testimony as the first witness, which Puter told Mays went well,
Mays visited Puter at his hotel room and suggested a settlement whereby they let the
Northern Pacific have half the land. Ultimately, they reached an agreement that Smith
would keep thirty-three, and that Puter would withdraw the other twenty-four entries to
allow the Northern Pacific to file indemnity selection.21
It was not a done deal, however, as all patents required approval from
Washington, D.C. Though this step was normally ministerial, the Northern Pacific’s
involvement apparently aroused suspicions in the GLO and the Department of the
Interior, causing the patents to be suspended pending a special investigation. The delay
in patents prompted Puter to dispatch his financial associate Frederick A. Kribs to
Washington, D.C., where Kribs reached an agreement with Senator John H. Mitchell,
from Oregon, to pay Mitchell twenty-five dollars for each patent he could expedite, both
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in this case and in all future cases.22 In the coming years, there was much corruption to
keep Mitchell busy.23
Puter had friends in all the right places. Just as defrauders from Benson and Hyde
in California and Arizona to Puter and Mays in Oregon had allies at the GLO
headquarters, so too did they enjoy much support at the local level. Puter and his
associates, for instance, frequently relied upon sympathetic local land officials. One
such official was Marie Ware, commissioner of the Eugene land office and intimate
acquaintance of Puter’s associate McKinley. In one case, Puter’s ring was so blatant as
to do away with the typical practice of paying people to make fraudulent locations and
instead simply filing a stack of locations themselves using fictitious names. With Ware
in charge of the land office, there was nobody they even needed to fool.24
They also had allies in the Department of Justice. Mays himself was a prime
example of this, as he first met Puter as a United States Attorney for the District of
Oregon. From the time Puter met Mays in 1890 until Puter stopped operations some
fifteen years later, Puter claimed he consulted with Mays “in regard to a large majority
of the deals in which [Puter] was interested.”25 Mays not only offered advice but also
helped protect Puter and his other associates from prosecution. In one deal after special
agents had been sent to Oregon, Mays advised Puter to be careful because he did not
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want to have to prosecute him if the agents found Puter out.26 In 1903, after the special
agents found sufficient evidence to justify formal federal proceedings against Puter and
others involved in land frauds in Oregon, U.S. District Attorney John Hall took over the
cases, and he too proved a reliable friend through his efforts to stall the prosecutions.
However, Hall’s assistant, Francis Heney, appointed over Hall’s objections, proved to
be just the opposite. Upon suspecting Hall was shielding certain prominent people from
prosecution. Heney traveled to Washington, D.C. to meet with Attorney General
Philander Chase Knox and Secretary Hitchcock, both Roosevelt Republicans eager to
eliminate corruption in politics. After that meeting, Knox appointed Heney as a special
prosecutor to investigate and prosecute the Oregon land frauds.27 At that point, Mays
reportedly said to Puter, “[i]f Hall should continue to have full swing, I shall not fear
the outcome; but should this man Heney gain control of the reins, there is no telling
where we might all land.”28
Heney immediately issued indictments in what he considered the strongest case,
one Heney did not know also involved an alleged two thousand dollar bribe to Mitchell.
Although at the start of trial, in November of 1904, Hall attempted to continue treating
Heney as his assistant, Heney took over the prosecution in a matter of days. Heney
expected Mitchell to cooperate, but Mitchell refused to answer certain of Heney’s
questions.29 Even without Mitchell’s compliance, Puter was convicted. When Mays
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declined to post bond on his behalf, Puter felt betrayed and isolated, and he decided to
testify against his co-conspirators and others who were complicit, including Mays and
Mitchell.30 At the end of 1904, Heney convened a grand jury that over the next several
months returned twenty-six indictments against one hundred people, including State
Senator Mays, Senator Mitchell, U.S. Representative Hermann (who had been fired
from his post in the GLO for his interference with the initial investigation only to be
elected to U.S. Congress representing Oregon), U.S. Representative John H.
Williamson, U.S. District Attorney Hall, and many other state and federal government
officials.31 Heney served as prosecutor until December 3, 1905, at which time Theodore
Roosevelt nominated William C. Bristol, a Portland attorney, to replace him. As with
Heney, government officials involved in the frauds but not yet prosecuted opposed his
nomination. Senator Charles W. Fulton (who despite his own extensive involvement in
the frauds remained the only member of Oregon’s congressional delegation not yet
indicted) led the Senate in opposing his nomination based on Bristol’s reputation,
according to one notable observer, as a man of “strict integrity and marked legal ability,
and as one possessed of the courage of his convictions.”32 Fulton escaped prosecution
but lost his seat in 1908, due in part to Heney’s active campaign against him.33
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Heney and his successors enjoyed many successes in the trials that carried on
into the next decade. His most notable victory was the conviction of Mitchell in July of
1905.34 Despite the evidence against him, Mitchell continued to proclaim his innocence,
not based on factual discrepancies but rather on his inability to see what he did as wrong.
As historian Jerry A. O’Callaghan characterized Mitchell’s situation, “Mitchell
belonged to a passing generation which did not comprehend the change in public
temper. He was caught in a shift of public mores, which is a cruel thing.” 35 Even
Democrats within the state had begun to feel sorry for Mitchell. In December of 1905,
while Mitchell’s case was on appeal to the Supreme Court, Mitchell died from
complications flowing from having a tooth pulled.36 James H. Raley, an attorney and
former state senator, wrote to Governor George E. Chamberlain, also a Democrat, that
Mitchell’s death was “the most fortunate solution of a most unfortunate and deplorable
situation.”37 Still, Raley wrote, “no one who has known him personally, or who has
known of his past services to this State and to the Nation at large, can refrain from a
deep feeling of sorrow of this sad ending of a useful life.”38 In all, over a thousand
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people in twenty-two states were indicted, with 126 being convicted, for actions relating
to land frauds.39
As to the jury of public opinion, Governor George E. Chamberlain recognized
the potential political windfall for himself and other Democrats, considering that most
public officials involved were Republicans. In 1905, he wrote,
The outlook here for at least partial Democratic success is flattering. The
land fraud prosecutions have involved so many of the old Republican
leaders that the people are very apt to hold them all measurably
responsible for the disgrace that has overwhelmed the States. One of our
Senators (Mitchell) and one Congressman (Williamson) have been
convicted, and another (Hermann) stands indicted here and in
Washington for complicity in these frauds, and the end is not yet. The
methods resorted to to accomplish Republican success in the East, the
levying of tribute upon the widow and the orphan through the
instrumentality of Insurance Companies, the sale of official information
for speculation purposes in the Departments at Washington, fraud and
speculation on the part of officers in said Departments, which are daily
being brought to light, disagreements among the leaders of the party as
to tariff revision, railway regulation and trust suppression, all combined,
are arousing in the people a spirit of opposition to the party in control.40
Of course, to take full advantage, Chamberlain also had to show that he had acted to
prevent the frauds, or at least to prosecute them after the fact. He considered himself to
have been proactive in addressing the problem of frauds and an important part of
bringing the defrauders to justice. As he wrote in one letter, “I have worked at this matter
for three years through the instrumentality of our State Land Agents, Morrow and West,
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who in turn have done all in their power to ferret out fraud, and the results are now being
attained.”41
Not all supported Chamberlain’s handling of the Oregon land frauds, including
at least one person, A. T. Kelliher, a timberland dealer from Chicago. Of course,
Kelliher was also accused of participating in the frauds, so he was far from impartial.
Kelliher especially disapproved of the governor placing pressure on Kelliher's defense
attorney in Portland to withdraw from Kelliher’s representation. This attorney,
according to Kelliher, “received a quasi social and political call from [Chamberlain] and
on account of [Chamberlain’s] influence refused to proceed further in [Kelliher’s]
behalf.”42 This astounded Kelliher as an act beneath the integrity of the Office of the
Governor: “Only think of the Governor of the great state of Oregon condescending to
such an act,” he wrote.43 Kelliher even offered to give five hundred dollars to charity if
Chamberlain could “point out any case where any governor of any state or territory in
the United States has ever personally used his influence to prevent the attorney who has
been selected by the person who has been charged with a crime, from acting for the
accused.”44 Chamberlain’s response was simple. He referred to records containing
evidence that Kelliher was not a good faith purchaser (or seller) of Oregon timberlands,
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such that there was little ground for his “apparently righteous indignation.”45 “Where
lands have been stolen from the State,” he wrote, “I propose to find the thief if I can,
and I expect the thieves to assail me. I propose to get the stolen property back if I can,
and I expect to meet resistance.... Your implied threats have no effect upon me, nor will
they deter me the least in the discharge of my duty as I see it.”46
Even at the time, some questioned why there were so many frauds. Some
predictably pointed to moral failings. Horace Stevens, a former land office clerk who
collaborated with Puter on his jail-house tell-all memoir, for one, blamed the
participation of one person on his being the son of a man who had served in the
Confederate army, reasoning that the “stunting of such men’s ethical growth by the
practice and defense of human enslavement might, as has sometimes been theorized,
have been a factor in their lack of any meaningful moral compass.” 47 But the
comprehensiveness of the frauds belied Stevens’ accusation. It was not just
Confederates, or even “speculators” or “monopolists,” who engaged in illegalities.
Rather, as Pisani has argued, people across the West used “speculators” as scapegoats
in part “to hide their own extensive, and often illegal, land dealings.”48
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Given the pervasiveness of land frauds, there must have been some systemic
failure in addition to any human ones. As early as 1883, a congressional committee
concluded that “[t]he present system of laws seems to invite frauds.” As one author later
summarized that committee’s conclusion, “the impossibility of purchasing, in a straightforward, honest way from the Government either timber or timber-bearing lands” was
the principal cause of the timber depredations and frauds.49 In the midst of the Oregon
land fraud scandal, the editor of the American Lumberman, James Defebaugh,
succinctly summarized the key problem with all of the land laws when he wrote that
160 acres “is hardly adequate for the establishment of a lumber manufacturing
operation.”50 Even Puter himself attributed the frauds to legal barriers to acquiring
Oregon’s land and resources.51 Prominent historian Vernon Carstensen agreed that a
combination of human frailties and systemic failures were to blame; he wrote, in 1963,
that “the alienation of the public land exhibits much human cunning and avarice, but in
many instances what was called fraud represented local accommodation to the rigidities
and irrelevance of the laws.”52
In that vein, Edward H. Harriman’s apparent refusal in 1903 to sell his railroad
empire’s land holdings seemed yet another barrier to Oregon’s economic development.
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However, while the cessation in sales precipitated the 1908 lawsuit, the many sales the
railroad made prior to 1903 in violation of the homestead clause served as its legal
justification. Not only did the Oregon & California ignore that provision in its disposal
of lands, but government officials and the public had also neglected it prior to 1904.
Early in that year, however, the Oregonian published a notice of an identical homestead
clause in a 1969 charter and land grant to the Coos Bay Wagon Road Company for the
construction of a military road from Coos Bay to Roseburg in southern Oregon.53 When
the Oregon & California’s Land Agent, George Andrews, saw the notice, railroad
officials became concerned that it was only a matter of time for the clause in the Oregon
& California’s grant also to be discovered. Andrews thus wrote to the Southern Pacific’s
chief counsel for advice as to whether to keep silent or whether to help the Coos Bay
company to defend its grant.54 The response was not to get involved but to watch for
changes in circumstances.55 As Andrews and other railroad officials feared, railroad
opponents soon discovered the Oregon & California’s homestead clause and used it in
its effort to compel the company to sell the remainder of its grant at an amount far less
than market value.56
Interestingly, the discovery of the homestead clause resuscitated a decades-old
legal controversy. Potentially, if the Southern Pacific could claim to be a successor of
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one of the two “Oregon Central” corporations (the so-called “East Side” and “West
Side” companies) of the 1860s, and if it could show that its predecessor “Oregon
Central” entity legally availed itself of the original 1866 grant, then it might not be
beholden to the homestead clause contained in the 1869 grant. In 1907, publisher and
historian Leslie M. Scott recognized that issue’s potential importance. After the Oregon
Historical Quarterly published rival first-person accounts from two surviving members
of the “Oregon Central” companies, Joseph Gaston and Samuel A. Clark, Scott wrote
to the journal’s editor, Frederick G. Young, a professor of sociology and economics at
Eugene. Scott argued that the Oregon & California’s predecessor was the “East Side”
company, and that such company could not have acquired a vested interest under the
1866 grant. He also acknowledged that he was not an unbiased historian regarding the
matter. Rather, he admitted, “these historical conclusions of mine have been but
accessories to my real purpose in studying into the railroad controversy,” namely “to
convince myself that the Southern Pacific is bound to observe the terms of the act of
April 10, 1869, in selling the lands yet retained from the grant.”57
An anti-conservation impulse fueled the opposition to Harriman and his policies.
Indeed, while historians have questioned Harriman’s motives in ordering the
termination of land sales, Oregon residents fully believed his conservationist rationale.
And this was the primary reason they opposed the Oregon & California’s retention of
lands. Harriman’s explanation of his railroad’s new policies in Sacramento in 1907
enraged a wide cross-section of the public, particularly in the affected localities of
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Oregon. Harriman defended the company’s withdrawal as not being motivated by
speculation. Rather, he stated, the railroad would hold “those lands [as necessary] to
protect [the people] in the future.”58 His view of protecting Oregonians was in ensuring
the railroad maintained an adequate supply of timber through retaining a “reserve” so
that nobody in the future could “accuse [the company] of wasting the resources which
we had at our command.”59 His use of the word “reserve” was especially problematic.
While the opposition against Harriman and the Oregon & California undoubtedly fed
off a populist distrust of railroads as malevolent monopolies that threatened to hold local
populations hostage to their economic whims,60 people also linked Harriman to what
they saw as an equally menacing force: the conservation movement. In the weeks
following his 1907 speech at Sacramento, the Oregonian accused Harriman of desiring
“to make a reserve out of the whole of Oregon.” In fact, said the paper, “he counts it his
reserve now.” 61
The Oregonian questioned not just Harriman’s motivations, but also those of all
who purported to be concerned with conservation: “this state is plastered from one end
to the other with timber speculators in syndicates and as individuals. All pretend to be
saving for the nation a wood supply. The truth is they are keeping out settlement and
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maintaining a wilderness in order at some future day to gratify their lust for wealth.” 62
The Oregonian believed that the state needed, above all, “the clearing up of forest land”
near the railroads so that it could “be used for agriculture and for sustaining a larger
population.”63 To the people along the Oregon & California line, whether Harriman
epitomized the speculator or the conservationist was immaterial, as the conservationist
was merely a new form of speculator. Both were seen as equally threatening to the rapid
development of the region.
Oregon residents made their anti-conservation views known through their
political opposition to forest reserves. One person involved in real estate, insurance, and
mines, Frederick R. Mellis, wrote to Chamberlain in July of 1903 with his opposition to
a proposed forest reserve in Grant County. According to Mellis, the federal government
“seem[ed] to have gone ‘forest reserve mad.’”64 He linked the establishment of reserves
with taking lands away from Oregon residents. “Every few weeks,” he wrote, “there is
an anouncement [sic] from Washington that some other unfortunate section of this state
has been discovered, where divorce proceedings would prove beneficial to Oregon.”65
He also questioned the integrity of agents sent to the state to survey lands and to
recommend which should be reserved: “it all depends on the report of inspectors who
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in my opinion are not sent here for the purpose of making an unbiased statement of
conditions as they find them, but to make converts for the governments [sic] policy.”66
A substantial part of Mellis’ concern came from a misunderstanding of both the
law of forest reserves and the physical geography of Oregon timberlands. Mellis seemed
to assume that mining would be prohibited from forest reserves, though the 1897
legislation first providing for the management of reserves explicitly extended mining
laws to the reserves.67 He also argued that the land was more valuable to farmers in the
valley after being deforested, despite all of the evidence of the exponential rise in value
of timberlands, the costs associated in clearing the timber, and the unsuitability of the
soils and terrain to agriculture.68 He insisted,
this land was worth absolutely nothing until the prospector came along
and demonstrated its value for mining. It will again be worth nothing if
the miner is harrassed [sic] by the government and driven away. The
farmer in the valley will gain nothing by government protection of trees,
for the rapid growth of brush where the trees have been cut off, prevents
the snow from quick melting, far better than where the trees are permitted
to stand.69
The willful ignorance of Oregonians to physical and economic realities would continue
for decades. Unfortunately, it would also impact federal policy.
Mellis claimed to represent the views of not just himself, but the entire mining
industry, when he asserted that “every miner interested in the section affected by the
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proposed reserve, is bitterly and unqualifiedly opposed to it.”70 Indeed, it was not just
miners that opposed the reserves, as Oregonians assembled all across western Oregon
to protest additional reserves. In May of 1905, for example, a group wrote to Governor
Chamberlain claiming to represent the interests of “certain citizens” in the town of Tory
in Wallowa County, who had assembled in a mass meeting “for the purpose of
considering the most expeditious means of getting portions of [two townships] now
included in the Walla Walla reserve restored to settlement.”71 Regarding federal forest
policy, they wrote the following in support of their petition: “We understand the forestry
act [sic] to define that land more suitable for Agricultural purposes than for timber shall
not be included in reserves, and there is no question but that the land is equal to any in
the state. Hoping you will be able to consider this matter favorably.”72
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Part of the effort to force the Oregon & California to sell its remaining lands was
for people actually to apply to purchase them. Beginning in 1907 and continuing for the
entire seven years of litigation, thousands of individuals filed applications with the
railroad company for the purchase of quarter sections. In 1907, as the political
movement to force the forfeiture of the land grant gained momentum, residents of
Oregon began “rushing into the rich timber country and gobbling it up.”

73

This

movement was apparently based on the government’s indications that, once individuals
offered to purchase lands at $2.50 an acre and were refused, they would then have
standing to sue the railroad to force such sales and would “have a pretty good case.”74
The Wall Street Journal reported “a frenzy of excitement” in Oregon, where “thousands
are leaving home and stampeding to the railroad land grants ... to force Harriman to
surrender” the land.75 By June of 1907, it was reported that “in many counties every
quarter section of the land held by the railroad has a claimant.”76
Although the government later used these claims as evidence that the land was
indeed capable of being settled under the homestead clause—contrary to the claims of
Harriman and his railroad—it appears that the vast majority were fraudulent. Upon
having examined the lands, Land Commissioner Brian A. McAllaster and the Oregon
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& California’s land office concluded that the lands covered by applications were all
valuable timberlands, including some of the most valuable of the entire grant.77 The
federal government later confirmed that most applicants had no intention of
homesteading on their claims. In his extensive overview of the Oregon & California
land grant, David Maldwyn Ellis concluded that “these so-called settlers were
speculators or dummies for speculators who hoped to make good their title to valuable
timberlands at a nominal sum.”78 Indeed, “practically all” of the almost fifteen thousand
applications to buy land from the railroad company during this time period, according
to Ellis, “were speculative in character,” a fact that was revealed over the next decade
as the Department of Justice convicted nine professional locators, each representing
several hundred applicants, for fraud in connection with these purported applications
for purchase and actual settlement.79
As with other frauds, the process was simple. Typically, some person, usually
one claiming to be the attorney or agent of each applicant, came into the office with
anywhere from five to a hundred applications, and for each one, he presented the
application and tendered four hundred dollars, only to have the application rejected and
the process repeated. In nearly all cases the blanks used by the applicants were printed
forms.80 Generally, the applicants paid a locator or attorney fifty dollars or more to file
the application and submit the payment on their behalf, with the agreement that they
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pay the $2.50 per acre whenever the lawsuit was finally determined, and often with the
additional agreement for the applicant to sell the locator the land at an agreed price per
thousand feet of stumpage, with this “agreed price” often being about one-half the
timber's market value.81
The lawsuit was tinged with irony. Inasmuch as the railroad’s policies thwarted
development, the lawsuit only added to the problem. In short, it not only forced the
railroad to extend its suspension of land sales due to the clouding of title, but also caused
the railroad to cease cutting or permitting others to cut timber growing on its unsold
lands for fear it would be held liable if the land were declared forfeited.82 After
McAllaster took over as the land commissioner for the Southern Pacific system in 1908,
for instance, he did not make any sales of “any consequence” during the entire duration
of the lawsuit. Most of the deeds he executed during those years were in completion of
contracts outstanding prior to the lawsuit.83
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Given his position with the Southern Pacific and his experience as a long-time
employee of the Union Pacific, McAllaster was in a unique position to be able to
compare the western land-grant railroads’ seemingly divergent policies towards their
land grants. As McAllaster explained, the policy of the Union Pacific “was always to
induce settlement by every means possible, for the reason that settlement means
building up the country and traffic for the road.”84 Similarly, according to McAllaster,
the policies of the Southern Pacific system were along the same lines, at least for as long
as he had been affiliated with the companies. The only reason that the Oregon &
California was not making more sales, McAllaster insisted, was the lawsuit itself. The
railroad’s policy, he claimed, “would have been to have offered the lands for sale, had
it not been for the fact that this suit had been instituted.”85 The primary inducement for
settlement was the long-term contract, and this was infeasible given the uncertainty of
titles.86
McAllaster insisted that “but for this suit,” he would have proceeded to secure
his examination of the land, to determine valuations, and to make sales of the land as
opportunity offered. In support, McAllaster pointed to the fact that other Southern
Pacific lands, also under his jurisdiction but not subject to the lawsuit, had begun to be
advertised for sale and that a “considerable area of land” had actually been sold in the
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previous year. He claimed he would have followed the same policy with reference to
lands in Oregon actually capable of settlement, but the lawsuit made such a policy
impossible.87
But little of the land was even amenable to settlement. At trial, Eberlein
summarized the general nature of the remaining grant lands. Of the remaining 2,200,292
acres, the cruisers’ reports showed 1,496,640 acres covered with timber and unsuitable
for agriculture and an additional 703,652 acres of grazing land unsuitable for
agriculture, leaving only 7320 acres that might be used for agricultural purposes. Even
that small amount of acreage suitable for agriculture was less than ideal, according to
Eberlein, because it “consist[ed] of small isolated tracts, many of them remote from
transportation and settlements, and scattered in small bodies in different places
throughout the whole extent of the grant, along creek bottoms, and on hillsides.”88 Thus,
“they are not easily saleable because more lands may be had and demand does not equal
supply.”89 Of the timberlands, Eberlein estimated that about a quarter-million acres
could be reduced to conditions suitable for agriculture by clearing the ground of timber
and stumps, but the expense of doing so would exceed the resulting value of the land.
The remainder of the grant consisted of 150,000 acres of “waste land”—land of steep
hillsides and rocky cliffs not timbered and not fit for agriculture or grazing.90 The lands
ranged in value, according to McAllaster, from ten to a hundred dollars an acre. This he
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determined based on the amount of timber found on the land, as measured in the number
of thousand feet board measure, the value of which ranged from seventy-five cents to
two dollars per thousand feet based on the kind and character of the timber, and its
location and accessibility to transportation.91
Developments on the ground perhaps provided the best evidence for the
unsuitability of lands to the sort of land use Congress envisioned in requiring that the
Oregon & California’s lands be sold according to the homestead clause. Even the
director of Booth-Kelly, Robert A. Booth, testified that most of the pine grew in granite
soils, which had little value once the timber was removed. While some of the granite
soils were being cleared, offered for sale, and sold by 1912, it still had not been
demonstrated that the lands could effectively produce vegetables, particularly without
the additional expenditure of adding irrigation works, the costs of which remained
prohibitively high.92 In fact, in all of his work in the railroad’s land department since he
was first employed in 1889, F. A. Elliott could not remember a single instance where
the railroad sold a quarter section to a person who then actually made a home and a
living on that acreage.93 The same was apparently true on the even sections within the
grant, as Homer D. Angell, a surveyor for the railroad and the government, observed
that “lands acquired by homestead from the government on the timbered areas are never
occupied for any appreciable period after title has been acquired.”94 In many cases, those
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who attempted to establish homesteads on these lands failed. Elliott noted that the few
improvements existing on these lands in the 1880s had, by the first decade of the
twentieth century, “grown up to brush.”95
As for timberlands, the trial also corroborated Harriman’s insistence that such
lands were being held by lumber companies for speculative purposes rather than for
development. As Eberlein explained, the railroad's prior policy of selling all lands
cheaply only encouraged speculation. Such a policy made the holding of such lands less
expensive and, therefore, also made it more profitable for the companies to hold them.
Indeed, this was the chief reason why Booth-Kelly and others “wanted to buy very
cheap” from the railroad.96 Eberlein testified at trial that the railroad “tried this
experiment for years of disposing of timber lands to whoever would come for them and
let them cut out what they wanted and practically at their own price.… [T]he net result
of that was that the Railroad Company sold timber, standing timber, merchantable
timber, for less than twenty cents a thousand feet on the average. I believed, and so
recommended, that the selling of timber at such very low prices up to the present time
had but one effect,” that is “to tie the timber up.” Quite simply, “it was more profitable
to hold it than it was to manufacture it.”97
The reason for not selling to speculators was that doing so had the effect of
“tying up timber land for an indefinite time.” This had indeed been the pattern on the
Oregon & California lands in Oregon that the railroad had sold since 1898. Only a “very,
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very small fraction” of these lands, by Eberlein’s calculation, “ha[d] ever been milled.”
Instead, such lands were “held for the rise,” meaning that the land could be carried so
long as the annual increases in the value of the timber was more than the cost of interest
and taxes. And the annual increases after 1898 were certainly sufficient for the land to
be profitably held. Because the increase in the value of timberlands was “quite marked”
after Booth-Kelly’s purchase of Oregon & California’s lands in 1898, that company cut
“very, very little” of its more than seventy thousand acres even by 1912.98
Lest the anti-speculator rationale be considered a pretext, Eberlein also provided
evidence that the Oregon & California would in fact consider sales of timberlands if
shown not to be for speculative purposes. In cases not involving demonstrated
speculators such as the Weyerhaueser or Booth-Kelly interests, the land department
made determinations regarding the intent of the applicants on a case-by-case basis. In
one instance, an individual by the name of Mrs. Potter Palmer applied for several
thousand acres southwest of Eugene near the McKenzie River. Eberlein and Harriman
met with Palmer in New York and Eberlein had the land cruised. Her sons, who were
involved with Michigan timber interests, were interested in the land.99
The deal ultimately fell through, but not because of the railroad’s unwillingness
to sell timberlands whatsoever. Rather, it was because it became clear that the purchase
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was for speculation rather than for “any immediate use at all.”100 Eberlein deduced that
Palmer’s application was for speculative purposes from the railroad's examination of it
combined with conversations with the applicant—as was normal practice. Eberlein later
explained the process: “Well, you can tell sometimes from the location of the land. It is
queer but it is the fact. And you can tell very frequently by your conversations, your
conversations with people, what they propose to do with the land.” In that case, “the
cruising was done as rapidly as possible” and the report of the cruisers was sent on to
New York about the same time that Eberlein relocated there. The report was typical in
that it included the character of the land, the character of the timber, the classification
of it, and the value of it.101 While Palmer's initial application was for a relatively small
body of timber which was capable of being used for a small milling operation, Palmer
revealed during their second and final conversation that she wanted to purchase all of
the timber in “about six townships down the east side of the grant” close to the BoothKelly holdings, a statement from which Eberlein deduced she had “no immediate
intention … to make use of them,” even without having cruised that timber.102 As
Eberlein explained, “anybody that comes in and wants to buy all the timber in six
townships of land … [has] no immediate intention of doing anything with it,” as had
been “borne out in the case of every large purchase,” including purchases made by
Booth-Kelly.103
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Accordingly, Eberlein's policy was that timberlands should be sold, but only
with covenants requiring their use and not to parties with already large holdings.
Eberlein proposed that any sales of timberlands at such low prices include a covenant
requiring that “some kind of use [be] made of it industrially” rather than allowing it to
be “tied up,” which had the effect of “strangling industry” as well as preventing the
entry of any competing railroad.104 He argued against “augment[ing] any more large
holdings,” because such sales would “limit the number of operators in the state” and
would further restrict competition. His recommendations were, thus, at least partly
based on the view that “small mill men should have a chance and not be compelled to
go to these large holders and get at a large price what they needed for their mills.”105
Eberlein’s justification for the Oregon & California not selling to large timber
interests may seem disingenuous, since the proposed alternative appeared to be for the
railroad to hold such lands itself. In Eberlein’s assessment, however, it was better for
Oregon to have the railroad hold onto the land rather than sell it to speculators because
the railroad had no intention of holding on to it indefinitely “for the rise.” Eberlein felt
that the holding of tens of thousands of acres by Booth-Kelly posed a menace to
Oregon's development not posed by the railroad's holding of over two million acres,
since the railroad's interests in disposing of the land were consistent with the interests
of “this whole body politic.”106 In other words, “there can be no throttling of industry
that does not injure the railroad, and there can be no expansion of industry without
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benefiting both the state and the railroad.” Those truths were “self-evident,” at least to
Eberlein.107
Also, Eberlein argued that the railroad could not have “tied up the country” even
if it had desired to do so because of its ownership being limited to odd sections. As he
explained, whereas other large holders were able to “body up their timber … and make
a complete monopoly and … limit output,” the railroad, with its ownership of alternate
sections, could not do so as long as there were intervening lands in private ownership.108
Large purchasers like Booth-Kelly and Weyerhaueser intended to acquire both railroad
lands and the intervening even-numbered sections, something the railroad never
intended to do and was legally incapable of doing.109
Booth-Kelly officials disagreed. Booth, for instance, testified that preventing the
occupation of lands would “retard the growth in a general way and prevent the normal
increase of population.”110 The impact arguably went beyond the railroad’s lands, given
the checkerboard pattern of land ownership. Booth contended that where a large portion
of lands are held in alternate sections by a single proprietor, be it a lumber interest or
railroad, that proprietor exerts a great influence over the market value of the intervening
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lands: “if the odd sections are held by one concern there can be no large grouping of
lands, and without the grouping or continuous ownership the milling industry cannot be
profitably carried on.”111 Booth further argued that the retention of lands allowed the
railroad to maintain and entrench its monopoly, even though it owned only alternate
sections. He explained that the ownership of odd sections not only allowed the railroad
to remove timber from its own lands and ship the timber over its own lands, but also
allowed the railroad to require owners of even sections to do the same.112 Booth
acknowledged, however, that the railroad’s policy had no impact upon the settlement of
intervening lands.113
Another Booth-Kelly official, Dixon, laid out a similar argument before
Congress in 1908, as he sought the forfeiture of the railroad grant. He contended that
the removal of odd sections from sale made it impossible for any lumber interest to
accumulate the large, unbroken tracts necessary for lumbering operations, as well as to
build the logging roads necessary to transport lumber. Rather than owning piecemeal
sections of timberland, “the manufacturer” he emphasized, “must have access to timber
in bodies more or less solid and united in character.”114 Regarding Booth-Kelly’s
purchase of seventeen thousand acres near Wendling, he testified that by 1908, this town
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had grown from a scattering of families to six hundred to eight hundred people emerged
along this seventeen-mile branch line, along which there had been constructed ten
sawmills. These sawmills employed about three hundred men. This “little valley,”
according to Dixon, was “alive with the hum of industry and has developed beyond the
dream of those who were familiar with it ten years ago.”115 While there had been merely
a half-dozen families within a radius of five miles prior to Booth-Kelly’s purchase and
its construction of mills, the construction of milling operations had made settlement for
farming possible, in that it appreciated the value of farm land in the area and provided
employment for men to support their families.116 Dixon hypothesized that development
and settlement such as what had occurred at Wendling would not have been possible “if
the mill owners had not been able to buy grant lands and had not felt that they could
purchase” additional lands in the future as needed.117
Regardless of developments on the ground, the federal government appeared to
have the law on its side in its lawsuit against the Oregon & California. In 1913, the
district court for the District of Oregon ruled in the government’s favor by decreeing
the unsold grant lands forfeited and quieting the government’s title to such lands. The
railroad, however, appealed this decision on several legal grounds, including that the
homestead clause, rather than being a condition subsequent justifying forfeiture, was
merely a set of restrictive and unenforceable covenants, and alternatively that the
government had waived its right to enforcement of the provision through its years of
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acquiescence. In delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, Justice Joseph McKenna
agreed with the railroad that the homestead clause lacked the required technical
language to support forfeiture of land grant, in that it did not constitute a condition
subsequent touching the railroad’s property interest. However, he also disagreed with
the railroad’s contentions that the conditions were unenforceable. He held instead that
the grant’s conditions constituted both contractual covenants and laws and were, thus,
strictly enforceable.
As to the appropriate remedy, however, the Supreme Court agreed with the
railroad’s contention that the land invited “more to speculation than to settlement.”118 It
therefore declined to order the railroad to sell the remaining lands pursuant to the terms
of the grant or merely to enjoin the railroad from violating the grant any further. Instead,
apparently in recognition that the homestead clause was unworkable as applied to the
remaining grant lands, it enjoined the railroad from “any disposition of them whatever
or of the timber thereon, and from cutting or authorizing the cutting or removal of any
of the timber thereon,” and it directed Congress to provide by legislation for their
disposition in accordance with such policy as it may deem “fitting under the
circumstances.”119 In disposing of the lands, Congress was required to secure to the
railroad “all the value the granting acts conferred upon the railroads.”120
The Supreme Court’s opinion seemed to raise as many legal questions as it
answered, and members of Congress were left to debate what, in fact, Congress was
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permitted or required to do in its “disposition” of the lands. Members of Congress
expressed confusion as to whether they even had the power to revest title to the lands,
and testimony from attorneys only exacerbated the confusion. A fundamental legal issue
was whether the court intended for Congress to pass legislation which would supplant
what the court determined to be an unworkable system, or whether it merely allowed
for Congress to provide legislation to supplement the original grant with new
enforcement mechanisms. Unsurprisingly, legal experts disagreed regarding the proper
interpretation of the court’s opinion depending upon which side in the dispute they
represented.121
The issue of whether Congress was allowed to supplant the land grant or merely
supplement it manifested itself first in the debate over whether Congress had the power,
under the Supreme Court’s decision, to revest the Oregon & California’s titles in the
federal government. Attorneys for the Department of Justice repeatedly insisted that
Congress had the power to deal with the remaining grant lands in any way it deemed
appropriate, including the possible first step of revesting title to the lands, provided only
that it ensured the railroad company the full compensation to which it was entitled under
the grant. Justice Department attorney C. J. Smyth, for instance, declared without
reservation that the court settled the question of whether Congress had the power to
revest the remaining grant lands, in that it authorized Congress to dispose of them in
any way it deemed necessary. According to Smyth, disposing of them necessarily
required that Congress first revest them.122 Smyth further contended that Congress could
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“select any means that it pleases, whether it be the one authorizing or directing the
railroad to go on and make the sales, or one proceeding along the lines of the
Chamberlain bill, or in any other way that Congress may see fit. The only question is
what, in the judgment of Congress, is the best way to accomplish the end.”123
Not all concurred in the Department of Justice’s legal assessment, however.
Senator Irvine L. Lenroot, from Wisconsin, raised the possibility that, by giving
Congress the power “to provide … for [the lands'] disposition” rather than directly
giving Congress the power to dispose of them, the Supreme Court merely gave Congress
the authority to direct the Oregon & California as to the lands' disposition.124 Smyth and
his colleague, Stephen W. Williams, rejected this as a potential interpretation of the
opinion. Williams argued that Congress had the same authority to do directly with the
lands what it could do indirectly through the railroad; since it had authority to require
the railroad to sell the lands in certain quantities and prices, it also had the power to
revest and sell the lands under those same terms. In a corollary argument, Smyth
contended that if Congress lacked the authority to revest title to the lands and dispose
of them directly, then it would likely have the same difficulty in “disposing of the legal
title to the money” in excess of the $2.50-per-acre restriction, which would be the legal
effect of restricting the railroad to that price.125
Representative Hawley, who sponsored the bill authorizing the lawsuit in the
first place, disputed the Justice Department’s legal contentions regarding Congress’
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power to revest title. He argued that revestiture would amount to a “legislative
forfeiture, or a forcible entry of the land against the will of the company which has
received the land.”126 He, therefore, doubted whether the Supreme Court would sustain
any legislative act of revestiture, just as it had denied the government's claim for a
judicial forfeiture.127 This argument, however, was unpersuasive, as even Wisconsin
Representative Irvine Lenroot, who shared Hawley’s concern over the scope of
Congress’ power, flatly rejected Hawley’s contention. Lenroot reasoned that since a
forfeiture “always implies a wiping out of all the rights of grantees without
compensation,” Congress’ revesting of titles with full compensation to the railroad was
not legally analogous to a forfeiture, whether judicial, legislative, or otherwise.128
Undeterred, Hawley insisted that Congress' power was limited to enforcing the
provisions of the original grant or to amending the restrictions with the railroad
company's assent. Hawley indicated that a majority of lawyers with whom he had
spoken interpreted the Supreme Court's opinion as meaning that Congress should
supplement the existing law “to cause the lands to be sold under the terms of the original
grant.”129 The Court, in other words, did not intend for Congress to revest title pursuant
to a new policy, but rather “to see that that disposition ordained by the original act of
Congress is carried out.”130 Congress’ power, according to Hawley, was limited to
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providing a means to enforce the restrictive covenants—something the Court had
determined the original grants lacked. Specifically, the original grants failed to define
who should be considered “actual settlers,” such that the Court could not enforce the
covenants. Therefore, the Court, according to Hawley, left it to Congress only to
supplement the original grants with this definition to make the restrictions judicially
enforceable. Hawley recommended Congress integrate the definitions of “settlers” from
the Homestead Act. In addition to serving the purposes of the original grant and interests
of Oregonians in having the land developed and settled, this would also prevent any
further litigation, for the railroad, he reasoned, could not “complain that such legislation
is imposing an unexpected burden on it, because when it took the grant it took it with a
condition that the lands should be sold by it, and that would imply that they assumed
the burden of the sale of the lands.”131
If Congress did in fact have the power to revest title to the lands, the basis of
that authority had important legal ramifications. In his questioning of government
attorney Williams, Lenroot placed Congress’ authority to revest title to land on the
provision in the 1866 grant reserving for Congress the power “to alter, amend, or repeal”
the grant.132 However, he also noted that no such provision was contained in the 1870
grant, under which the railroad had acquired several hundred thousand acres. If that
provision in the 1866 grant was the basis of authority, he wondered if that then limited
Congress’ power to revest to those lands acquired under that grant. Williams shrugged
off this question with his assertion that Congress’ power to amend or repeal the land
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grants would exist even without such a provision; that the provision was essentially
superfluous. In support he cited the fact that the Supreme Court, in its lengthy opinion,
made no distinction between the land grants of 1866 and 1870. The grant, Williams
reasoned, as a law, could be amended or changed just as any other law: “Congress can
pass any law it sees fit, within its limitation, taking private property, provided only it
secures to the individual the full value that he had before.”133 General Counsel for the
Southern Pacific, J. P. Blair, contended that the government’s reserved right “to alter,
amend, or repeal” the grant—if that in fact was the basis of authority—was severely
limited. Citing to the Supreme Court’s opinion in the Sinking Fund cases,134 he argued
that Congress could not forfeit lands given to the railroad without making compensation,
could not make changes in the title created by the grant without the consent of the
railroad, could not take property the railroad had already acquired, and could not make
any alterations to the grant deemed unreasonable or inconsistent with the grant and act
of incorporation.135
Members of Congress and the lawyers who testified also realized that Congress
arguably had the power to revest title to the grant lands under its broad power of eminent
domain. Relying upon this power, however, would trigger the requirement the taking be
for a “public use,” the traditional basis for that sovereign power.136 In analyzing this
issue, representatives conflated “public use” with the seemingly broader “public
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purpose.” Even so, some members of Congress still rightly raised the issue of whether
taking the lands to sell them to settlers and lumber companies qualified even as a public
purpose. Justice Department attorney Smyth answered this question in the affirmative,
the public purpose of such an act being “the reclamation of these forest lands and the
settlement of the country.”137 He argued that since the purpose of the grants in the first
place was a public purpose, and that sales of land to settlers and timber to private
companies would only further that original purpose, then these actions must also qualify
as fulfilling that public purpose. Hawley, who argued against revesting the railroad’s
grant at all, disagreed, arguing that “taking the lands from one private party or person
to be disposed of to another private person” relying upon the theory of eminent domain
“must fail.”138 Congress did not explicitly resolve this issue.
Regardless of whether Congress chose to proceed on the theory of eminent
domain, it was required to provide to the railroad compensation for “all the value”
conferred by the grant. Not only did the Fifth Amendment require it for all eminentdomain actions,139 but the Supreme Court’s opinion also directly required it, as did prior
precedent regarding amendments to land grants. The value of the lands was quite large,
with one estimate, as of 1912, placing it at over thirty million dollars.140 The value of
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specific lands varied greatly. Booth, for one, estimated the value of the timber in the
best quarter section of Lane County to be about one-dollar per thousand board feet on a
stumpage basis, and the value of that land to be about ten thousand dollars.141 Dixon
agreed, estimating the maximum value of any quarter section to be between eight and
ten thousand dollars. Dixon knew, however, of one case where a lumber company, the
Nehalem River Lumber Company, the owner of a quarter section in Tillamook County,
had submitted a price of forty thousand dollars for the timber on that quarter section,
and that price did not include the title to the land for reforesting or for any other useful
purpose. That land, he explained, was of a different character from the remaining
Oregon & California lands and was nearby a sawmill on the Pacific Railway and
Navigation Company’s line.142
Arguably, though, the law only required Congress to compensate the railroad for
the value of its privileges and rights under its land grant, not the value of the lands
themselves, since the railroad arguably did not “own” the lands in the full legal sense.
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That argument, however, was seemingly undercut by the government’s own treatment
of the land grant for tax purposes. The lands of the Oregon & California, despite the
grant’s restriction that the railroad could not receive more than $2.50 per acre, were in
many cases assessed at a much higher value. According to J. B. Eddy, a tax and right of
way agent for the Southern Pacific Company and the Oregon & California, the company
never objected to a valuation above $2.50 per acre as one would expect if that were
indeed the limit of the company's interest in the lands. There was no intent whatsoever
to keep the assessments down to that point. Instead, the railroad and county assessors
proceeded as if the railroad were the “absolute owner” of the lands, without reference
to the grant's homestead clause.143 Still, there seemed to be a consensus building in
Congress that it need only compensate the railroad for the $2.50 per acre it was entitled
to receive from purchasers.
However, even assuming the railroad had the right only for the value of the rights
and privileges to which it was entitled under the grant, that value potentially included
not just the $2.50 per acre it could receive for the lands through sales, but also a
guarantee that the lands be developed or settled. In testifying before the joint committee,
Williams stated his own view that the act revesting title to the lands should also provide
for their disposition to private developers and settlers. This was based on his
interpretation that the grant “contemplated that the grant should be settled and
developed, so that the railroad company would acquire business and the revenue from
such business.”144 He did not, however, go so far as to contend that such was required
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of Congress, but merely that “there may be some doubt as to the validity of an act of
Congress which would merely give the railroad company its money value and nothing
else.”

145

He thus recommended taking the safe route to avoid litigation. Another

government attorney, Smyth, however, was less equivocal in his pronouncement that
placing some or all of the lands in a reserve would not harm the legal rights of the
railroad, but even he argued against such an action from a policy standpoint, stating that
such an action would take the lands out of the taxable property and would constitute “a
great hardship to the state.”146
Beyond these legal questions to what Congress could do, there remained the
important issue of what Congress should do, given its legal options. In making that
decision, some in Congress insisted that the lands were still amenable to the type of
settlement that Congress originally contemplated, despite all the evidence to the
contrary. Representative Hawley, for instance, claimed to have received “a large number
of letters from men ... stating that there have been people living on these lands, with
good houses and good improvements, who settled on the lands and made their
improvements in good faith and are living there and have been making a home for a
number of years on the land.”147 “All through the grant,” he insisted, “with the exception
of comparatively small areas, there are farms of agricultural lands.”148 Representative
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Clifton N. McArthur, also from Oregon, however, disputed Hawley’s claims. He cited
a joint investigation conducted by the Interior, Justice, and Post Office departments,
which found that “all but a comparatively small percentage” of the thousands of
applications for the purchase of land from the railroad were “secured by so-called
locators,” and that there were “very few, if any, actual settlers on these lands” as of
1916.149
The proclaimed interests of Oregonians weighed heavily on Congress’
deliberations. Immediately after the Supreme Court delivered its opinion, Oregon’s
governor called together delegates in Salem to discuss the matter. The conference
attendees resolved that Congress should “enact laws defining and settling who shall be
considered actual settlers ... and what shall be considered an actual settlement, and
requiring the [railroad] to perform the terms and conditions of the [grant] and to sell and
dispose of said lands according to the true intent and purpose of [the grant].”150 They
also declared their “unalterable” opposition to the creation or enlargement of any forest
reserves in Oregon. They proposed, instead, that Congress provide for the immediate
sale of grant lands under the conditions of the homestead clause, while also protecting
the process from fraud.151 Despite the appearance of unanimity, however, McArthur
contended that Oregonians were in fact divided on how the lands should be handled. He
cited the fact that, immediately after the conference passed its initial resolutions, it
passed a new set of resolutions directing the conference chairman to form a committee
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to negotiate a settlement with the Southern Pacific that could then be presented to
Congress, the apparent purpose being to avoid a prolonged dispute above all.152
The politicians from Oregon largely followed suit in arguing that Congress
provide for actual settlement of the lands. Senator George Chamberlain, who had moved
from the governorship to the Senate in 1909, drafted the bill that largely dominated the
debate in Congress. He reported that he had realized after Harriman's speech at the
Irrigation Congress in 1907 “the importance to the people of the State to have these
lands brought under actual settlement by sale or otherwise so as to assist the State in its
development and in the purposes of government.”153 Though he claimed to be “nearly
alone in the West ... in defending the policies of the Forestry Service” and to have been
“one of the original advocates of that for the welfare of the people, with Mr. Pinchot,”
he argued that no more lands in Oregon, except those deemed necessary to protect water
supplies, should be added to the forest reserves.154 Representative Hawley purported to
relay his constituents’ demands “that no part of the lands be placed in the forest reserves;
that all of these lands be made available for development under proper conditions; that
all lands capable of any agricultural use be disposed of for that purpose; that the just
rights of the State and counties of Oregon be recognized and provided for; that provision
be made for the payment of accrued taxes; and that all of these lands remain on the tax
rolls.”155 Finally, Representative McArthur insisted that what Oregonians wanted most
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were “actual settlers, people who will go there and make homes in the wilderness …
and build up communities that will be of material benefit to the development of the
state.”156
A report submitted by the Department of Agriculture, as well as the testimony
of department officials, belied the assertions of the Oregon delegation. They not only
confirmed the Oregon & California’s assessment of the unsuitability of the grant lands
for settlement, but also implicitly vindicated both the railroad’s policy of selling
timberlands in large tracts prior to 1903 and its effective termination of land sales after
that date. The department considered “some” of the lands to be agricultural, but it
determined that “most of it was heavily timbered.”157 Furthermore, just as the railroad
had found it untenable to sell heavily timbered lands in 160-acre legal subdivisions, the
department’s report criticized any attempt to limit land sales to small legal subdivisions
as “not consistent with the natural requirements of the industry.”158 Assistant Forester
William B. Greeley testified that limiting sales by “any legal subdivision” would “likely
lead to mismanagement,” and he encouraged Congress to leave it to the Interior or
Agriculture departments to make sales in “in accordance with the topography—
normally by watershed—and the natural logging factors.”159 He indicated that even
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sales in excess of twenty thousand acres could be justified. Finally, the Department of
Agriculture confirmed the contention of railroad officials that there was little market for
the immediate consumption of timber, and that any purchases of timberlands would be
at very low prices and only for speculative purposes. Based on western Oregon’s market
position, the department reported that “it [was] obvious that vast quantities of privately
owned timber must be held for many decades before it can be marketed” for
consumption. Thus, the department recommended holding the lands from sale, except
in the few cases where local mills demanded stumpage, until such time—possibly even
decades into the future—that the market conditions considerably changed.160
Unfortunately, Congress disregarded many of the observations and
recommendations of the Department of Agriculture in its Chamberlain-Ferris Act of
1916. This act revested the remaining grant lands in the federal government and
provided for their sale as well as the disposal of the timber upon them. Rather than
providing for the efficient management of the forests pursuant to conservationist
principles, as government foresters had advised, it directed the secretary of interior to
sell off the timber to the highest bidder, at which time the timberlands could be
reclassified as agricultural land and opened for settlement. Moreover, Congress
disregarded Secretary David F. Houston’s recommendations that any sales of
timberlands be in large tracts and not according to legal subdivision when it instead

160

Oregon & California Hearings of 1916, 220-22. Of course, representatives from the
Forest Service differed from the railroad’s policy in one important respect: it pushed for all of
the timberlands to be held in public ownership under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service. Even
this, however, was not based on a distrust of the railroad’s motives, but rather on a concern that
carrying the lands would be too heavy a burden for any private party to carry. See Oregon &
California Hearings of 1916, 236-37.

274
provided that each legal subdivision be offered for sale separately before any larger sales
are made. Finally, Congress failed to heed the department’s advice regarding the lack
of an immediate market for standing timber and the extent to which the immediate sale
of timber would depress its price, when it designated that proceeds from land and timber
sales in excess of the amount owed to the railroad would adequately compensate the
Oregon counties for tax revenues lost as a result of the land’s being ordered forfeited in
1913 and ultimately transferred to public ownership in 1916.161 Sure enough, sales were
slow, the system Congress created proved unworkable, and the counties were on the
verge of economic collapse in 1926, when Congress approved a loan to the counties in
the amount of lost tax revenues and passed a new formula for distributing the revenues
from the lands.162
*******
With its 1916 legislation, Congress exchanged a land regime in which the
Oregon & California had demonstrated its interest in managing the lands for long-term
sustainability for one that perpetuated the federal government’s nineteenth-century
approach to public lands. All of this occurred despite the concerns expressed over the
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prior generation regarding the exhaustibility of the nation’s natural resources and the
waste and possible irreversible damage which had resulted (and would continue to
result) from the government’s policies favoring privatization and rapid exploitation.
President Calvin Coolidge would later complain about the land-grant railroads’ ability
to use the law as an instrument not only to insulate themselves from prosecution for
their supposed subversions of federal land-grant policies, but also to secure additional
benefits contrary to the interests of the public and of the government in efficiently
managing the nation’s natural resources.163 However, the experiences of the Oregon &
California during the first decades of the twentieth century provide a far different
narrative. While certainly corroborating Coolidge’s lament that law had operated to
inhibit effective management of natural resources, the Oregon & California’s
experiences show, at least in this important instance, that it was the government, and
not the railroad, that used outmoded laws as instruments to block conservationist
advances, and it was the railroad, and not the democratically-elected branches of
government, that sought cooperation with the federal bureaucracy to implement
management regimes which would ensure sustainable economic development, even if
at the cost of short-term gains.
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EPILOGUE
Almost a century after Congress forfeited a portion of the Northern Pacific’s
land grant in the Pacific Northwest, a congressional committee again considered taking
action to assert the public’s interest in the benefits flowing from the land. The issue
arose as to whether Congress had the authority to forfeit the remaining land grant and,
if so, whether it should do so. (The Northern Pacific, for its part, no longer existed. In
1967, it merged with the Great Northern, the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy, and other
subsidiaries to form the Burlington Northern.) Prompting the renewed attention to the
land grant was a plan the stockholders of the Burlington Northern approved in 1981.
The plan was to create a new company to hold the land and mineral assets of the railroad
empire, unencumbered from the railroad’s debts. To some, this seemed to violate the
terms of the 1864 legislation granting the Northern Pacific its massive land subsidy.
Specifically, the legislation arguably required that the land grant be used to support
railway functions, something that would no longer occur if a separate company held the
land assets. Accordingly, Congress formally asked a legislative attorney for the
American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service, itself a branch of the
Library of Congress, to analyze the legal issues pertaining to the Burlington Northern’s
plan, specifically whether it had the authority to do so and, if not, what legal remedies
Congress had.1
In her report to Congress in October 1981, the assigned legislative attorney,
Pamela Baldwin, concluded that the various pieces of legislation relating to land grants,
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including the Northern Pacific’s, and the hundreds of judicial opinions interpreting them
failed to provide an answer to the legal questions presented. However, she also
concluded that Congress could exercise its power to amend or even repeal laws to clarify
the legal uncertainties on its own. Additionally, she advised that Congress could file a
lawsuit against the Burlington Northern and allow the judiciary to resolve legal
ambiguities. The trouble with this approach, she surmised, was that courts were
unpredictable. “A court could determine,” she wrote, “either that any obligation on the
part of the railroad grantees had already been discharged, or that none existed, or that
there is no breach until the company seeks to abandon one of the lines specified in the
grants.”2 With this one run-on sentence, Baldwin perfectly encapsulated the
indeterminacy of law.
Baldwin assumed either Congress or the judiciary had the power to clarify, for
one last time, the serious legal issues relating to the Burlington Northern’s land estate.
For support, she cited to Congress’ 1908 legislation calling for a federal lawsuit to revest
the Oregon & California’s land grant and its condemnation of that company’s land in
1916. However, though Congress resolved certain issues relating to the Oregon &
California’s land grant with its 1916 legislation, it did so only while raising new
questions. Indeed, the “O&C Lands,” as locals still call them, have never stopped being
at the center of controversy.
From the perspective of these lands, the twentieth century ended much as it
began. In January 1987, Greenworld, an environmental advocacy group, fired the first
shot in what some have called the “Forest Wars” when it petitioned the Fish and Wildlife
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Service (FWS) to list the northern spotted owl as endangered under the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 (ESA).3 Passed with the purpose of conserving the ecosystems on
which imperiled species depend, the ESA provided for the listing of such species, upon
which the FWS was obligated to develop recovery plans for the species, in consultation
with the relevant states, and to ensure that no federal action would jeopardize the success
of that plan.4 Importantly, the statute required listing decisions to be made solely based
on scientific and commercial evidence of species viability, without any consideration of
economic consequences. In July of that year, the FWS acted on the petition and began
a status review of the subspecies’ viability. As part of that review, Dr. Mark Shaffer, the
agency’s expert on population viability, concluded that “continued old growth
harvesting is likely to lead to the extinction of the subspecies in the foreseeable future,”
a finding he thought “argue[d] strongly for listing the subspecies as threatened or
endangered at this time.”5 The FWS solicited peer reviews of Shaffer’s study, and all
agreed with his ultimate prognosis. Despite these findings, in December 1987, the FWS
issued its decision that listing the spotted owl was not warranted.
Conservation groups, including Greenworld, challenged the FWS’ decision in a
federal court in Seattle, Washington. Like the vast majority of judicial reviews of
administrative actions over the past several decades, the Administrative Procedure Act
3
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governed the court’s review. Congress passed that law in 1946 to answer the dilemma
that baffled jurists and administrators alike through the late-nineteenth century, namely
the relative roles of the executive bureaucracy and the judiciary in implementing and
enforcing statutory law (and hence in establishing new legal precedents).6 Congress
sided heavily with the bureaucracy in providing for courts to review administrative
factual findings and policy preferences only as to whether they were “arbitrary and
capricious.”7 Even with its narrow field of vision, however, the court saw enough to
overturn the FWS’ decision. Particularly, Judge Thomas Zilly, writing for the court,
criticized the FWS for ignoring expert opinions, including that of its own expert, on the
spotted owl’s population viability, and for failing to provide any factual or scientific
basis for its own conclusions. He thus ordered the agency to provide additional analysis
and to reconsider the petition in light of the court’s opinion.8
Less than two years after its initial decision not to list the spotted owl, the FWS
reversed itself in concluding that listing was indeed warranted, but that was not the end
of controversy. With its listing, finalized in June of 1990, the FWS declined to designate
any “critical habitat” for the species, deeming it “not determinable.”9 This sparked
another round of litigation before the same court and judge as before. Again, Judge Zilly
was limited in his inquiry to whether the agency’s decision was adequately supported—
whether it provided legitimate reasons and considered all relevant data. And again, he
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found the agency’s determination to be lacking. He found that the FWS “fail[ed] to
direct this Court to any portion of the administrative record which adequately explains
or justifies the decision not to designate critical habitat for the northern spotted owl.”10
He thus ordered the agency to reconsider designating critical habitat for the spotted owl
and to issue a final rule by the end of April 1991.11
As the deadline for the FWS’s critical habitat designation neared, the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM)12 adopted a management plan for protecting northern spotted
owl populations, while also providing for logging in their habitat.13 Called the “Jamison
Strategy,” this plan authorized timber sales totaling roughly 750 million board feet of
timber over the next two fiscal years. The BLM promulgated the plan without consulting
with the FWS to ensure it was “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of [the
northern spotted owl] or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [its critical]
habitat,” as the ESA required for all federal “agency actions” likely to affect the owl.14
The BLM contended that the plan did not itself constitute an “action” and instead
consulted with the FWS as to each individual timber sale. The problem with such an
approach, according to environmentalists, is that the tendency in reviewing each sitespecific action separately is to minimize or ignore the cumulative impacts of all the
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actions taken together. Thus, environmental groups once again sued to protect the
northern spotted owl, this time suing the BLM in federal court in Oregon for its failure
to consult with the FWS as to its Jamison Strategy. After district court Judge Robert
Jones found the BLM indeed violated the ESA and issued an injunction preventing
implementation of the plan, the BLM appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which agreed with Jones. The Ninth Circuit, in March 1992, enjoined the BLM from
entering into any of the 1991 timber sales until it completed the ESA’s formal
consultation process.15 The following January, Jones permanently enjoined all sales that
may affect the endangered owl.16
An agency is surely desperate when it is compelled to appeal to something called
the “God Squad” to undertake its desired action. That is where the BLM found itself
even before the Ninth Circuit’s upholding of Judge Jones’ opinion in 1992 and the
subsequent permanent injunction against all sales. In September 1991, the BLM
petitioned the secretary of interior to call together the “God Squad” (officially the
Endangered Species Committee (ESC)) to consider whether thirteen of its proposed
sales (covering over four-thousand acres) should be exempted from the ESA’s otherwise
strict mandates not to jeopardize listed species and the resulting harsh economic
impacts.17 Congress established the ESC in 1978 largely at the behest of the Tennessee
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Valley Authority, which sought to finish constructing a dam on the Little Tennessee
River, despite the FWS’s conclusion that it would jeopardize the viability of the
endangered snail darter.18
Once called to duty, the ESC’s task was simple. To grant an exemption, five of
seven members had to find the following conditions to be met: (1) that there are “no
reasonable and prudent alternatives” to the proposed action; (2) that the benefits “clearly
outweigh” those of alternative actions consistent with conserving the species at
question; (3) that the action is of “regional or national significance”; and (4) that neither
the agency nor the applicant has “made any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of
resources.”19 In this case, the ESC found such conditions satisfied and exempted thirteen
of the BLM’s proposed sales from the ESA.20
The ESC’s decision did not end the controversy, however. Environmental
groups challenged the granting of the exemption based on the BLM having allegedly
failed to comply with all the statutory requirements in availing itself of the exemption.
First, they contended that the BLM did not adequately consult with the FWS in the first
place, as Judge Jones and the Ninth Circuit had found. Second, they argued that the
BLM did not “previously prepare” an environmental impact statement assessing the
impacts upon endangered species and their critical habitats prior to seeking the
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exemption, as required. Third, they alleged numerous procedural defects in the ESC’s
consideration of the BLM’s petition, including the treatment of the proceedings as
rulemaking rather than as a more trial-like adjudication, thereby allowing for unofficial
contacts among committee members, interested parties, and others—including members
of the White House staff—throughout the decision-making process. Moreover,
environmental groups pointed to a conflict of interest (actually multiple conflicts of
interest) for Solicitor General Thomas Sansonetti, who was concurrently representing
the BLM in related litigation while also serving as counsel for the ESC and chief counsel
for the FWS.21 These irregularities led the Oregonian editorial board to observe that
President George H. W. Bush’s administration was “manipulating the input before a
federal hearings judge so the output will be favorable to the timber industry, irrespective
of the facts of the matter.”22 Shortly after a federal court granted the environmentalists’
request for an evidentiary hearing and, in so doing, agreed that the ESC’s decisions were
adjudicatory in nature, the BLM—by this time under the direction of President Bill
Clinton’s administration—withdrew its proposal to pursue the thirteen sales for which
it had sought the ESC exemptions in the first place. The agency also pledged not to sell
timber in the future except in strict accordance with the ESA.23
The Clinton administration then established an inter-agency task force to
develop a plan for managing all federal forests—including national forests and parks in
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addition to BLM lands—within the northern spotted owl’s range. Its work culminated
in the Northwest Forest Plan, which amended existing management plans for nineteen
national forests and seven BLM districts from northern California to Washington, in all
covering twenty-four million acres of federal land.24 Its goal was to protect the spotted
owl’s old-growth habitat while still allowing for a stable and sustainable timber industry
in the region. To protect the spotted owl and other species, it set aside over seven million
acres of old-growth forest as “late successional reserves” and over two million acres of
riparian areas as “riparian reserves.” To preserve the timber industry, it recognized about
four million acres of “matrix” lands where most of the timber harvests would occur.
Though this may seem to be a middle-ground compromise between environmental
protection and extractive uses, the conditions placed upon harvests even in the “matrix”
lands placed a substantial burden on the timber industry. Timber production plummeted
as a result. While in the late 1980s, the O&C Lands produced over four billion board
feet per year, in 2004, they produced less than 300 million, a ninety-three percent drop.25
Although the plan has been attacked since its inception, it for the most part remains
intact.26
Beyond the impacts on the regional timber industry, implementation of the
Northwest Forest Plan devastated county governments, including the eighteen counties
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encompassing the O&C Lands (“O&C Counties”). Since the federal government
revested the O&C Lands in 1916, these counties have been dependent upon federal aid
to make up for lost tax revenues. When the Chamberlain-Ferris Act of 1916 failed to
provide sufficient funds to protect the counties, Congress, in 1926, provided for a loan
to the counties from the general treasury to compensate them for the property taxes the
counties would have received had the federal government not revested the lands.
Congress also adjusted the formula for allocating revenues from timber sales to protect
the counties and local economies going forward.27 However, like its predecessor,
Congress’ new formula presumed timber revenues would ultimately be sufficient to
make up for lost taxes. It too proved unworkable. Congress, in 1937, replaced the
scheme with one that called for management of the lands for sustained yield and for the
protection of local communities and industries. It directed the BLM to allocate seventyfive percent of timber revenues to the O&C Counties, with the remaining twenty-five
percent going towards management of the lands.28 That formula worked well for the
counties, particularly as timber harvests increased drastically in the last half of the
twentieth century.
That all changed with the listing of the spotted owl and with the Northwest
Forest Plan. Counties lost not only in terms of the drastically reduced annual payments
from the federal government, but also in job and income losses due to the contraction in
the regional timber industry as well as others dependent upon the timber resource. In
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2000, Congress attempted to aid the O&C Counties by providing for annual payments
to the counties in an amount equal to the average of the three highest paying years
between 1986 and 1999.29 This program was not designed to be permanent but was
rather intended to give the counties an opportunity to diversify and to develop other
sources of revenue other than the federal government. It was thus set to expire after six
years of payments. However, Congress passed an emergency four-year extension in
2008 and another one-year extension in 2012.
Most of the O&C Counties remain desperately dependent upon federal land
revenue sharing and other payments in lieu of taxes. In early 2012, Members of
Congress Peter DeFazio, Greg Walden, and Kurt Schrader, all from Oregon, proposed
a new approach to managing the O&C Lands. They proposed dividing the lands into a
number of timber and conservation trusts. Conservation trust lands would be transferred
to the jurisdiction of the U.S. Forest Service and be managed pursuant to the Northwest
Forest Plan. Timber trust lands, on the other hand, while still being owned by the federal
government, would be managed by private boards of trustees for the benefit of the
counties and local economies. Their management directive would be to produce
“maximum sustained revenues in perpetuity for the O&C [C]ounties.” Some experts
have projected the proposed legislation would triple the amount of timber harvests from
O&C Lands, while also exempting them from federal environmental protections,
including the ESA’s consultation requirement.30
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For now, finding a management scheme consistent with the web of correlative
rights, expectations, and duties that have attached to the O&C Lands seems impossible.
Alas, it is a tangled web that law weaves. It remains inseparable from the land.

http://www.oregonlive.com/mapes/index.ssf/2015/03/aid_to_timber-dependent_oregon.html
(last accessed April 12, 2015).
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